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Abstract
The African Union (AU) established the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) in
2008 to identify escalating conflicts before they turned violent. Several studies underscore that
early warning signals are not always translated into prompt response decisions. This study asks
the following: When do conflict early warnings lead to early response decisions in the African
Union’s Continental Early Warning System (AU-CEWS)? This question has not yet been
addressed comprehensively in the literature through the use of empirical data. To address the
gap, I test three hypotheses derived from political will and organizational culture theories. These
hypotheses are the following: (H1) Early warning leads to early response decisions if the
organizational culture in the AU-CEWS encourages involvement and adapts to external
challenges; (H2) The commitment and consensus among key AU-CEWS decision makers (i.e.,
their political will) is a prerequisite for early response decision; and (H3) Depoliticization of
early warning indicators at the AU-CEWS is a critical factor for triggering early response
decisions. I employed thematic analysis of semi-structured interview with 30 experts and
decision-makers while referring to pertinent secondary data. I also used process tracing to assess
the political willingness of AU-CEWS to respond to the current conflict in Burundi. Analysis of
political will indicates that decision-makers were reluctant to discuss early warning signals of
powerful African countries, struggled to put continental welfare over national interests, and
lacked authority to impose decisions on member states. The organizational culture of the AUCEWS shows some factors that facilitate early response decisions, but at the same time, it has
other factors that limit effective early response decision-making. The consensus based decisionmaking process within the AU Peace and Security Council facilitates full engagement of the
decision-makers. However, AU-CEWS’ limited interaction between decision-makers and
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conflict early warning experts, hierarchical organizational structure, and the absence of a formal
structure to bring early warning into the decision-making process limited the effective flow of
early warning information to the decision-makers. Regarding depoliticization, my study shows
that the early warning indicators were developed in a technical manner, which limits subjectivity
or bias. The use of existing legal instruments as a base to identify conflict early warning
indicators, however, partially, and perhaps inevitably, politicizes the conflict early warning
indicators. The AU-CEWS has made creditable strides to prevent conflict in Africa, but it needs
more political will, a more conducive organizational culture, and the depoliticization of its
indicators and analyses to create a more robust and successful early warning-response nexus.
Overall, my research findings indicate that conflict early warning signals make a difference only
if they are converted into an early response. Effective conflict early response is guaranteed when
decision-makers prioritize early response above political interest, when there is a structure to
bring conflict early warnings timely and directly to decision-makers, and when the very
indicators of conflicts are developed in a depoliticized and technical manner. Early warning
institutions should underscore the fact that social factors (political will, organizational culture,
and depoliticized warning signals) that guarantee conflict early response decisions remain as
indispensable as technical and material capability needed to gather early warning signals.
Key Words: Conflict Prevention, Early Warning, Early Response Decisions, Political
Will, Organizational Culture, Continental Organization, African Union, Decision-Makers
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Chapter One
Introduction
The incidence of large-scale wars in Africa has declined from twelve to eight since the
inauguration of the African Union (AU) in 2002 (HIIK, 2014). However, the occurrences of
small-scale conflicts with transnational implications have soared (Heidelberg, 2014; Strauss,
2012; Vines, 2013). Studies show that preventing conflict is four times less costly than resolving
it (Brown & Rosecrance, 1999; Chalmers, 2007; 2004). However, contemporary interest seems
to be focused upon conflict resolution. Between 2000 and 2013, for instance, the international
community had expended $900 million in 50 African peacekeeping operations. In the meantime,
the African Union established the continental early warning system (AU-CEWS) to foresee
violent conflict and prevent it (Coning, 2013).
AU-CEWS was established as one of the four branches of the AU’s Peace and Security
Council (PSC) in 2007. The AU-CEWS was established “in order to facilitate the anticipation
and prevention of conflicts” in Africa by coordinating its activity with the five Regional
Economic Communities (RECs)1 on the continent (AU, 2006; IPI, 2012). The initiative to set up
AU-CEWS can be traced back to 2003. However, it took four years to put the methodological
framework in place to start operations (Wulf & Debiel, 2010). The main functions of the AUCEWS include collecting, analysing, and communicating conflict signals. Information is
gathered on the context of the conflict, actors, and events that trigger the conflict. Information on
the context is used to conduct a structural analysis, which includes not only the key sources of
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Regional Economic Communities (RECs) include Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS),
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development
Community (SADC).

the conflict but also the context in which it happened (AU, 2008). Information on actors is used
to conduct actor analysis focusing on the activities of important actors (individuals and groups)
in the conflict. CEWS also gathers information on the development of events over time to
develop dynamic analysis (AU, 2008).
The central subject of this doctoral research is examining the AU-CEWS, its success and
its challenges. More specifically, this study focuses on the early warning and early response gap
that exists. Therefore, this introductory chapter provides the background to the study and
contextualizes it within the broader literature on the subject. It begins with the descriptive review
of definitions of early warning, early response and AU-CEWS. It also briefly summarizes the
major components of the dissertation. More importantly, it sketches the most notable and
significant components of the AU-CEWS including the branches of the AU and that of the
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It then identifies the research problem
addressed, outlines the objectives, lists the research questions, and provides the methodology
employed in the study. The introduction concludes with a brief discussion of the significance of
the study and an overview of the chapters.
Statement of the Problem
The AU-CEWS has been operational since 2008. Several studies indicate there has been a
gap between the AU’s early warning and its response mechanism during this brief period
(Nathan, 2007; Vines, 2013; Williams, 2008). As a consequence of this gap, the African
continent has suffered from multiple incidents of violent conflicts (Dallaire & Beardsley, 2003;
Power, 2001; Suhrke & Howard, 1996). Yet, there has been a lack of a systematic study that
addresses why this gap exists. Besides, there is a visible lack of research that tests theories,which
explain why such a gap persists in the case of AU-CEWS. This dissertation seeks to address
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these practical and theoretical challenges by conducting a systematic evaluation of the AUCEWS.
Objectives of the Study
The main objective of the study is to identify and explain the underlying challenges
facing AU-CEWS. More importantly, it identifies and tests three hypotheses on the early
warning-response link/gap derived from relevant conflict prevention theories (Meyer et al., 2010;
Post et al., 2010; Woocher, 2008; Wulf & Debiel, 2009). It also imparts an in-depth
understanding on how conflict early response decisions are made at the AU level by focusing on
the role of political will and organizational culture and the extent to which Early Warning
Indicators (EWI) of the AU-CEWS are depoliticized.
Background to Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems (CEWRS)
The practice of CEWRS is based on post World War II breakthroughs in intelligence
studies and natural disaster forecasting. However, a more concentrated application to conflict
issues began after the Cold War (Matveeva, 2006). The practice of CEWRS is a post-Cold War
concept that evolved in four generations since the 1990s. Table 1.1 shows the premise (location),
promise (goals), and means (technology) employed in CEWRS and how these have changed over
the past two decades. Since the 1990s, CEWRS has been decentralized from headquarters to
networks; its scope has broadened from detection to intervention and interaction; and its
application has become more sophisticated and affordable over the last two decades where it has
become possible to gather text and video sources, analyze them, and initiate responses using state
of the art social media platforms (Mutton, 2014).
CEWRS is a “conflict management tool” used to detect early signals of conflicts and
develop preventive measures (Kuroda, 1992, p. 217). It encompasses interrelated functions such
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as systematic data gathering to identify causes of conflict, rigorous analysis to determine its
future outcome, prompt communication to inform decision-makers, and effective measures by
decision-makers to prevent the conflict on the ground (Austin, 2004; Wulf & Debiel, 2009). The
process of CEWRS can be broken down into early warning (data gathering, analysis, and
communication) and early response (decision to act).
Table 1.1
Four Generations of Early Warning and Response
Generation

Objective

Technology
Expensive,
proprietary
technology
GIS and satellites,
Internet (e-mail &
websites)

1st Generation since
1990s

Headquarters

Conflict detection

2nd Generation since
2000

Headquarters with
stronger links to
networks in the field

3rd Generation since
2003

Conflict areas with
local networks
included in the system
and monitors on the
ground

Conflict detection
with limited response
(mainly
recommendations)
Conflict detection
with stronger links to
response mechanisms;
monitors often serve
as “first responders”

4th Generation since
2008

Conflict areas with
less centralized
organizational
frameworks

Decentralized twoway information
service for data
collection and
dissemination

Proprietary software
with structured
reporting & coding
protocols,
Mobile phones,
GIS and open-source
satellite imaging
Free and/or open
source technologies,
especially mobile
phones

Source: Letouze et al. (2013, p. 6)
In the case of AU, this generational classification does not neatly apply to the AUCEWS. Considered as the headquarters, AU-CEWS had RECs as its network. Some of the
RECs, such as IGAD and its CEWARN had been created earlier than AU-CEWS. CEWARN
had also field monitors from the beginning, while ECOWARN had networks of Civil Society
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Organizations(CSOs)earlier than the AU-CEWS. What is more, AU-CEWS from the beginning
decided to make use of open source information.
Rupesinghe et al. (2001) defined early warning as a “a process of communicating
judgments about threats early enough for decision-makers to take action to deter whatever
outcome is threatened; or failing that, to manage events in such a way that the worst
consequences are mitigated” (p. 399). Dorn (1996) explained the intended recipient of the
warning by defining the term as “the act of alerting a recognized authority (e.g., UN Security
Council) to the threat of a new (or renewed) armed conflict at a sufficiently early stage for that
authority to take preventive action” (p. 398). These definitions show the action needed, its aim,
and when to respond. Nonetheless, they do not show who warns whom and who should take the
action. Instead, they assume international organizations (communities) are responsible for doing
the warning for themselves and respond accordingly. Further, Woocher (2008a) pinpointed the
exact functions of early warning as “(1) Estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of
emerging threats, (2) analysing the nature of these threats and describing plausible scenarios, and
(3) communicating warning analyses to decision-makers” (p. 404).
The above listed definitions are specific and, in some cases, too narrow. Most definitions
of EW are too general. Although the above definitions explain the roles of experts in the warning
process, they do not include the role potential victims could play in alerting relevant parties and
taking preventive action (Barry, 2006; Meier, 2011). It is well known that people often send
crises signals through rumors and other informal channels (Horowitz, 2001). In addition, the
2011 Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrated that people are very active
and effective in sending text and/or video messages using different information and
communication technology (ICT) tools at their disposal. This is what Meier (2009) coined as the
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latest (fourth) generation of the early warning system whose purpose is to enable local
communities to take charge of conflict prevention by themselves. There are several initiatives of
conflict early warning initiatives that use social media to alert people about the situation in their
area. Una Hakika, which means “ Are You Sure?” is one of these initiatives coordinated by The
Sentinel Project. It is set up to help communities in Tana Delta, Kenya to avoid engaging in a
violent conflict based on misinformation. This project helps them to identify the missing
information on their cell phones (Tuckwood, 2014).
Similarly, most definitions of early response are general. Austin (2004), for example,
defined the term as “any initiative that occurs in the latent stage of a perceived potential armed
conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution, or transformation” (p. 2). This definition captures
important elements such as the role of perception and the goal of preventing armed conflict using
different conflict management tools. Apart from mentioning these general concepts, however,
Austin’s definition does not describe the actual processes taken by different parties to prevent
armed conflict on the ground. Diller (1997) explains this in more detail as follows:
[Early responses]…refer to processes of consultation, policymaking, planning, and
action to avoid or reduce armed conflict. These processes must be undertaken with
sensitivity to the political and social dynamics of a situation to avoid exacerbating
conflict. IGOs [Intergovernmental Organizations], NGOs [Non-Governmental
Organizations], and private actors engage in various types of preventive action,
including (1) diplomatic/political, (2) military/security, (3) humanitarian, and (4)
development/economic activity. (p. 8)
In sum, the discussion so far shows that conflict early warning and response are
necessary steps to prevent violent conflicts. Throughout these steps, there are several actors with
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different tasks. Some of these are the experts who analyze information, ordinary people who
send signals, and decision-makers at different levels. The decision-makers include community
activists, religious leaders, and government officials at many levels who decide on the early
response options and implement it. The following section focuses upon the practical application
of CEWRS in the African Union.
Origin of African Union’s CEWS
The evolution of AU’s CEWS may be classified into five milestone periods. From 1963
to 1993, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), AU’s predecessor, established the
“Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration (CMCA)” to resolve conflicts
peacefully (Amoo, 2002). From 1993 to 1999, OAU substituted the commission with a Central
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution (CMCPMR). The main goal
of this initiative was to anticipate and prevent civil wars in Africa (Cilliers, 2008). From 1999 to
2003, the AU replaced the OAU through a new Constitutive Act, culminating in the formation of
AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC), which included the AU’s Continental Early Warning
System (AU-CEWS). From 2004 to 2007, the AU-CEWS department was involved in designing
its methodological framework. Since 2008, AU-CEWS has been engaged in operationalization of
its methodology.
The roots of Africa’s CEWS go back to the formation of the OAU on May 25, 1963.
Pursuant to Article 7 (4) of the OAU (1963) Charter, the OAU’s founders established the CMCA
as one of the four “principal institutions” set up to realize OAU’s goals. After thirty years, OAU
heads of state replaced the commission with a “mechanism for conflict prevention, management,
and resolution” whose “primary purpose [was] the anticipation and prevention of conflicts”
(OAU, 1963, p. 5).
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In 1999, African leaders took a radical measure to transform OAU’s power by replacing
its Charter with a new Constitutive Act. The mandate includes “the right…to intervene in a
Member State… [during] grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity” as stipulated in Article 4 (h) (AU, 2000). As per Article 5 (2) of the Constitutive Act,
the AU established the PSC as “a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate
timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (AU, 2006, emphasis
added). AU’s CEWS is one of the six branches of the PSC along with the Panel of the Wise
(PoW), African Standby Force (ASF), Military Staff Committee, Common Africa Defense and
Security (CADS) and the African Peace Fund (Peace Facility) (Wulf & Debiel, 2009). Figure 1.1
shows the organizational structure of the African Peace and Security Structure (APSA).

Figure 1.1 Organizational Structure of APSA

Source: AU (2008)
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In 2006, experts from member states and regional organizations gathered in Addis Ababa
and designed the “framework for the operationalization of early warning system” (AU, 2006a).
The framework was assigned four major responsibilities that are quoted below:
(i) the collection of data, (ii) strategic analysis of the data collected, through an
appropriate indicators module, (iii) early warning reports and engagement with
decision-makers, and (iv) the coordination and collaboration with the Regional
Mechanisms for conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution and other
stakeholders on conflict prevention early warning in Africa; and to adopt a Roadmap
that would clearly spell out the steps to be taken towards the operationalization of the
CEWS and the role of each of the stakeholders, as well as the timelines for
implementation. (AU, 2006, p. 4)
In 2007, AU’s Conflict Management Department (AU-CMD) assessed best practices
from regional and sub-regional organizations and adopted a hybrid methodology known as
Strategic Conflict Assessment Methodology (SCA) (AU, 2008). The SCA methodology
summarized in Figure 1.2 outlines AU-CEWS as a three dimensional system where information
is gathered (input) on the context, actors, and events (three dimensions), which are then
processed (structural, actor, and dynamic analysis) to produce an output including alternative
scenarios and line of actions in the form of recommendations. The diagram shows the steps and
factors considered during the formulation of conflict early warning as an output. Moreover, the
steps included also show that the early warning needs to be sent to the decision-makers who will
decide on the response options.
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Figure 1.2 Summary of the CEWS Methodology
Source: AU (2008)

The literature on the AU-CEWS, which is further explored in the next chapter, has
several gaps. Most of the literatures identify the various challenges that AU-CEWS faces without
conducting in-depth analyses of the root causes beneath those challenges. Those studies
highlighting its drawbacks were prematurely done before 2008 when the CEWS became fully
operational. Very few studies appraise those cases where AU-CEWS successfully prevented
conflicts from escalating. Even those few studies making balanced assessments of AU-CEWS
operations are often descriptive (Lamara, 2013). They bring forth insightful remarks from
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primary and secondary sources. However, these analyses are not supported and explained by a
sound theoretical framework. Although there are several theories explaining the problems of
early warning and response, very few have been empirically tested using the AU-CEWS. This
dissertation aims to test pertinent theories on CEWS using the AU-CEWS.
This study raises two critical research questions to address the aforementioned gaps in the
literature. First, when do conflict early warnings lead to early response decision in AU-CEWS?
Second, how do organizational culture, political will, and depolitization of conflict early warning
indicators (EWI) affect early response decisions in the AU-CEWS? Before exploring the
literature on AU-CEWS, the following sections briefly delineate the problem that triggered this
study, its background, and the objective of the study.
The second chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literatures explaining why early
warning leads to early response and frames testable hypotheses that might address the research
question. The third chapter describes the methodology employed to test the framed hypotheses.
Chapter four examines the role of organizational culture on early response decision-making.
Chapter five discusses the findings on the impact of political will on AU’s early response
decision-making process. Chapter six examines the origin and development of AU-CEWS
conflict early warning indicators (EWI) to determine whether they are sufficiently depoliticized
to permit early responses. And finally, the last chapter will summarize the main conclusions of
the research and impart useful recommendations deemed to improve the AU-CEWS’s
effectiveness.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
On the Challenges of AU- CEWS
The literature on the AU-CEWS has been rife with hasty criticisms, which overlook the
arduous and time-consuming task of putting an effective preventative/predictive system in place.
Levitt (2003) pointed out that the legal experts did not review the PSC protocol hence resulting
in “blatant conflict of law and inconsistent terminology” with the regional organizations (p. 136).
Cilliers and Sturman (2004), on the other hand, wrote, “with the design phase complete, the
human and financial resources used to build these new institutions will now determine their
future success” (p. 97). Nathan (2007) relied on personal experience to focus on the warningresponse gap by identifying administrative bottlenecks as information flowed from low-level
experts to top-level decision-makers through midlevel officers, competing warning signals
flowing to decision-makers, preoccupation with the resolution of violence over preventing
probable conflict, and inaction due to sensitive (thus confidential) information protected by
member states.
The critics after 2008 did not focus on AU-CEWS challenges by assessing the theoretical
basis of the already publicized Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) methodology. Instead, they
were confined to pointing out the legal and operational limitations associated with AU’s day-today work. For example, Williams (2008) wrote, the “PSC has not been engaged in serious
conflict prevention but has instead dealt with issues only after they have erupted” (p. 314). In
responding to the already violent conflicts, the AU lacked essential military equipment and
human resources (trained peacekeepers) to intervene in violent conflicts (Hengari, 2013;
Williams, 2011). Williams (2011) also commented on the lack of coordination due to
methodological conflict with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) early warning
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system. Besides, he also identified the “insufficient real time diplomatic reporting and
intelligence...[and] difficulty of analysing information and using it to influence decision-making
within the PSC” as one of the major obstacles to the program’s success (p. 9).
Similarly, in April 2012, forty expert panelists at a conference organized by the
International Peace Institute (IPI) indicated that the AU-CEWS faced a substantial scarcity of
“staff expertise, material, and technical equipment … [and the need to] strengthen political will”
(IPI, 2012, p. 9). Vines (2013) added organizational culture problems, such as unnecessary interdepartmental conflict due to overlap, unwillingness to delegate tasks by top decision-makers, and
overdependence on external donors, as major problems. Noyes and Yarwood’s (2013) qualitative
study reported that senior-level officials working at the AU also understood the wide array of
challenges ranging from “human limitation, inchoate cooperation and information
sharing…unsystematic coordination with various AU organs…[to] issues of political will, as
high level-political disagreements and issues of sovereignty militate against effective preventive
action” (p. 249).
Furthermore, some authors mention how the AU’s role in conflict prevention and peace
building is limited and sometimes ignored because of external (non-African) conflict
interventions (De Waal, 2013; Hengari, 2013; Paterson, 2012). De Waal (2013), for example,
explained how external actors’ interventions limit the conflict prevention initiatives of the AU.
De Waal argued that AU’s initial peace processes in Libya’s 2011 conflict was terminated when
three of the five United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent member states (United
States, United Kingdom, and France) implemented UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya. This
military intervention in Libya undermined the AU’s role in resolving the conflict, which was
included in the UNSC Resolution 1973. Besides undue external interventions, Hengari (2013)
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also noted that African countries’ lack of “unified or consistent approaches to armed conflicts
within the UN Security Council” creates obstacles in managing conflicts. While the effectiveness
of AU’s peace initiative for the 2011 Libya’s conflict could be difficult to prove, external
interventions could cripple AU’s capacity and legitimacy to prevent conflict in the region.
To summarize, the literature does not comprehensively deal with the challenges
confronting AU-CEWS, and particularly theory-based analysis of the AU-CEWS is non-existent.
Moreover, the literature is limited in exploring the underlying reasons AU-CEWS lacks early
response decisions. This limitation has narrowed the scope of these studies and prevented them
from answering fundamental questions such as the following: why are decision-makers unable to
recognize warnings and promptly respond to them? Are certain warning signals more persuasive
than other signals to the decision making body? Under what circumstances do early warnings
lead to early response decisions? The following section addresses the theoretical basis of the
purpose, process, and problems of early-warning, early response, and the interface between the
experts and decision-makers.
Theories on Early Warning and The Response Gap
Insights from Intelligence Studies: Orthodox versus Revisionists
Various schools of intelligence studies provide different answers concerning the problems
of early warning and early response. The first stage, at least in the U.S. intelligence community
circle, was Sherman Kent’s (1950) pioneering work on “strategic intelligence,” which argues that
warnings should entail an “exhaustive examination of the situation for which a policy is required,
and …the objective and impartial exploration of all the alternative solutions which the policy
problem offers” (p. 201). This argument is based on a strong confidence in the ability of qualified
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analysts to untangle complex realities and offer comprehensive options without influencing
decision-makers to discriminate among the options.
Roberta Wohlstetter (1962) laid the foundation of the so-called “orthodox school” and
challenged Kent’s assertion through an exhaustive study of U.S. intelligence failures to forewarn
the Pearl Harbor attack. She concluded that it is impossible to make “exhaustive examination…
[or] objective and impartial exploration of all the alternative solutions” (1962, p. 201). Instead,
Wohlstetter identified several barriers between early warning and response. These are the
tendency of the analyst to be swayed by a desired end (wishful-thinking); presence of
contradicting signals; equally valid alternative hypotheses; risk from deceptive perpetrators that
suppress signals and amplify noise; failure of communication among analysts; vaguely worded
warning reports and bureaucratic level misperceptions; additional miscommunication; and interdepartmental rivalry and prejudice against particular analysts. Accordingly, Wohlstetter (1962)
concluded, “we have to accept the fact of uncertainty and learn to live with it. No magic, in code
or otherwise, will provide certainty. Our plans must work without it [warning signals]” (p. 401).
Beyond admitting the aforementioned limitations of early warning and response, Betts
(1978) classifies the limitations into different categories, prioritizes which ones are critical, and
imparts useful recommendations on potential solutions. Betts classified intelligence failures into
those associated with wrong models, organizational problems, and misperception. According to
Betts (1978), the most critical failures come from decision-makers as opposed to analysts and
information collectors because they are busy and are vulnerable to preconceived biases. He also
cautioned that not all problems have solutions, and that some solutions may create greater
problems due to intrinsic Early Warning and Response (EWR) paradoxes such as boosting
warning capabilities and increasing false alarms, creating new problems by reforming the EWR
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organization, or the difficulty of accommodating warnings that defy one’s intuition. Despite
these challenges, Betts (1978) believes there are remedies to EWR problems. Such remedies
include giving more attention to the worst signals despite lower probability of occurrence,
providing unpopular (including devil’s advocates) analyses a channel to be voiced, focusing
more on the quality of early warning analysis than data collection, rewarding talent and
discouraging mediocrity among analysts, and creating awareness among decision-makers about
cognitive biases and methodological issues.
Revisionists accuse the orthodox school of reductionism and neglect of scientific
methods. Cohen (2012) criticizes the pessimistic outlook of the orthodox school that intelligence
failures should be considered as a norm rather than as an exception, which assumes that all
conflicts are the same. He attributes their resort to reductionism to their failure “to explore the
operational consequences of surprise” (2012, p. 43). The pre-emptive admission of limitation
also exposes them to “severe methodological and substantive shortcomings that cause serious
doubt on the validity of their conclusions” (Levite, 1989, p. 346). Levite addresses the warningresponse gap “first [by] looking strictly at the threat perception part of the process [warning
problem], then looking at the action initiation and implementation part of it [response problem],
and only finally combining the two [warning-response gap]” (1987, p.189). Levite believes that
warning per se does not trigger response. Instead, he argues that the quality (clarity and
unambiguity) of the warning, the impact of competing warning signals from different sources,
and the cognitive biases and political affiliation of the decision-makers determines the
effectiveness of early warning on early response. Betts summarizes the “principal theses” of the
revisionist school below:
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High quality warning has not usually been available in advance of attack, so
victims have suffered surprise [attacks] because of insufficient information rather
than pathologies in communication, analysis, or judgment; (2) when excellent
warnings are available they may well produce response, especially if consumers
“are truly familiar with the identity and reliability of the source” [Levite, 1987, p.
1977]…; and (3) much of the orthodox view rests on superficial research and
conceptual confusion. (p. 330)
To summarize, the orthodox and revisionist schools of intelligence argued that early
warnings fail to trigger early response because of problems inherent in the complexity of the
process itself, errors created by the analysts, and biases (cognitive and political) held by
decision-makers. However, the two schools differ in their level of confidence on the quality of
early warning. Whereas proponents of the orthodox school are at best skeptical, revisionists
express optimism in the power of the scientific method to provide powerful messages that can
lead to appropriate action. Despite the complex nature of conflict early warning, it is a useful
mechanism to prevent conflict.
Perspectives from Conflict Studies
The insights derived from intelligence studies are useful. However, the use of intelligence
is markedly different from that of conflict prevention (Table 2.1). As Woocher (2011) puts it,
despite sharing a common objective of understanding complex reality ahead of time, “conflict
assessment and intelligence analysis have different origins, aims, and methods” (p. 1). In light of
these differences, this sub-section explores various theoretical perspectives from conflict studies
to understanding the early warning-response (EWR) gap.
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Table 2. 1
Summary of Differences between National Security Intelligence Analysis and Conflict
Assessment
National security intelligence
analysis
Subject, process, and outcome of Threats to national security;
Clandestine and open
analysis
sources;
Typically distinct from data
collection;
No policy recommendations;
Secretive, private, classified;
Value in product
Organizational issues

Government’s intelligence
organizations;
Analyst set apart from
decision-makers;
Analysis is a core function;
Relatively significant
resources for analysis

Conflict assessment and
analysis
Threat to human security;
Open sources;
Typically not distinct from
data collection;
Frequently includes policy
recommendations;
Collaborative, consultative,
public;
Value in both product and
(participatory) process
International organizations,
NGOs, aid agencies, foreign
ministries;
Analysts and decisionmakers are often one and the
same;
Analysis is rarely a core
function;
Relatively minimal resources
for analysis

Source: Woocher (2011, p. 5)
The study of conflict prevention is the most pertinent sub-field in conflict studies that
addresses the problem of EWR. On the other hand, the idea of EWR is a post-Cold War concept,
which developed out of regret following humanity’s failure to halt genocides in Bosnia and
Rwanda in the early 1990s (Carnegie, 1997). The significant lesson learned by the conflict

18

theorists and practitioners is the necessity for conflict prevention. Wallensteen summarizes
conflict prevention’s essence as follows:
One lesson is that by observing early warning signs, developing agendas for early
action, summoning support, implementing particular measures and sustaining
collective action, the chances increase of preventing disastrous escalation and great
human suffering…[and that] preventive measures need to be devised and
implemented at a time when that society is not directly on the path to war. (2002, p.
213)
Based on the above assertion, Wallensteen (2002) argues that it is possible to “anticipate
conflicts prior to the formation of parties with incompatible goals” (p. 213). Accordingly, conflict
prevention is of two types, structural and direct prevention. Structural prevention monitors the
situation minus the root causes (less obvious, yet fundamental political, economic, and social
conditions) of conflict. On the other hand, direct intervention addresses specific triggers and/or
catalysts that spark and exacerbate already existing tensions. The basic assumption beneath this
classification of prevention is the consensus that conflict is a dynamic force having a life cycle
encompassing different stages of escalation and de-escalation (Figure 2.2). In this broad context,
conflict early warning and response together constitute one of the four mechanisms of conflict
prevention alongside “preventive diplomacy, economic measures, such as sanctions and
incentives, [and] the use of force” (Carnegie, 1997, p. xxi).
Figure 2.1 shows that prevention measures are taken at the early stage of conflict duration
(X-axis) to abort gradual escalation of conflict intensity from stable peace, to unstable peace, and
finally, to an open conflict (Y-axis). It also indicates that a stable peace lasts as long as the
structural building blocks of a society where the political, economic, and social dimensions are
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adequately met. Therefore, the ideal purpose of structural conflict prevention is identifying
imbalances at early stages and addressing them before they cause tensions (unstable peace).
Once the conflict has reached the unstable peace stage, direct prevention (i.e., an early
identification and resolution of tensions before they escalate into an open crisis) needs to take
place (Swanstrom & Weissmann, 2005).
IntensityLevel
War
Crisis
Open Conflict

Unstable Peace

Peace Enforcement
Crisis Management

Peacekeeping
Conflict Management

Conflict Management
Direct Prevention

Peace Building

Stable Peace

Structural Prevention

Early Stage

Peace Consolidation

Mid Stage

Late Stage

Duration of conflict
Figure 2.1 The Cycle of Conflict
Source: Swanstrom and Weissmann (2005, p.11)
Although Figure 2.1 provides useful insights about the role of conflict prevention in the
context of conflict escalation, it has a few shortcomings. When it comes to structural prevention,
there is a strong disagreement among scholars and organizations regarding the indicators needed
to anticipate conflict, the relative importance of each indicator, and the most effective method
needed to measure them. There are several institutions (Nyheim, 2009; Wulf & Debiel, 2010)
and scholars (Goldstone, et al., 2010; Hegre, et al., 2013) claiming to have found robust
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quantitative models to predict conflict. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of Collier,
Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), who propose selfish prospects for aggrandizement rather than
perceptions of relative deprivation (Gurr, 2011), most quantitative scholars do not weigh the
relative importance of their independent variables. Moroever, their applications of large samples
to predict most conflicts overlook conflicts that are difficult to explain using quantitative models
and yet cause substantial damage.
In addition to the problems of structural conflict prevention discussed above, the figure
does not portray the full scope of direct conflict prevention. It confines conflict prevention to the
early stage, and fails to grasp the role of prevention to prevent relapse. As Bock (2012) opined,
besides structural factors, conflict prevention targets not just ‘troublemakers’ who escalate
conflict at the early stage, but also ‘spoilers’ who reverse an already deescalated conflict at a later
stage of the conflict. The scope of direct prevention remains important at both the early and later
stage of conflict because conflict is cyclical (could relapse), not linear (has a beginning and an
end).
The third shortcoming surrounding the conflict life cycle curve has to do with exact
timing. Apart from making a rough classification of the duration of conflict, the model does not
show how fast or how slow conflicts escalate (Y-axis) from low to high intensity (X-axis). More
particularly, it does not explain what types of conflicts present more time to respond and which
sorts of conflict provide little time to respond.
In sum, the conflict curve shows the role and types of conflict prevention in the context
of a conflict life cycle. However, it is difficult to pinpoint which indicators are more important in
which contexts and which conflicts escalate swiftly or protract. Most importantly, the conflict
curve ignores the continuity of the conflict cycle and the role of conflict prevention especially in
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conflict-affected countries. Despite these challenges, the conflict curve can be a useful tool to
identify the conflicts that the AU-CEWS use to issue the warning to decision-makers.
Furthermore, the following theoretical framework provides useful insights that could help
resolve some of the identified gaps in the conflict curve.
Horowitz’s Ethnic Riot Analysis
Proponents of structural prevention (Goldstone et al., 2010) believe that addressing the
basic political, economic, and social imbalances in a society could prevent conflict. Others
(Collier et al., 2009) challenge this assumption arguing that grievance is not enough to spark a
rebellion. Instead, they posit that greedy troublemakers who anticipate financial, political, and/or
military gain in conflict are necessary to transform dissatisfaction into resistance. However,
because their studies were quantitative, they were not able to explain how rebellions evolve.
Horowitz (2001) made a seminal contribution to fill this shortcoming by analyzing 150 cases of
ethnic riots from 50 countries from Africa and Asia.
The Horowitz framework has three components that Bock (2012) described and are
reproduced below in Table 2.2 as “underlying conditions, time to build a consensus for violence
[and] process during the lull” (Bock, 2012, p. 18). Horowitz believed that structural imbalances
in a society create hostile relations among the societies. In order for conflict to escalate, an
alleged unjust incident, which triggers a sense of resentment, has to take place among members
of a group who feel victimized. This incident (precipitating event) is then spread out to a much
broader audience through “characteristic rumors [which] give rise to characteristic
interpretations, followed by times in which certain preparations are made” before transpiring into
violence (Horowitz, 2001, p. 73). After the rumors spread, the rebels take time to build consensus
before they resort to violence.
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Table 2. 2
Components of Horowitz Framework
Underlying conditions
Time to build a consensus for violence
Processes during lull

Hostile relationship;
Precipitating event
Lull, with rumors occurring near the onset of
violence
Acute emotional engagement;
Justification for killing;
Exaggeration of threat posed by the out-group;
Reduction of the risk of violence to the ingroup;
A sense that there are no options

Source: Bock (2012, p. 18)
The period between “the last precipitant and the onset of a serious violence is [called] a
lull, [which witnesses describe as] ‘an ominous quiet,’ ‘a death-like quiet,’ ‘a deadly quiet…that
heavily atmospheric threat of something about to burst’” (Horowitz, 2001, p. 89). In turn,
Horowitz defines lull as “the time when the nature of the precipitant is interpreted, usually
through the magnifying lens of rumor” (2001, p. 90) and provides a warning signal and an
opportunity for early preventive measure. It is also during a lull that temporary riot organizers
build consensus linking four variables. These are (i) a general sense of grievance, (ii) an
emotional outburst over a particularly harmful incident, (iii) justifying vengeance via violence,
and (iv) a calculation of the prospect of violent behavior (Horowitz, 2001).
The length of a lull has several implications. If the lull is long, it could mean the
perpetrators are anticipating a larger violence. It could also mean that there is either a
disagreement or lack of leadership among the potential rioters. This, in turn, depends on inter
alia, whether the perpetrators are civilians or armed groups because it takes civilians a longer
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period of time to build consensus than armed groups (Bock, 2012). Most importantly, however,
longer lulls provide a better opportunity to effect early response than shorter lulls. Moreover, as
Table 2.3 shows, the length of the lull also determines the type of early response that top, mid,
and local level officials could employ to prevent conflict.
Table 2. 3
Levels of Leadership and Response Capacity
Level of intervention
Level I: Top-level

Leaders involved
Government officials
& diplomats

Level II: Mid-level

Higher level religious
leaders, civic leaders,
intellectuals, NGO
directors
Religious leaders,
community-based
organization leaders

Level III: Local-level

Approach (long lull)
There is time to order
an intervention by
policy or
peacekeepers’ event
There is time for midlevel leaders to seek
the involvement of
top-level leaders
Focus on local-level
leaders to work in
partnership with other
actors so there is
sustainable capacity
to counteract the
influence of
troublemakers and
spoilers

Approach (short lull)
Little, if any, impact,
unless police and
peacekeepers are
nearby
Not much time to
reach out to top-level
leaders
Emphasis on locallevel leaders if the lull
is short since there is
very little time to
marshal a multilevel
response

Source: Bock (2012, p. 23)
To summarize, Horowitz’s insights from 150 cases of conflict shed light on processes of
conflict escalation in fragile societies. Horowitz showed that fragile structural conditions render
a society hostile towards others. If the aggrieved learns (usually through rumors) about an
incident of unexpected violation of the rights of its members, before resorting to violence, it
takes time to assess risks, justify responses, grow leadership, and organize action. Therefore, by
examining whether the enraged group has a strong chain of command, it is possible to foretell
how quickly it might resort to violence. Bock (2012) further developed Horowitz’s framework
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by adopting Lederach’s (1997) multi-track diplomacy to identify appropriate responses that top,
middle, and local actors could take to prevent conflict before it turns violent.
Horowitz provides interesting insight on how much time there is to respond, and which
response mechanisms are most effective for long and short lulls. The time between the conflict
and its escalation to violence will have a significant effect on the conflict capacity of decisionmakers, particularly the leaders at the top level. Conflict early response decision-makers are
leaders at the continental level, and they are far from the actual conflict zone. Hence, the lull
(time) of the conflict and the level of leadership in the case of AU-CEWS could affect the nature
of conflict early warning and response decisions in the African Union.
Persuasion Theories and EWR
Many conflict early warnings do not lead to early response because of failure to persuade
decision-makers (Meyer et al., 2010). Simon et al. (2001) define persuasion as “human
communication designed to influence the autonomous judgments and actions of others” (p. 7).
O’Keefe (2002) further clarified the concept by describing it as a goal-oriented communication
intended to alter the mindset of someone else voluntarily. As the proceeding section shows, there
are several theories that help explain the circumstances under which persuasion attempts could
succeed or fail.
The proponents of social judgment theory argue that individuals do not come across
persuasive information as a blank-slate (i.e., tabula rasa). Rather, before encountering new
information, they are already loaded with their own set of preconceptions where they have a
positive (latitude of acceptance), a negative (latitude of rejection), or an indifferent (noncommitment), attitude (judgment latitudes) toward something. The “theory offers a rule of
thumb” that when individuals come across new information which supports their point of view,
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they will assimilate it (O’Keefe, 1990, p. 36). By contrast, if they are exposed to new
information that contradicts their preconceived stance, they will reject or challenge it (O’Keefe,
1990). This theory, however, fails to explain why people reject an opinion that contradicts their
preconceptions. Cognitive dissonance theory fills this gap.
Cognitive dissonance theory (CDT) “centers around the idea that if a person knows
various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a variety of
ways, try to make them more consistent” (Festinger, 1962, p.93). The main “hypotheses” of CDT
are summed up as follows:
1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate
the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.
2. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will
actively avoid situations and information that would likely increase the dissonance
(Festinger, 1985, p. 3).
The persuasiveness of early warning depends not only on cognitive factors discussed
above, but also on non-cognitive factors such as organizational culture and political will. Meyer
et al. (2010) present a model that offers a comprehensive account of early warning as a
“persuasion discourse” (p. 569). The model (Figure 2.2) portrays conflict early warning-response
as a system and identifies direct and indirect potential barriers ranging from the analysts’ end to
the decision-makers’ end. The organizational culture of the institution affects how the decision
makers receive and react to an early warning. An institution with an organizational culture that
supports learning and debate, and allows experts to have regular interaction with decisionmakers, will prevent conflicts effectively (Meyer, de Franco , & Otto, 2012). Political will or
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motivation to process warnings, on the other hand, depends on the warning recipient (i.e., the
decision-maker).

Figure 2. 2 Persuasive Model of Intra-State Conflict Early Warning
Source: Meyer et al. (2010)
Although the persuasive model in Figure 2.2 accounts for the factors leading to effective
response, it does not tell what constitutes motivation to process the warning and which factors
are more important than others. Woocher’s (2008b) model tries to address this gap by adopting
Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) three decision-making models, namely the rational actor model,
the organizational behavior model, and the government politics model. The rational actor model
stipulates decision-makers are willing to respond if they get sufficient and objective information
to convince them that reaction entails low risk, high opportunity cost, and a potential of getting
collective support from other actors. The organizational behavior model, on the other hand,
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assumes that decisions are not made through case-specific rational calculation, but are based on
pre-established organizational objectives, culture, routines, and standard operational procedures
(SOPs). Finally, the government politics model argues that, in the real world, decisions are made
neither through rational calculations nor through rigid SOPs, but rather via a “process of political
bargaining based on established rules and... channels” (Woocher, 2008b, p.186). Hence, in the
government politics model, the participants, their personality, and the rules guiding their
interaction, matter. In this sense, the third model combines the two models because it admits the
notion that each participant is self-interested (rational model) and each interest is expressed in
accordance with some preordained rule of bargaining, which is the organizational behavior
model. Moreover, the work by Post et al. (2010) on how political will can have an effect on
adopting policy options shows major elements that must be present in the decision-making
process. The general definition of political will is based on the absence of political action or
failure to implement policies. Post et al. (2010) argued that such definition lacks clarity because
political will is considered as the “sine qua non of policy success that is never defined except by
its absence” (p. 654). This definition makes it difficult to measure. Instead, Post et al. (2010)
provide four indictors to measure presence or lack of political will when deciding on public
policy. These indicators are presence of key decision-makers, common understanding,
commitment to implement the decision, and preference to policy options.
Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has reviewed several theories available on conflict early warning and
early response problems as well as their application on CEWS. The theories on conflict cycle and
time (lull) are useful to gauge the available conflict early warnings in the AU-CEWS. Social
judgement theory and cognitive dissonance theories state that effective communication of early
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warnings depend on the early warning recipient’s mind-set and preconceived attitude towards
new information. These two theories indicate the psychological aspect of the decision-makers
that contribute to the effective communication of early warnings. Persuasion theories show the
importance of variables that are external such as message filtering mechanisms where
organizational culture is one variable. The political will or motivation to act is another factor that
contributes to the decision on conflict early warnings. Hence, the theory on decision-making
models is a crucial theoretical framework to understand how AU-CEWS decides on conflict
early warnings. All these theories show that early warning and response mechanisms have
complex and multidimensional challenges demanding systematic study. This study will focus on
persuasion theories and political decision-making models and test the three hypotheses outlined
in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
Methodology
Hypotheses
The main research question of this dissertation is as follows: When do conflict early
warnings lead to early response decisions in AU-CEWS? This study focuses on three variables
identified in the literature as affecting the success or failure of conflict early response. These are
organizational culture, political will, and depoliticization of conflict early warning indicators as
they were developed. I have framed the following three hypotheses based on these variables.
H1: Early warning leads to early response decisions if the organizational culture in the
AU-CEWS encourages involvement (e.g., debate, learning, and regular interaction between the
experts and decision-makers and empowers decision-makers) and adapts to external challenges
(i.e., learns from failure).
H2: The commitment and consensus among key AU-CEWS decision makers, (i.e., their
political will) is a prerequisite for early response decision.
H3: Depoliticization of early warning indicators at the AU-CEWS is a critical factor for
triggering early response decisions.
Conceptualization and Operationalization
Conflict early response decision is the dependent variable of the study. It is defined as the
action of decision-makers to address the signals they receive through conflict early warning
(Wulf & Debiel, 2009). Examining the presence or absence of a decision based on conflict early
warning signals operationalizes the early response decision. The independent variables are
organizational culture, political will, and depoliticization of conflict early warning indicators.
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They are defined and operationalized in the following manner. According to the persuasive intrastate conflict-warning model created by Meyer et al. (2010), the information-filtering channel is
one of the factors for a persuasive communication of conflict early warning. Organizational
culture is one of the factors that affect how information is filtered. This includes how early
warning reports are communicated and by whom. Sun (2008) defined organizational culture as a
set of “deeply rooted values and beliefs that are shared by the personnel in an organization” (p.
137). The culture within an organization can be assessed using four important traits, namely
involvement (inclusiveness of its members), consistence (concert of beliefs, values, and actions),
adaptability (ability to adjust when necessary), and mission (clearly delineated long, medium,
and short-term destinations) (Dev, 2013). The following table illustrates these traits and their
accompanying dimensions alongside illustrative examples that further illuminate the concept. I
have used Sun’s (2008) definition and operationalization of organizational culture.
Table 3.1
Organizational Culture Traits
Organization’s Dimensions of
Cultural Traits Organizational
Culture
Involvement
Empowerment
Team orientation

Consistency

Capability
development
Core values
Agreement

Adaptability

Coordination and
integration
Creating change
Customer focus

Examples of items
Decisions are usually made at the level where
information is available
Cooperation across different parts of the
organization is actively encouraged
There is continuous investment in the skills of
employee
The leaders and managers practice what they
preach
When disagreement occurs people work hard
to achieve win-win solutions
It is easy to coordinate projects across different
parts of the organization
The way things are done is very flexible and
easy to change
Customer comments and recommendations
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Mission

Organizational
learning
Strategic direction
and intent
Goals and
objectives
Vision

often lead to changes
Failure is viewed as an opportunity for
learning and improvement
There is a clear mission that gives meaning
and direction to the work
There is widespread agreement about goals
There is a shared vision of what the
organization will be like in the future

Source: Dev (2013, p. 7).
Political will is defined as “the extent of committed support among key decision-makers
of a particular policy solution to a particular problem” (Post et al., 2010, p. 659). Post et al.’s
(2010) definition points to four dimensions of political will and I will use these dimensions in the
AU-CEWS conflict early response decision-making context. These dimensions are the following:
(1) “presence of key decision-makers (capable and legitimate decision-makers); (2) common
understanding on conflict early warning; (3) commitment to support conflict early warning and
response decisions; and (4) commonly perceived, potentially effective policy options” (Post et
al., 2010, p.659).
For this study, I have used these dimensions to collect qualitative data from the decision-makers.
Depoliticization of AU-CEWS early warning indicators is the third independent variable,
and I have defined it as the extent in which AU-CEWS conflict early warning indicators are
developed free from political manipulation. I developed this definition based on the theory which
suggests conflict early warning systems work better if the system is institutionalized to include
both the warning and the response components (Vines, 2013).
Data Collection Strategies
I have employed primary and secondary data to test the hypotheses framed in the study. I
have collected primary data by conducting face-to-face interviews and disseminating survey
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questions among key respondents. I have conducted in-depth interviews with decision-makers
and early warning experts working at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The
decision-makers whom I interviewed work in various capacities at AU’s Peace and Security
Council (PSC) and AU commission (AUC).
I used an in-depth interview technique to collect the primary data from the decisionmakers and early warning experts. An in-depth interview technique is the best technique to
solicit insiders’ views on how organizational culture and political will facilitate or hinder conflict
early action in the AU. Bernard (2006) points out that it is suitable to use semi-structured
interviews (with both open and closed ended questions) if respondents are not easily accessible
more than once or have limited time during that period. Accordingly, I have also used semistructured interview questions. These questions took about 45 minutes for the respondents to
answer.
I have used contacts I created during my preliminary field study to access the decisionmakers and experts at the AU-CEWS. I employed snowballing/respondent driven sampling
(RDS) to access the decision-makers where I requested my contacts to introduce me to key
respondents ad continuum. The snowballing method has particularly helped me identify research
participants who were difficult to find or access. By the time I concluded the interview with my
respondents, I often asked them to refer me to field officers working in the AU field missions.
In order to accommodate views of all parties involved in the early warning production, I
also distributed survey questions among officers working in the AU field missions across 16
countries2 representing the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs). I used Qualtrics

2

Liaison offices are located in Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia,
Sudan, Kenya, Somalia
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software to distribute the survey questionnaire. This questionnaire, which included both open and
closed ended questions, took a maximum of 15 minutes to complete.
In addition to the interviews and surveys, I also gathered written data primarily from
AU’s online data archives and library located in the AU headquarters. I gathered PSC’s decision
in the form of communiqués, reports issued by the Panel of the Wise (PoW), and news highlights
posted by the CEWS on continental conflicts. The PSC’s decisions are accessible online in the
form of communiqués and press statements for public use. PoW is composed of “five highly
respected African personalities” (PSC, 2004). It was established based on Article 11 of the PSC
with the objective of supporting both the PSC and the AUC to maintain peace and stability in the
continent (PoW, 2015). The PoW also publishes its own reports online. The CEWS, on the other
hand, provide daily news highlights to a wide rage of subscribers. I used all of these sources to
triangulate my data. Moreover, I accessed the AU library and online documents that are relevant
to the study.
I also used conflict cases in Burundi and Burkina Faso, which were unfolding during the
interview, to elaborate the interview questions. These cases and other conflict cases are used to
analyze the role of early warning in early response decisions of the AU. The AU uses preventive
diplomacy as an early response to conflicts. I have selected conflict cases where the AU has been
actively involved in issuing either an early warning or a late response to support the main
arguments that surfaced during the interview. First, I identified these conflicts from AU-CEWS
news highlights and available media sources such as AllAfrica.com, Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP), and African Union data archive. Additionally, these sources were useful to
identify the onset, type, and evolution of conflicts in Africa since 2008. Second, I consulted
scholarly analyses written in books and academic journal articles that are available in published
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or electronic formats. Third, I utilized video documentaries made on conflicts in Africa before
and after 2008. Fourth, I consulted online documents such as early warning reports, PSC
communiqués, and working documents to track how and when they rendered decisions of
conflict early response.
Sampling
This research targeted the decision-makers and conflict early warning experts. The
decision makers are PSC, Panel of the Wise (PoW), and AU Commission (particularly the
Commissioner for Peace and Security). The early warning experts are conflict analysis, situation
room experts and field officers working in the CEWS of the African Union. PSC, AU’s “standing
decision making organ for the prevention, management and reduction of conflicts” has 15
members (Cilliers & Sturman, 2004, p. 98). Five of the PSC members serve for three years and
the remaining ten serve for two years (Protocol PSC, 2004). The five members are elected from
the five regions and they are politically appointed officials. Many countries have participated in
the PSC and the current members include Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tunisia (see Table 3.2). The
Panel of the Wise is another decisive organ in conflict prevention. Established in 2007, the Panel
of the Wise is composed of five individuals who contributed to peace and security in Africa. The
third decision-making organ I include in my sample is the AU Commission (AUC), particularly
the commissioner for peace and security, and the commissioner’s special assistants in the Peace
and Security department.
Table 3.2
PSC Members in by 2015
Region
North

Country
Algeria

Years elected
2013- 2016

35

West

East

South

Central

Libya

2014- 2016

Niger

2014- 2016

Nigeria

2013- 2016

Guinea

2014- 2016

Gambia

2014- 2016

Ethiopia

2014- 2015

Tanzania

2014- 2015

Uganda

2013- 2015

South Africa

2014- 2015

Mozambique

2013- 2015

Namibia

2014- 2015

Burundi

2014- 2015

Chad

2014- 2015

Equatorial Guinea

2013- 2015

Source: Current members of the PSC
Early warning experts in this sample include those who are working in AU headquarters
and political liaison officers assigned to provide information to the AU from the field. In the AU,
there are 15 experts (both conflict analysts and situation room experts) and they are based in
Addis Ababa. As of June 2014, the AU has 16 liaison offices in 16 African countries. Eight of
these liaison offices are active in providing primary information to the AU on conflicts in their
area. For the interviews and surveys, the main targets of this research were individuals with key
positions in producing early warning and those who render decisions on behalf of the AU and its
membership. This makes non-probability, purposive sampling procedures the appropriate
technique to solicit expert opinions (Bernard, 2006).
In my preliminary field data gathering at the AU, I created some contacts, both from the
PSC and AUC. This has allowed me to have access to decision-makers and experts working at
the AU. These contacts helped me to gain access to the other members of the PSC and AU
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Commissioner for Peace and Security. However, it was difficult to meet the PSC members at the
AU when they held sessions. Due to this, I had to make an official appointment request through
their embassies in Addis Ababa. I distributed interview request letters to 15 PSC member state
embassies, and I managed to get a reply from 11 countries. In sum I was able to conduct an
interview with 30 out of 35 interviewees in the proposed sample. These included 20 decisionmakers and 10 conflict early warning experts (see Table 3.3). In order to make the study robust, I
also distributed survey questions to a total of 17 individuals working in 16 countries and received
three responses. This group was included because they have some role in the data collection of
early warning. However they do not have any role in the conflict early response decision, which
is the main focus of this dissertation.
Table 3. 3
Early Warning Experts and Decision- makers in the AU
Decision-makers

Experts

Proposed Actual

Proposed Actual

PSC

15

14

Situation Room data managers

10

5

AUC

5

6

Conflict Analysis experts

6

5

POW

5

0

Liaison officers

8

3

Total 25

20

Total

24 13

Data Analysis
I analysed the data using thematic analysis. This method is useful for identifying and
analyzing both implicit and explicit patterns within a qualitative dataset (Guest et al., 2012). The
application of thematic analysis allows the researcher to unravel the lived experience of research
participants (or their meaning of it) or to construct “the ways in which events, realities,
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meanings, and so on are the effects of a range of discourses operating within society” (Braun &
Clarke, 2008, p. 79). This method can also be employed to examine both small and large
datasets.
The qualitative data gathered in this research, which comes from interviews and
questionnaires, requires the identification of patterns explaining how the organizational culture
traits and political will affect decisions of early response. Although procedures of developing
early warning, communicating it to decision-makers, and rendering a decision can be found in
written form (documents and protocols of the African Union PSC), their practical application is
better understood from the working experiences and perspectives of both the decision-makers
and experts. Hence, thematic analysis is useful to identify main themes of lived experiences of
research participants. In line with this, I transcribed the 30 interviews and developed codes that
capture the main indicators of political will and organizational culture. This helped me to capture
major themes that emerged during the interviews.
Besides thematic analysis, I used decision-making tree techniques and process tracing to
see how decisions are made using specific conflict early warning cases. This method was useful
to analyze how early warning information flows from the experts to the decision-makers,
particularly the Peace and Security department and the PSC. Process tracing is a qualitative
research method useful to assess how decision-makers act when the early warning issues change
(Meyer et al., 2010). In early warning, this method helps to understand the decision-makers’
reactions to warning messages by looking into successful and failed cases. Hence, I identified
early warning cases to see how the decision-makers accepted and prioritized them. This was
supported by questions specifically about these cases in the interviews with decision-makers at
AU-CEWS.
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Ethics
This study targets research participants above 18 years of age working within the AU. In
order to ensure informants’ privacy and information confidentiality, I followed the ethical
guidelines stipulated by the Institutional Review Board (IRB). Participation was voluntary, and I
obtained permission through a written consent form. Any identifying data was kept confidential.
Data gathered was kept in safe encrypted files. I conducted all interviews in places where the
participants felt secure.
Limitations of the Study
This study had several limitations. At the data gathering stage, it would have been ideal
to interview early warning experts working at AU’s liaison offices. Instead, I distributed an
online questionnaire because of the financial and time constraints associated with travelling to
the eight countries to conduct interviews. Administering questionnaires online has several risks,
including non-response and/or late-response. The online questionnaire limited the field officers’
engagement. Besides, collecting early warning information data is their secondary task which
also limits their views on the early warning response nexus.
Interviewing is the best technique to gather firsthand accounts of conflict early warning
decision-makers at the AU. The amount of information I was able to procure was limited. First,
accessing members of the PoW was very difficult because they were high profile people who did
not reside in Ethiopia. Second, although I interviewed many of the decision-makers who were
willing to share their views, a few declined to be interviewed. While this has a limited impact on
the research, their involvement could have enriched the dissertation.
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Chapter Four
The Role of Organizational Culture on AU-CEWS Conflict Early Response Decision

In this chapter, I examine the how organizational culture of the AU-CEWS affects the
conflict early response decisions. According to Meyer et al. (2010), organizational culture is one
factor that could allow early warnings to have the quality of appeal for action from the decisionmakers. An institution with an organizational culture that supports learning and debate and
allows experts to have regular interaction with decision-makers will perform well in prevention
(Meyer, de Franco , & Otto, 2012). Accordingly, this chapter assesses the key indicators of
organizational culture that are suitable for the utilization of early warnings to deliver early
response decisions.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section evaluates whether the early
warning professionals and decision-makers are adequately involved in the conflict prevention
process. The second section investigates whether the AU-CEWS undertakes regular professional
development training sessions to ensure organizational learning. The third section examines the
degree of collaboration between the AU-CEWS and the RECs. The fourth section assesses the
capacity of the AU-CEWS’s early warning signals to empower decision-makers in preventing
conflicts and studies how the PSC sets an agenda and responds to emergency crises. The fifth
section concludes the chapter by summarizing the discussion and imparting key
recommendations.
Involvement of Warning Professionals and Decision-Makers
The personnel working in the AU-CEWS are involved in the process of developing and
communicating conflict early warning to decision-makers. The degree of interaction varies based
on their role in the process. The strength of involvement of personnel working in the AU-CEWS
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varies in accordance with their frequency of interaction. Even though the AU-CEWS remains
understaffed, it still accommodates multiple interactions having varying intensity. It includes
early warning personnel (situation room officers, conflict analysts, and field officers), the five
RECs, and early response decision-makers (AU PSD Director and Commissioner, AUC
chairperson, and the PSC members) whose involvement in the early warning and response
process varies significantly.
The early warning and response process is a collective process involving several experts
and decision-makers. The AU-CEWS has three types of experts: the field officers, the situation
room experts, and the conflict analysis experts. The field officers send daily conflict reports to
the situation room experts pertaining to their particular mission. In addition to summarizing the
daily report from the field missions, the situation room experts are engaged in soliciting daily
conflict information available in the open source media. They compile these reports and forward
them to the conflict analysts who develop the conflict early warnings and send them to the PSD
Director and Commissioner.
Currently, the AU has 16 field missions around the continent (see Appendix A). The AUCEWS collaborates with field officers comprising liaison offices and peacekeeping missions
(PSC, 2015e). According to one of the respondents, the liaison offices are composed of an
“ambassador who serves as AU’s special representative, a political officer, a military officer, and
finance/administrative officers” (R22). The political officer in the liaison office is responsible for
monitoring the political, economic, security, and human rights environment of a state and
reporting it to AU-CEWS (PSC, 2015e).
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The liaison offices are located in countries where there is ongoing conflict. Thus, there
are no field officers in countries showing signs of a potential conflict. As one respondent
suggested, “it would have been great to have field officers in countries that have not yet become
violent such as Burkina Faso” (R20). Due to the lack of liaison offices in Burkina Faso, the
respondent indicated that the AU-CEWS managed to solicit information from the ECOWAS
while “two of AU-CEWS experts participated in an ECOWAS meeting in Ouagadougou” (R20).
The limited access to what was happening in Burkina Faso before the coup in 2014 has limited
the role of AU.
Although the AU-CEWS has liaison offices setup in 16 African countries, only a few of
them are active. One respondent mentioned, “the liaison offices in Chad, Western Sahara, Mali,
Guinea-Bissau, Comoros, and Somalia are actively involved in data collection [while] the
remaining send information once in a while” (R24). One of the major reasons why regular
information is not communicated has to do with staffing. According to one respondent, the
liaison offices are understaffed and conflict early warning reporting is an additional task to their
main responsibility – peacekeeping. Because of this, they find it difficult to allocate sufficient
time for sharing information.
In order to rectify this gap, the AU-CEWS utilizes a report called the “African Reporter,”
which the liaison officers have to fill out and share (by fax or email) with the AU-CEWS on a
weekly basis. As one respondent put it, the AU-CEWS “trains the liaison officers on using the
African Reporter which they fill out and send every Tuesday” (R21). Yet, another respondent
mentioned that these liaison offices experience a high rate of staff turnover. In other words, there
is a need to regularly train the new liaison officers on how to use the African Reporter as those
already trained are often transferred to a different mission, thereby wasting scarce resources. In
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order to address these problems, one respondent said that the AU-CEWS is planning to “hire a
permanent staff to update conflict information that will follow up after the peacekeeping
missions are completed” (R6).
Besides interacting with liaison offices to gather information, the AU-CEWS experts
collaborate in preparing a weekly situational report called the “African Brief.” The respondents
stated that CEWS prepares the situational reports based on 19 indicators, which have 73
questions (See Appendix B). These questions are categorized into political, economic, and social
groups and assigned weighting factors. When the trend exceeds a certain threshold then it is an
indicator that there will be potential violent conflict. In addition to these indicators used to detect
potential conflicts, the respondents also mentioned that the AU-CEWS monitors the situation in
already violent countries such as Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic to prevent
violence from reoccurring.
The Situation Room works 24 hours, every day. However, it has only 10 staff (two
officers for the five regions in Africa3) who collect information on 54 countries by working in
three shifts throughout the day. These officers gather news highlights (relevant news copied from
open source such as CNN, Al Jazeera, local media outlets, etc.), daily reports (a combination of
the highlights and the liaison office reports), flash reports (gathering information on current
developments such as election processes using a tool called the “African Media Monitor”), and
conflict analytical reports done by organizations such as the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU)
and Oxford Analytica (IPI, 2012).

3

North Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa.
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There is a regular period of interaction among the situation room duty officers and
conflict analysts. The situation room staff works on their respective regions and briefs the CEWS
conflict early warning analysts every Tuesday. The analysts use the preliminarily conflict
information to develop a conflict early warning report. The early warning reports, as many of the
respondents put it, include different scenarios that the PSC could take. Besides, they work in the
same office where access and interaction is easy; those regular interactions between the conflict
analysts and the situation room staff help the conflict early warning development process to be
effective (Meyer, de Franco , & Otto, 2012).
The AU-CEWS also provides opportunities for the conflict early warning experts to
debate the conflict issues before preparing their report. For instance, one key respondent said:
Before any report is generated, we normally sit down and look at the short-term
perspective for the next three months based on our weekly meetings… We identify what
we can see as signs worthy of a report. We then discuss our suggestions with the director
who can add or deduct from that list. Once we agree on it, the person responsible
develops the first draft and we as a CEWS team will work on it before it is submitted as a
CEWS report to the PSD Director. (R6)
The PSD director and the commissioner will add to or deduct from the early warning
report and communicate it to the AUC Chairperson. At this stage of the conflict early warning
communication process, the AUC chairperson and the Peace and Security Commissioner decide
how to utilize the early warning. Pursuant to Article 10(2) of the PSC protocol, the AUC
chairperson can utilize the early warning report in any of the following three ways:
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a.

[the chairperson] shall bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council
any mater, which, in his/her opinion may threaten peace, security and stability
in the continent.

b.

May bring to the attention of the Panel of the Wise any matter which, in his/ her
opinion, deserves their attention;

c.

May, at his/her own initiative or when so requested by the Peace and Security
Council, use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys,
special representatives, the Panel of the Wise or the Regional Mechanisms, to
prevent potential conflicts resolve actual conflicts and promote peace building
and post conflict reconstruction. (AU,?? p. 15)

The AUC Chairperson, the Peace and Security Commissioner and the PSD Director have
a significant role in bringing the conflict early warning reports to the PSC. This role is crucial to
have a conflict early response decision at the PSC level, which makes it significant to the conflict
early warning and response nexus (AU, 2008). Their involvement in the conflict early warning
information flow and interaction with the PSC and the AU- CEWS experts determines the
presence or absence of an early response decision. If the chairperson decides to bring the conflict
early warning to the PSC, she will brief the PSC. Thirteen out of the 14 PSC interview
respondents clearly stated they have never been provided with a conflict early warning. But some
of the respondents acknowledged that they get briefings on conflict situations. However, the PSC
members do not consider the Chairperson’s briefing as an early warning.
The AU-CEWS conflict early warning experts’ involvement in the conflict early warning
and response process ends when they submit their early warning reports to their department
director (PSD). Around 50 percent of the respondents believed that this arrangement has created
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a disconnect between experts and decision-makers. For instance, one conflict early warning
expert said, “our job is to develop early warning…after that, you don’t know what is happening.
That is why I said it is political, even sometimes hierarchical” (R20). Moreover, when the
chairperson presents the conflict early warning reports to the PSC, they present it with other
reports that might need an urgent action, such as where violence already broke out. Hierarchal
In March 2013 the PSC held its 360th meeting where they agreed to receive direct reports
from the conflict early warning analysts twice a year. The PSC initiated this measure to close the
gap mentioned above (PSC, 2013). Although this is a good initiative, one respondent pointed out
that some conflicts might require an urgent response after they are identified. One respondent
said, “some of the situations might not wait for 6 months, they might need an urgent action”
(R6). By contrast, another respondent believed that it was sufficient for experts to brief the PSC
members twice a year because there are other mechanisms for updating them. He said, “through
news highlights and weekly report we engage them [decision-makers]. We have direct
communication with decision-makers” (R21). However, this initiative might not solve the
problem completely because conflict early warning will exist throughout the year and PSC’s
access to the information will continue to be delivered hierarchically through the top officials.
Another respondent also highlighted the absence of regular feedback from decisionmakers by saying the following: “the AU-CEWS doesn’t get any feedback from decisionmakers. There are times when the Chairperson requests for a better job or requests for additional
information. But feedback is not given on a regular basis” (R5). Perhaps rightfully, there are
conditions where giving feedback is not necessary. For example, decision-makers might endorse
the recommendations of the experts. However, their main purpose is to act upon the
recommendations rather than inform the experts that they have adopted their suggestions. Yet,
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based on the action of the decision-makers, the experts sense that their suggestions have been
implemented. As one expert put it:
The decision-makers might not say anything, nor do you expect them to come and say
‘hey, we are taking your advice’…but sometimes you see them doing things – acting
upon some of your recommendations. They might send the Panel of the Wise. But they
will not come back to you and tell you what you did. (R4)
The other important aspect of debate is the one conducted between the members of the
PSC. After the director or commissioner of the PSD submits the situation report to the
chairperson of the AUC, she will decide either to brief the PSC or take her own action using her
good offices. When the chair presents it to the members of the PSC, as one respondent put it,
“the council [PSC] will have an intense debate on the issue. Concerned countries or their
regional partners will voice their interest and often demand some points to be either added in or
deducted from the report. Then, they will be considered while formulating the decision whose
outcome will be stipulated in the form of a communiqué” (R1).
If and when the concerned country does not agree with the PSC’s decision, it is given an
opportunity to provide a brief to the PSC members. It is then asked to leave the room so that, as
one respondent explained, “the PSC will have an open discussion, deliberate more freely, and
arrive at a decision based on the facts on the ground” (R2). This has been the case on PSC
decisions on recent crises in Libya and Egypt in 2011, Mali in 2012, and Mozambique in 2013.
Such a procedure could limit the potential bias towards the country by the PSC members.
If, for some reason, the PSC members do not agree on a possible course of action or on
the agenda of the month, as one respondent put it: “even though the Protocol says, they can vote,
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they always reach agreement on consensus” (R1). Despite the legal option of voting, they prefer
to debate until they reach an agreement. One decision-maker said: “normally, we don’t vote. So,
when we don’t have consensus, we go on debating until we reach some level of agreement. The
rule allows members to vote on issues that we did not reach based on consensus. But I don’t
remember any time that we made any vote” (R10). According to another decision-maker, “the
only time when the PSC members came close to voting was in the 2011 Gadhafi case” (R2). A
consensus is reached because the few members who don’t agree, as a third respondent put it,
“don’t have the means of disproving the facts presented by the Commission” (R2). Although the
consensus based decision-making procedure creates sense of responsibility and inclusiveness
among the PSC members, it could work against the delivery of a timely early response decisions.
To summarize, this sub-section examined the degree of involvement by warning experts
and decision-makers in the conflict early warning and response process. At the early warning
stages, liaison offices are responsible for gathering conflict information on the ground. However,
these offices do not report regularly, let alone get involved in regular debates, because they are
understaffed and rotated regularly. At the expert-analyst level, there is a weekly meeting
(physically and through web-based tools) among the experts and analysts who collaborate in
preparing the African Brief, thereby allowing them an opportunity to debate on the main themes
of the report and peer review their work.
AU-CEWS experts’ involvement in the early warning and response process ends within
their department. The PSD department or the AUC chairperson are in charge of the conflict early
warning report and if the chairperson decides to inform the PSC, the Chairperson briefs the PSC
together with other issues included in the agenda of the PSC. The PSC members do not consider
the briefing by the PSD as an early warning which creates a gap in the conflict early warning and
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response nexus. And, finally, the PSC members adopted a strong tradition of debate. They prefer
to decide on issues (including the discussion agenda) based on consensus rather than by majority
vote. The fact that the PSC members never resort to decisions, but instead adhere to reaching
consensus, indicates that there is a strong culture of debate. Such organizational culture of debate
allows the members to identify different viewpoints, which could be helpful in addressing
conflicts. According to Meyer et al. (2010), an institution that has the culture of debate will have
the potential to prevent conflicts. The prolonged debate, however, could delay early response
decisions.
The State of Organizational Learning at the AU-CEWS
Organizational learning is another dimension of Organizational Culture. The
organizational learning of the AU-CEWS can be analyzed within the context of AU’s overall
evolution and the AU-CEWS’s attempts to improve the skillset of its personnel and strengthen
the link between early warning and response. A closer look at the AU’s evolution indicates that
the organization has made significant strides in learning. The development of AU’s Constitutive
Act and the establishment of the PSC Protocol were the outcome of the organization’s attempt to
address its challenges of securing peace and security in the continent. On the other hand, the AUCEWS was established based on lessons learned from theoretical and practical experiences.
According to one of the respondents, the AU-CEWS has so far been unable to implement a
tailor-made program to develop the early warning collection, analysis, and reporting capacity of
its experts (R6).
The AU was an outcome of the consensus made among AU’s key member states that the
OAU needs to be overhauled. In the early 1990s, the OAU realized that Africa’s crises have
changed from inter-state to intra-state and that focusing on conflict prevention was less costly
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than sponsoring peacekeeping (Berdal, 1999). Despite this, the OAU was unable to prevent some
of Africa’s major crises, such as the mass killing in Rwanda. Leaders of Africa Union key
member states, such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Libya, contemplated this issue (Tieku, 2004).
Finally, Libya proposed the transformation of OAU to AU, South Africa designed the
Constitutive Act, and Nigeria contributed the idea of PSC to the AU (Adogamhe, 2003).
In 2004, the AU member states initiated a consultation with RECs, the UN, African civil
societies, and research institutions to explore the modus operandi for establishing conflict early
warning and response mechanism in Africa (PSD, 2015). After consulting for three years, they
drafted a “Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS” in December of 2006 in which its
implementation was anticipated for 2009 (Wane et al., 2010). This roadmap identified the
following three steps of conflict prevention: (1) collect and monitor relevant information, (2)
analyze conflicts in an interactive and collaborative manner, and (3) identify response options
and craft policies (Wane et al., 2010).
The CEWS Handbook stressed the need to maintain and upgrade the skill set of its
experts. Further, “to preserve the ownership and sustain the CEWS, it is absolutely vital this
training is conducted by the CMD [Conflict Management Department] itself, and not
outsourced” (AU, 2009, p. 76). The handbook also emphasized that experts and situation room
assistants should be trained on how to analyze and formulate response options and specific
standards of operation respectively through orientations as well as on-the-job training. It is also
recommended that the CEWS personnel upgrade their skills through continuing education
programs and participating in academic and professional seminars (AU, 2009).
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Most of the respondents acknowledged this lack of sufficient numbers of well-trained
personnel in the AU-CEWS. As one respondent noted:
The nature of conflict prevention is that you have to deal with issues before they get
violent. So much of what you deal with has not happened before. But this is not to say
we have been effective. Otherwise we wouldn’t have witnessed Mali [in 2012], Libya
[in 2011], etc. because all these cases are new. Prevention requires some skill and we
need to have these skills in the Commission because you can’t use someone who does
not have the skill. (R17)
When asked if AU-CEWS experts receive professional development training, one expert
responded, “I wouldn’t say that we are provided with such trainings while working here, but
before you are hired, you need to fulfill certain criteria” (R4). This answer implies that the AUC
hires qualified professionals to bridge the aforementioned gap. However, formal
education/experience qualification is not sufficient. All qualified professionals need to receive
regular on-the-job training, mainly because conflict type and contexts change through time. Onthe-job training will equip the professionals to handle immerging conflicts efficiently.
Besides, many respondents believed that the experts needed further training. One
respondent, for instance, stressed, “the AU is not lagging behind because they lack information.
Instead there is a lack of capacity to analyze it [the information]” (R12). Another respondent
supported this view by saying, “the situation room and CEWS can’t produce an early warning.
Even if you see its international content, I am not sure all these officers can produce an early
warning that could be presented to the PSC. I think we need to hire two properly trained
professors” (R17).
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The AU-CEWS took some initiatives to train its experts. According to one respondent,
for example, the AU-CEWS hired “two technical experts from [a German Institute called]
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)” in 2012 to train experts on how
to utilize different conflict early warning tools, particularly the Africa Prospects tool. The AUCEWS uses the African Prospects tool to profile member states’ vulnerability based on a set of
structural indicators. The respondent said, the AU-CEWS “used to have regular trainings on
conflict assessment and early warning report writing. But it is not specifically tailored for the AU
and RECs. We are trying to develop a module tailored to the AU and RECs in collaboration with
partners” (R6). Another respondent disagreed with this assessment by stating, “professional
development training does not take place on a continuous basis. The only training given pertains
to practical utilization of software tools” (R27).
Most of AU-CEWS’s trainings focus on familiarizing experts on how to use the software
tools needed to prepare early warning reports. However, even those trainings are not conducted
on a regular basis. There is a need to provide trainings on how to utilize the open source input to
prepare a persuasive conflict analysis. One respondent mentioned the AU-CEWS is working on
designing tailored training modules for its experts. The effect of this module remains to be seen
in the future.
To summarize, this sub-section reviewed the organizational learning ability of the AUCEWS from two angles. The first angle demonstrated how the AU-CEWS was an outcome of the
lessons learned by key member states in the late 1990s. The AU Constitutive Act and the PSC
Protocol were established due to the AU’s determination to learn from its past. The second angle
showed the nature and frequency of professional development training within the AU-CEWS.
Many respondents agreed that the AU-CEWS lacks sufficient numbers of well-trained experts.
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One respondent mentioned that the AU-CEWS is currently designing a tailor made professional
development program (R6).
Regular Interaction with Regional Economic Communities (RECs)
The AU- CEWS collaborates with seven RECs on a regular basis. As one respondent put
it,
“When the CEWS came into force, it planned to preserve a channel of
communication with the RECs by staging a biannual meeting called technical
meeting. Because some of the RECs are at an early stage of development, they utilize
these meeting to exchange ideas on how they can operationalize their regional early
warning systems. They [also] get technical assistance from us [AU-CEWS] and give
us daily reports. Also they discuss on thematic issues. So, we have so much
collaboration”. (R19)
However, the current collaboration between the AU-CEWS and the RECs developed in a
gradual manner. In 2008 the AUC and RECs signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),
which outlines their modalities of cooperation (African Union, 2008). Some of these modalities
are on how to exchange information on areas of peace and security. Initially the collaboration
was only with IGAD and ECOWAS because most of them were not functional. The study
respondents stated they started collaboration with COMESA, the EAC (which has installed an
early warning system, but has not yet completed its policy document), ECCAS, and SADC. The
only RECs lagging behind according to the respondents are CEN-SAD, due to the crisis in
Libya, and UMA because its head office is in Morocco, which is not an AU member state.
The collaboration between AU-CEWS and the RECs is based on three principles:
subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage. This collaboration is formally
stipulated in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol (AU PSC Protocol, 2002). While implementing this
53

Protocol, respondents mentioned that the AU-CEWS and the RECs adhered to the principle of
subsidiarity. This principle recommends the AU-CEWS to rely on RECs if it deems they will
address the conflict more effectively. According to one of the respondents, one key example
where this principle applied was the case of South Sudan. The IGAD (Intergovernmental
Authority on Development) has taken the lead in addressing the conflict there. Due to this, “the
PSC does not do much at the forefront but supports the IGAD in its effort. At the end of the day,
however, the PSC has a say on the issues” (R28).
The collaboration between the AU-CEWS and the seven RECs goes beyond formal
collaboration. According to one respondent, this collaboration “is not just based only the
mandate but also on personal relationship. The technical meetings facilitate the interpersonal
relationship between the experts at the AU-CEWS and the RECs. This increases the magnitude
of exchanged information” (R6).
The principle of comparative advantage is also very important because it permits an
efficient division of labor between the AU-CEWS and the RECs. As the respondent put it, “if we
[AU-CEWS] think the RECs have a comparative advantage, then we collaborate with them…to
avoid overlap and conflict of interest” (R4). The RECs also complement the AU-CEWS because
the latter does not have missions in every country. One respondent summarized the multifaceted
dimensions of mutual collaboration between AU-CEWS and the RECs as follows:
For instance, ECOWAS has regional bureaus in its member countries where the AUCEWS does not. But through ECOWAS, we [AU-CEWS] got critical information on
Burkina Faso…We have a MOU with the RECs that will allow us [AU-CEWS] to
share information. In addition, most of the early warning the RECs collect is based
on the tools we [AU-CEWS] provide them. Whenever we issue daily reports, news
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highlights, and other documents by Peace and Security, we post it for the RECs to
utilize. We are also trying to connect with the RECs through V-Sat…whenever there
is any situation, we can share information by dialing through our internal line.
Currently, we have also begun developing joint early warning reports. (R22)
Nonetheless, there were also some disagreements among the RECs and the AU-CEWS.
Especially, if countries stage a coup, the AU’s sanction is often respected despite resistance from
the RECs. One respondent presented the following case of Guinea-Bissau as an example,
When the AU and ECOWAS ended up disagreeing on AU’s sanction over GuineaBissau, the solution was for the ECOWAS to respect AU’s decision. [As a result] we
[AU] found a mechanism to stage an election by discussing it with the leaders of
ECOWAS and Guinea-Bissau…Initially, powerful countries such as Nigeria resisted
AU’s decision, but they agreed later on because they found it necessary to preserve
African unity. Subsequently, ECOWAS followed Nigeria’s lead. And, finally, the AU,
UN, ECOWAS, and CPLP [Coalition of Portuguese Speaking Countries] decided to
cooperate closely and put pressure on the military junta. (R8)
Agbor and Menhan (2013) mentioned that “with proper coordination and collaboration,
the RECs have proven to be an effective channel of intervention in conflicts as was seen in the
recent case of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) intervention in the
Central African Republic” (para.3). By contrast, there were also instances where poor
coordination between AU-CEWS and the RECs failed to prevent conflict. For example, IGAD’s
conflict early warning branch, the CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response
Mechanism), did not capture the early warning signals that triggered the 2013 post-electoral

55

crisis in Kenya (Kuwali & Viljoen, 2013). This was because the organization adopted a
gradualist approach to conflict prevention by focusing on pastoralist conflict and then proceeding
to address bigger conflicts (Kuwali & Viljoen, 2013; Wulf & Debiel, 2009). However, this
excessive focus on pastoralist conflicts prevented CEWARN from capturing the election crisis in
Kenya. In addition to that, Iya (2014) pointed out that Ghana managed to prevent similar
electoral conflict because it had put in place a national early warning mechanism. Unlike Ghana,
most African countries, including Kenya, do not have national conflict early warning institutions
(Iya, 2014).
To summarize, the AU-CEWS and the RECs have closely collaborated in preventing
conflicts in Africa. This collaboration is based on three principles: subsidiarity, complementarity,
and comparative advantage stated in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol. While the AU-CEWS has
assisted the RECs in utilizing state of the art conflict prevention indicator tools and modernized
means of communication, the RECs have helped the AU-CEWS in providing critical reports in
areas where it lacks direct access to information. The AU has also delegated IGAD in addressing
the conflict in South Sudan. However, IGAD’s CEWARN focus on pastoralist conflicts
prevented it from capturing the early warning signals from the 2013 Kenyan post-electoral crisis.
The AU-CEWS should encourage countries to institute national early warning systems following
Ghana’s example. On the other hand, RECs have also proven to be effective in conflict
prevention as has been seen in ECCAS’s role in the Central African Republic. It is also
noteworthy that RECs adhered to AU-CEWS strong stand against unconstitutional changes of
government despite initial resistance as witnessed in ECOWAS’s role in Guinea Bissau on lifting
the sanction imposed on Guinea Bissau in 2012.

56

The Capacity of Early Warning to Empower Decision-Makers
An effective conflict early response depends on timely and persuasive early warning
signals. Most of the AU-CEWS’ early warning signals are collected from open sources.
Currently, one respondent said there is an ongoing debate between those who believed the AUCEWS should rely on intelligence sources and those who think that other branches established
by the AU—that is, the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and
the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)—should specialize in providing intelligence
reports to the chairperson of the AUC. On the other hand, 19 out of the 20 decision-makers at
PSC interviewed for this study complain that they do not receive timely conflict early warnings
from the AUC. For example, one respondent mentioned that the PSC failed to receive warnings
on “[the 2011 Arab spring crises] in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya; [the 2012 violence] in Mali, and
Burkina Faso in 2014” (R3).
Respondents from the PSD stated that either the AUC chairperson or the commissioner
briefs the PSC on conflict early warnings. However, PSC members do not consider the
chairperson’s briefing as an early warning because it does not show the level of urgency and the
measures the PSC should take. For example one respondent stated that “yes, we get briefings
from Political Affairs Department and Peace and Security Department. They might have signals,
but they don’t cast the immediate urgency of the issues” (R23). Besides, the briefing from the
AUC chairperson does not show what the PSC should do; it is purely informational for the
benefit of the council. In line with this, another respondent said:
Very interestingly prevention requires verified information, convincing analysis that there
is a looming crisis, and it needs brutally frank communication. You can’t be diplomatic
because you are going to tell country X, if you don’t do a, b & c, you will face a conflict.
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So you have to be frank. And fourth it requires trust between the early warning providers
and the end users. So I am not sure if we have built this capacity – the gathering of
information, audacity to tell others what is about to come, trust that is required to conflict
prevention and capacity. Of course there were some initiatives here and there for instance
the case of Burundi. PSC has raised a flag. (R14)
Many of the respondents believe that AU-CEWS’s open source based information
collection is not sufficient. For instance, one respondent said: “they [AU-CEWS experts] work
on open sources such as CNN, Aljazeera, and BBC…The limitation is you can’t get an office
outside the CEWS to conduct the study on the ground” (R3). On a similar note, another
respondent also said: “why do they only use data from TV? They need to send people for fact
finding, they need to be able to read and follow all issues on a daily basis” (R11). The PSC
members believe CEWS’s high reliance on open source made the early response decisions
impossible. According to one respondent, “this [reliance on open sources] has made it difficult to
swiftly address the situation in Burundi where intelligence sources were needed to make a
decision [ahead of the news cycle]” (R11). The use of open source however should not be
limited to the international media. Social media could also be used to develop early warning.
However, the AU-CEWS is not using social media at this time because it has become difficult to
verify the authenticity of information released on social media.
But the AU doesn’t solely rely on AU-CEWS open source based reports to learn about
potential conflicts. One respondent acknowledged this fact by saying, “No! We [AU-CEWS]
don’t [use intelligence]. But that doesn’t mean that the AU does not have access to intelligence.
There is the Committee of Intelligence Security Services of Africa [CISSA], which directly
reports to the AU Chairperson. There is also the Intelligence Security Committee [ISC] in the
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office of the AUC Chairperson” (R6). These organizations are there to provide information
directly to the offices in which it is required. The Director and the Commissioner of the Peace
and Security Council do attend all statutory meetings” (R6). In particular, one respondent
indicated that, “sensitive issues are not taken by the PSC because the warning reports are based
on open sources. They must be verified through the good offices of the Chairperson” (R4).
According to the PSC framework, [one respondent mentioned that] we [AU-CEWS] are
required to collaborate with CISSA. [After all,] 90 percent of the intelligence data is collected
from open source… [However] the framework does not state how the collaboration should take
place” (R6). The respondent indicated that the AU-CEWS and CISSA experts “had a couple of
meetings. The CISSA experts were interested in our [AU-CEWS] information collection tools
that we send them. These initiatives are good but they are not yet at the level where we want
them to be” (R6). Moreover, the respondent also noted that the CISSA rotates their staff every
other year. That means the two organizations have to renew dialogue every two years. According
to the respondent, such continuous employee shuffling undermines previous initiatives. In order
to prevent this, the respondent recommended that the relationship between the AU-CEWS and
the CISSA needs to be institutionalized. On the other hand, the respondent said that collaboration
between the AU-CEWS and the ISC is not in place because there is no guideline on how such
collaboration should take place.
On the other hand, respondents from the PSD and some PSC members believe that the
main problem doesn’t rest in the source of information, but rather in the capacity to analyze it.
As one respondent put it, “the AU is not lagging behind because they lack information. Instead it
is lagging behind because it lacks the capacity to analyze it” (R12). Other respondents also
questioned the potency of the indicators used by the experts. The situational report is prepared by
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answering 73 questions on 19 indicators having different weighing factors. However, one
respondent noted that the PSC does not categorize conflicts based on their intensity level. As a
result, the respondent said the seriousness of conflicts in countries such as Burundi could not be
identified. Furthermore, another respondent questioned the validity of these indicators by stating,
“the indicator module was developed by member states and they kept those indicators which they
wanted to keep and got rid of those they didn’t want to hear about. Although the module [the
conflict early warning indicators] says it has ‘appropriate early warning indicators’, [its
appropriateness is questionable]. Half of the indicators are useful, half are useless” (R17).
Another respondent supported the aforementioned view, saying that the conflict early
warning signals fail to look at the root causes of most African conflicts. Due to this, the conflict
early warning briefings don’t capture the main cause of the conflicts such as bad governance. For
instance, he asked, “if you consider bad governance as a cause of conflict, then do you think the
leaders of the African countries would be held accountable like those in the United States or the
UK?” (R3).
Yet another respondent emphasized that predicting conflict per se is a very difficult task.
He said, “it is easy to develop early warning by hindsight, but it is very difficult to forecast a
trend. You can be able to trend backward retroactively, but forecasting forward is more
challenging” (R18). One respondent said, “the AU was shocked about what happened in Tunisia,
Libya [the 20111 Arab Spring], and even Mali [violence in 2012] (R3). The AU-PSC members
were in Bamako for a meeting on the 20th of March, 2011, and a coup took place the following
day after they left” (R2). Another respondent indicated that there was no way the AU-CEWS
could have foreseen the Arab Spring by saying, “if you say a man burning himself in rural
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Tunisia on December 2011 would have triggered the Arab Spring on January 2012, everybody
would look at you like you lost your mind” (R19).
Even if early warning signals are persuasive, many respondents thought that the PSC was
overwhelmed by ongoing conflicts to attend to them. As one decision-maker put it, “we are
overwhelmed by the already ongoing conflict. We have to handle these conflicts. Our attention
and resources are consumed by all these flaring issues…striking a balance between the two
[prevention and resolving conflicts] requires wisdom” (R18). Another respondent also said, “The
PSC deals with many ongoing conflicts. These conflicts require attention of the PSC. This
preoccupation with the ongoing conflicts has prevented the PSC from dealing with conflicts that
are not yet violent” (R9). Another decision-maker also attested to this trend by saying, “we
hardly sat to discuss about an eventual crisis in the making” (R3). However, the respondent
stressed that it is not just because the PSC is overwhelmed by existing conflicts that it does not
attend to early warning signals. Rather, it is also because the AU Constitutive Act doesn’t allow
the AU to intervene unless the stage of the conflict is beyond the capacity of the member state.
To summarize, respondents expressed differing opinions regarding the effectiveness of
early warning reports in empowering decision-makers. Some respondents questioned the validity
of the 19 indicators in identifying the root causes of conflict in Africa by indicating that they
don’t address the problem of governance on the continent. For instance, one respondent pointed
out that the indicators don’t gauge the intensity of conflict. Furthermore, others argued that
collecting early warning information from open sources is not sufficient. They stressed the need
to rely on intelligence sources such as CISSA as well. Certain respondents disagreed with this
notion by pointing out that the CISSA and the ISC are primarily engaged in gathering
intelligence and reporting it to the AU Commissioner. This gap between open source and
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intelligence is beginning to be addressed through the regular collaboration between early
warning experts and the intelligence officers. Regardless, however, all respondents agreed that
predicting early warning signals witnessed before the Arab Spring in Northern Africa was a
daunting task that demanded intensive training. Another major problem is the fact that decisionmakers are overwhelmed by ongoing conflict, thereby overlooking potential conflicts. Several
respondents mentioned that, unless something drastic happens, the AU finds it difficult to
confront member states on potential conflicts. In this respect, the decision-makers need to realize
that preventing conflicts is less costly than addressing violent conflicts.
Adaptability: Setting an agenda and responding to emergency
The PSC sets an annual schedule comprising the agenda to be discussed for each month.
These cases could be on ongoing conflicts, new conflicts, or emergency issues requiring urgent
response. The PSC, said one respondent,
“has an annual plan listing the mandatory meetings for each month based on ongoing
conflicts like Somalia. Every year, we have to renew it and every January, there is a
mandatory meeting. There is also an open session where the PSC decides to hold every
year on April to discuss on key areas such as women and children. Also we look at new
conflicts such as the Central African Republic which is proposed to the Chair. Besides,
there is an emergency meeting where the council can be called at any time” (R2).
Another respondent added that most of the PSC agenda is focused on ongoing conflicts
rather than potential conflicts because “the early warning system does not work sufficiently… [in
other words] the preventive approach of at the AU is very weak” (R9).
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Before discussing any agenda the PSC members need to reach an agreement on whether
the agenda, which is organized around multiple issues, is worth discussing. Most of the agendas
are deemed to permit sufficient time for discussion. But, sometimes, conflict early warning
signals that demand an urgent response from the PSC could arise. Thus, in addition to setting
agendas through consensus, the flexibility of the PSC to deliberate on urgent cases is also
critical.
Setting the agenda for discussion in the PSC, as one respondent put it, is a “shared task.
The [PSC] Chair of the month, together with the rest of the [PSC] member states, and the
commission will develop the agenda…When the Chair of the month reaches an agreement with
the AU Commission on the agenda, he or she presents it to the PSC for approval” (R2). Another
respondent indicated that the agenda to be discussed is pushed upward from the early warning
experts in a hierarchical manner. The experts propose the issues to the AU PSD director, who in
turn, forwards it to the PSC commissioner. It is the chairperson in consultation with the
commissioner who decides on how to deal with the early warning. If according to another
respondent, the PSC Chair of the month “agrees with the proposed agenda by the Commission,
he or she will present it to the PSC members for discussion” (R1). He explained the PSC
members don’t reserve the right to reject the agenda.
If there is disagreement on an agenda, taking a majority vote is the final step. But many
respondents noted voting has never taken place because the members give an utmost priority for
consensus through discussion. Even so, bringing a conflict early warning about an AU member
state for discussion is not an easy task. One respondent said, “it is very easy for the PSC to
discuss the cases of small countries. But for bigger countries, it is difficult to table their case in
the agenda” (R2). According to another respondent, countries resist being placed on the agenda
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because they “don’t want to be labeled as having a good governance deficit...everybody wanted
to preserve a good image” (R13). Another respondent shared this view by saying: “let me give
you an example: on the issue of Egypt. The AU-CEWS did so many reports before the situation
got out of hand. And, of course, the issue didn’t make it to the table because Egypt was a
member of the PSC at that time” (R4).
In addition to the influence of member states on the agenda, the internal agenda selecting
procedure of the PSC is normative. According to one respondent, the PSC Chair selects an
agenda based on either the “urgency of the issue or [if] past engagements are considered to have
a spillover effect on neighboring countries [as is the case of] Somalia on Ethiopia” (R2). In some
cases, the respondent also noted that the PSC Chair of the month has the discretion to propose an
issue as has happened in the Lesotho case. One respondent criticized the agenda selection
procedure mainly because it was not based on written rules by saying,
We don’t have any written rules but…the Commission will come with the list of
agendas. They are the ones who come and tell us what issue needs to be discussed.
Because they are better placed to know more than us since they work on the issues,
we don’t reject their proposal…we don’t have a regulatory rule for [setting] an
agenda. It is based on a norm. (R11)
The fact that the PSC selects an agenda based on “norms” as opposed to written criteria
makes it vulnerable to external intervention. As one respondent put it, “it is generally a norm for
many foreign countries to approach the Chair of the month to advice or lobby for a particular
issue to be included in or excluded from the agenda of the month. It has become a tradition”
(R13). This norm has also created a disconnect between the PSC members who decide on the
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agenda and the experts who propose the agenda. Another respondent said, “PSC members can’t
request feedback from the experts. The experts brief the Director who then updates the Chair.
[Furthermore,] the PSC members don’t impart feedback in writing. They may [however] tell the
Chair verbally. For example, some members expressed their concerns on the Burundi agenda by
suggesting that the reports were based on rumors and require further investigation” (R10).
Several respondents indicated that the PSC has sufficient flexibility to respond to
emergency cases. According to one respondent, “if there is an emergency, the Council will be
called at any time of the day” (R2). The respondent noted that the officers elaborate the agenda
to be discussed and distribute it among the PSC members for review and feedback. The
respondent emphasized that the monthly agenda meeting “is considered provisional because it
has to be flexible to accommodate change if there arises an emergency agenda. If there are new
issues that need the attention of the PSC at any time of the month, it is easy to change the
agenda. The PSC can even change the date [for discussing a case] based on the circumstances”
(R11).
If the issue is very urgent, such as the 2014 crisis in Libya, the respondent stated that the
PSC doesn’t even demand “supporting documents, but [would deliberate based on] a briefing
given by its special envoy” (R1). Another respondent also noted that “with regard to
unconstitutional change of government, the PSC gives 48 hours to observe how the
developments will proceed and convene meetings. [This is because] one needs time to collect
sufficient information for decisions. Then, the AUC Chairperson issues a press release. [That is
why illegitimate government in] Burkina Faso was not suspended immediately” (R9). Another
respondent also noted “when the Egyptian crisis erupted on the 3rd of July, the PSC convened a
meeting on the 5th of July” (R3). After sufficient deliberation, however, the respondent pointed
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out that the AU sanctioned Burkina Faso, put pressure on the coup perpetrators who initially
refused to relinquish power, and instituted an interim civilian government.
In summary, the PSC is open to discussion regarding the agenda for the month or
emergency situations in the continent. It doesn’t have preset criteria for selecting an agenda. Due
to this, external lobbyists pressure the Chair of the month to consider their preferred agenda. The
PSC members never vote on response options, but make decisions through consensus. However,
they don’t believe conflict early warning information is flowing in a way that enables them to
decide on early actions. The AUC briefs the PSC, but the briefings do not show the type of
action required from the PSC nor its urgency. On the other hand, there is also an agreement
among the respondents that it has been easier for the PSC to prevent conflicts in smaller
countries, such as AU’s intervention in the Comoros in 2007, rather than the bigger ones.
Moreover, the PSC is open to consider emergency crises which erupt on the continent. For
example, if a coup takes place in member states, the PSC convenes a meeting and issues a press
release on the situation within 48 hours after it happened.
Conclusion
This chapter examined whether the organizational culture of AU facilitates effective early
response. It reviewed the following four pillars of organizational culture: involvement,
organizational learning, capacity of early warning and flow of information, and adaptability to
external challenges. The organizational culture’s involvement dimension of the AU, particularly,
the AU-CEWS and the PSC, is not strong enough to facilitate effective conflict early response.
Part of this has to do with the fact that the organization is still young, especially the AU-CEWS,
which became operational after 2009. It is difficult to expect a strong organizational culture
within this short timeframe.
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The other major challenge has to do with understaffed, undertrained, and regularly
rotated personnel. The organization needs to hire more professionals, train them, and avoid
rotating them to different assignments on a regular basis. It is very difficult to build a strong
organizational culture among two-dozen situation room assistants, liaison officers, and conflict
analysts who are overstretched. One respondent noted the AU is preparing a tailor-made
professional training program for its experts. The outcome of this program remains to be seen.
Furthermore, if liaison officers are regularly rotated to different locations, the AU incurs more
training costs, and it becomes difficult for new officers to build rapport with their AU-CEWS
counterparts.
The AU-CEWS has established a principled working relation with the RECs based on
subsidiarity, complementarity, and comparative advantage. It stages technical meetings with
RECs twice a year. This has enabled AU-CEWS to easily gather information from places where
it lacks regional offices. It has also prevented duplication of effort by allowing the RECs to
handle regional crises due to their close proximity. The downside of this collaboration has been
the resistance of RECs regarding AU’s uncompromising stand against the coup d’état in Guinea
Bissau for example. The other problem has been the inability of the RECs to foresee conflicts as
witnessed in the 2007/8 election related violence in Kenya because IGAD’s CEWARN was only
focusing on pastoralist conflicts (Mwaura, Baechler, & Kiplagat, 2002; Wulf & Debiel, 2009).
Moreover, two of the seven RECs are not yet operational, thereby curbing AU’s ability to gather
information in those regions.
Lack of timely information flow to the AU-CEWS decision-makers is also one aspect f
organizational culture identified in the interview. Some respondents argued the AU-CES doesn’t
utilize some of the key indicators because very few African countries meet those standards. They
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also pointed out that the indicators the AU-CEWS use do not measure the intensity of conflicts.
The respondents were divided over the value of open source information used by AU-CEWS to
prepare warning signals. Instead of collecting information from global media, some argued that
the AU-CEWS should gather intelligence sources from the ground. By contrast, others argued
that the AU already has the CISSA and ISC, which provide the AU Commissioner with
intelligence resources. Given this, they argue it is futile for the AU-CEWS to duplicate their
work. All of these factors are some of the reasons why conflict early warning is not
communicated to the decision-makers on time
Even so, many respondents stressed that it was impossible for the international
community (not just for the AU-CEWS) to forecast the Arab Spring. Although it is cheaper,
preventing conflict remains a very complex endeavor. Several respondents said decision-makers
do not receive warnings on time. However, they admitted that the AU is overwhelmed by
ongoing conflicts. Even if they get warnings about potential crises on time, they will normally
prioritize them by addressing the ongoing conflicts first.
The strongest aspect of AU’s organizational culture rests on its swift ability to address
emergency crises and make decisions. If an emergency crisis such as a coup takes place in a
member state, the PSC members convene immediately and issue a press release concerning AU’s
perspective regarding the issue within 48 hours. Furthermore, the PSC members have a tendency
to reach decisions through consensus as opposed to majority voting. This tradition enables them
to debate intensely and emerge unified. The agenda of the month is also determined through
consensus. However, this could have a negative effect on delivering timely early response
decisions. There is no written standard for selecting the agenda of the month. Due to this,
external lobbyists often pressure the chair of the month to include or exclude a case from the
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PSC table. Furthermore, respondents noted that the PSC tends to enforce its decisions on smaller
countries more readily than it does with bigger and more influential states.
All in all, the AU-CEWS has taken significant steps to strengthen its organizational
culture to prevent conflict in Africa. It is, however, critical for the AU-CEWS to increase the
number of its professionals and implement a sustainable professional development program. The
AU’s collaboration with the RECs and the consensus based relationship within the PSC are also
helpful for conflict early warnings that may indicate a longer time to intervene.
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Chapter Five
The Role of Political Will on AU’s Early Response Decisions

This chapter examines how the political will of AU’s decision-makers impacts the
conflict early response decisions to prevent conflict in the African continent. Political will refers
to “the extent of committed support among key decision-makers of a particular policy solution to
a particular problem” (Post et al., 2010, p. 659). In this chapter, I have assessed three dimensions
of political will. These are as follows: the capability of decision-makers in AU’s conflict early
response process, the commitment of the decision-makers to enforce conflict early response
actions, and the amount of “commonly perceived, potentially effective policy options among the
decision-makers” (Post et. al., 2010, p. 259).
Capability of Key Decision-Makers
The capability of early response decision-makers in the AU is one of the dimensions of
political will. This sub-section examines the legal foundation that entitles AU’s decision-makers
to respond to conflict early warnings in Africa and their acceptance by the public. This subsection also evaluates the capability of these key decision-makers to decide on conflict early
response options while identifying significant challenges, which limit their effectiveness.
Authority to Decide and Capacity to Implement
Decision-makers need the authority to approve decisions that could affect the interest of
the institution or states. The PSC Protocol of AU authorizes the PSC to address peace and
security issues of the continent. According to Article 2 (1) of the AU Peace and Security
Protocol, the PSC is “a standing decision making organ [established] for the prevention,
management, and resolution of conflicts” (2004, p. 6). The same provision contextualizes the
organ as “part of collective security and early warning arrangement [which] facilitate[s] timely
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and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (p. 6). These provisions indicate
PSC has the legal authority to decide on matters of conflict prevention and management issues.
Hence, they make the PSC the legal actor with the authority to approve and pursue conflict
prevention and early response decisions.
The AU legal documents indicate the authority of PSC to decide on conflict early
responses. As of June 2015, the PSC held 508 meetings and issued 456 communiqués, press
statements, and reports. In these meetings the PSC has approved 456 decisions. Almost 95
percent of the 456 decisions are on either an already violent stage of the conflict or post conflict
cases. The remaining five percent are about early warnings. The ways they handle these early
warning decisions are by either delegating RECs to handle them or sending special envoys or the
Panel of the Wise. Some of the cases include IGAD’s involvement in the South-Sudan conflict in
2013 and AUC’s discreet mission to Burundi in 2015. These interventions, although they started
at the early stage of the conflict, failed to prevent the violence. Moreover, the post-conflict cases
are follow-up decisions to prevent the post conflict areas from relapsing into violence.
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Figure 5. 1 Top 16 Countries in the PSC Agenda, 2004 – June 2015
Figure 5.1 shows countries that have been on the PSC agenda at least ten times over the
last 11 years. One common feature of these countries is that they all were already in a violent
conflict stage. The PSC and the AUC chairperson are authorized to engage in conflict early
response actions. In some of these cases, the AUC chairperson has been engaged in discreet
mediation or negotiation efforts. For example, in 2014 the AUC sent a special envoy to Burkina
Faso, Burundi, and Tunisia before the conflict escalated to violence (PSC, Press Relese, 2014).
Nonetheless, almost all of the PSC decisions are on already violent conflict. Thus, why the PSC
decides only on already violent conflicts needs further exploration. Lack of sufficient access to
early warning information and the hierarchy of the PSC levels are some of the reasons
pronounced in the interviews as barriers to the PSC’s role in conflict early response decisions.
Access to Conflict Early Warning: The AUC works to facilitate the activities of the
AU. Among others, the PSD should provide timely conflict early warnings to the PSC. In line
with this, the CEWS produces early warnings and provides them to the PSD. Given the wide
range of areas they have to cover, CEWS’s capacity for producing early warning is limited.
However, CEWS works on 70 plus indicators to monitor and develop early warning signs
throughout the continent. Despite what the CEWS is doing, there are different views as to how
and why early warnings are utilized in the AU.
The interviews with the conflict early warning experts indicated that they send all the
early warning reports to the PSC department decision-makers, namely to the PSD. Once the
information reaches the PSD, the decision to send the warning to the PSC is the ultimate decision
of the PSD and AUC Chairperson. One of the respondents stated that:
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We are part of the PSD- so we send our early warning reports to the director. The
Director will give it to the Peace and Security Commissioner where he might share it
with the Chairperson of the commission. [If they agreed they need to inform the PSC],
they will brief the PSC on a situation. [However] the briefing they give to the PSC might
not be exactly the same as what the expert presented as an early warning report. [Instead]
the commissioner will update the reports based on other information sources such as field
missions. So they include these [additional pieces of information] to prepare the brief
report and provide it to the PSC. So the PSC is not getting the early warning as in where
they tell them [PSC] the scenarios and recommended solutions by the experts. The PSD
will prepare a brief report showing the problem and what they can do. (R4)
Authorities in the PSD also confirm that there is an early warning that comes from the
CEWS. Once the AUC chairperson gets the early warning, she can either use her good offices,
she can send a special envoy to address the issue and later brief the PSC, or she can brief the
PSC when the information arrives. In practice, however, conflict early warning information does
not flow from the PSD to the PSC. In line with this, one respondent stated the absence of a
formal structure to bring early warnings to the PSC as the main problem:
Early warning reports, they are there. They can go to the commissioner or director or
secretariat. It depends on the personal whim of the council – I will not take it to the
council. After all the council does not have a format. So we have it filed. (R17)
Interviews with the PSC members also indicated that they hardly get early warnings, but
they confirmed they get briefings on issues that are already becoming violent. Other PSC
members indicated that they get briefed and get SMS messages on what happens in member
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countries, but they don’t consider them an early warnings. For example, one of the respondents
who also thinks that there is no structure to bring the information from the PSD stated his views
as follows:
You have a whole unit/department that is doing a fabulous job of conflict analysis but the
difficulty you have is how does it [that information] filter up to the members of [PSC]
Council and the chair of the council. What we have been doing of late is that the CISSA
[brief the PSC on peace and security issues in the continent]. [So far], CISSA has done
two or three briefing for us. In their briefings they highlight what to expect and what is
happening. To me, that is the sort of the early warning. (R11)
In some of the conflict cases where many respondents considered the briefing an early
warning, such as the 2014 conflicts in Burundi and Burkina Faso, PSC member states were
aware of the potential violent conflict and the need for their intervention. However, as one of the
respondents suggested, these conflicts made it very difficult for the PSC to utilize the early
warning because the conflict early warning was on governance and constitutional issues of the
countries, which are commonly considered internal affairs of sovereign states.
Hierarchy: The hierarchy of decision-makers, in other words, PSC members and the
heads of states, affects how decisions are accepted by the member states. The PSC is the key
standing decision-making organ. Member states are represented through their embassies, and
their participation can be at three levels: head of states, ministerial, or ambassadorial levels. At
the ambassadorial level, the PSC is required to meet twice a month. As of June 2015, the PSC
had held 508 meetings, and almost 85 percent of them were conducted at the ambassadorial
level. While there are many factors determining the PSC decisions on violent conflict, one of
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them is the hierarchy of power vested in the three levels. As representatives of the member
countries, there is some hierarchical power difference between the PSC council members,
composed mainly of the ambassadors and the country they represent. For example, some of the
respondents stated that “at times Council members are hesitant to discuss early warnings because
they are concerned about the politics – they are worried about their personal interests – career”
(R11). Hierarchy and access are two of the factors that limit authority of the PSC.
Other Aspects of Decision Making: The selection procedure into the PSC provides each
member state an equal opportunity to serve in the Council. Unlike the UN Security Council, no
member state in the PSC holds a permanent membership or a veto power, which consolidates
their equality. The AU Executive Council elects the PSC members from the five African
Regions. For one term, which constitutes three or two years, West Africa provides four regional
representatives, and North Africa provides two representatives, whereas the Eastern, Central, and
Southern regions each contribute three members to the council. Each PSC member holds the
chair in the Council on a rotating basis using the English alphabetical order of the countries (AU,
2015).
The fact that PSC members are composed of different regional representatives offsets the
possibility of bias. As one respondent put it, “even if one country advocates a certain stance and
earns the support of its regional compatriots, there are twelve countries from the four regions that
would see the issue objectively. Besides, it is not always the case that countries take their
regional positions” (R12). According to Article 5 (2) of the PSC Protocol, the fifteen members
are selected based on seven criteria. These criteria are the following: “contribution to the
promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa, participation in conflict resolution,
peace making and peace building, willingness and ability to take up responsibility for regional
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and continental conflict resolution initiatives, contribution to peace fund, respect for
constitutional governance, rule of law and human rights, and commitment to AU financial
obligations” (AU, 2015a).
Although the seven criteria listed above seem feasible, it is very difficult to find
candidates that meet all of them. As one respondent noted:
The Protocol stipulates certain criteria that qualify countries to the PSC membership such
as internal stability, and active peacekeeping involvement. [However] these are not taken
into account [because] only a few countries will be there [eligible]. (R12)
The criteria for countries to represent the PSC have their own effect on the capacity of
member states to deliver their responsibilities, such as conflict prevention. One of the areas
where this incapacity is reflected is that member states don’t allocate enough staff to their
delegates of the PSC. Many respondents reiterated that member countries don’t provide the
required human resources to their embassies that can facilitate their role in the PSC. For
example, one of the PSC representatives stated this as follows:
Yes, political will but also putting the required resources for the structure to function. The
big countries could have five individuals assigned to work but this is not enough. For the
UN Security Council they have so many representatives. When we were member of the
UNSC we devoted over ten people but here we have devoted only three people. (R10)
It is with these insufficient human resources that the AU PSC has to work and it affects
their capacity because Africa is a continent and it becomes very difficult for the PSC
representatives to keep up with the ongoing situation in a timely manner. One of respondents put
this challenge of capacity as follows:
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Many of the embassies that get involved in the PSC don’t allocate enough resources (both
human and financial) to the agenda of the PSC. So the people who are following the
decisions you don’t see them here asking for information. They don’t have an interest to
know, I would assume. They don’t have the capacity to project themselves. Lesotho can’t
know about Guinea-Bissau because it is too far. When we created the AU, it was to pull
the resources together- and resources are not only money and troops. It is also
knowledge. (R5)
Since its establishment, the AU has deployed over 64,000 peacekeepers in the continent.
External donors, such as the United States, Japan, and France, funded 46.43 percent of these
missions (Renwick, 2015). As of April 2015, six of the top ten UN peacekeeping contributors
were African countries (See Table 5.2). Also, as of May 2015, 80 percent of the UN
peacekeepers (composed of more than 80,000 troops) were deployed in nine African
peacekeeping missions in conflict-prone areas, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Darfur, South Sudan, and Mali (Renwick, 2015).
Table 5. 1
Countries’ Contribution of Uniformed Peacekeepers in 2015
Country
Bangladesh
Pakistan
India
Ethiopia
Rwanda
Nepal
Senegal
Ghana
Nigeria
Egypt
Source: Renwick, 2015

Uniformed Personnel Contributed
9,307
8,163
8,112
7,864
5,575
5,316
3,570
3,053
2,975
2,937
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In particular, democratic governance and institutions in Africa have not developed
(Bratton, 2007). There are only a few countries in the continent that meet the “constitutional
governance, the rule of law, and human rights” criteria mentioned above (EIU, 2015). In this
regard, the African Human Rights Strategy has listed several challenges. These include
“inadequate coordination and collaboration among AU and the RECs organs and institutions,
limited capacity of human rights institutions, insufficient implementation and enforcement of
human rights norms and decisions, and limited awareness and access to the human rights
mechanisms” (African Union , 2015, p. 4).
The member states’ financial contribution to the AU is also unsatisfactory. The AU
solicits only 33 percent of its funding from member states and receives the remainder from
external donors. Even when it comes to the 33 percent, the organization has difficulty collecting
the funds. For example, in 2015, the organization managed to collect only 67 percent of the
anticipated $138.5 million from its members. Moreover, only a few countries cover most of the
financial contributions (See Figure 5.2). For example, in 2015, the AU had pledges from South
Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, and Libya to cover 60 percent of AU’s budget.
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Figure 5. 2 AU Member States’ Financial Contribution to the AU Budget

Source: Plaut, 2015

One respondent portrays that AU member states’ failure to contribute to the AU funds as
a significant indicator of deficient political will. He said, “African countries do not have the
political will to contribute to the AU because member states don’t fulfill their dues. Why don’t
they contribute? We don’t have resources? No! We have [resources], but [still] depend on
external funding. The funding is, for sure, not for free. They have so many conditions, they
[donors] have interests in Africa” (R16). The major external donors covering 67 percent of the
AU’s budget are Canada, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Spain, China, Turkey, the European Union, and the World Bank (Plaut, 2015).
Figure 5.2 shows that some African countries have contributed to the continent’s security
more than others. South Africa is the largest financial contributor and has mediated in critical
conflicts in Africa. However, it is not among the top ten peacekeeping countries. Countries such
as Nigeria and Egypt have played a significant role by providing a meaningful amount of
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military, financial, and diplomatic assets to resolve the continental and regional conflicts. Yet
their internal democratic and governance track records remain fragile. Ethiopia is the largest
peacekeeping contributor in Africa, but is not among the top African financial contributors.
Ghana has better democratic and governance institutions and contributes significantly in
peacekeeping. However, it is not one of the largest financial contributors.
The absence of African countries that fulfill all of the PSC criteria has limited the
effectiveness of early response at the AU. As one respondent put it, “We don’t have locomotive
states [a powerful country with military capability and resources to intervene] in Africa. If a
country in Europe misbehaves, the U.S. will come and take action…there is no locomotive state
in Africa because none of them has moral authority on any other African country because none
of them has real democracy. For instance, South Africa might say, ‘let’s act!’ to Burkina Faso,
but they have their own problems [too]” (R17).
Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act stipulates seventeen principles that guide its
functions. Most of these principles have had a visible impact on the security of the African
people. For example, Article 4 (p) declares the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional
changes of governments” (AU, 2000, p. 7). According to the former UN Secretary General, this
article is a unique contribution made by the AU that the UN should emulate. Kofi Annan (2013)
said, “a coup means you would be immediately kicked out [of the AU] as a matter of course. I
hoped and expected the UN to follow the AU’s lead, but that has yet to happen” (p. 182).
Another unique feature of the AU Constitutive Act pertains to conditional intervention.
Article 4 (h) stipulated, “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and
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crimes against humanity” (AU, 2000, p. 7). But the fact that matters need to be approved by the
General Assembly makes it impossible to address urgent matters. As one respondent put it:
The AU Commission is composed of elected officials and they can’t take decisive
action….They are not like the UN Security Council where the ambassadors can
decide to impose peace…Because the UN Charter allows that [it] does not mean that
the AU Constitutive Act allows that too. Even when there is a genocide, the PSC
can’t take action [immediately]. They have to refer it to the AU General Assembly,
to the 53 member states. The 53 minds could disagree and you can imagine…people
being killed and the PSC recommends to the General Assembly, it takes time to
convene all the 53 states and during this time many will die…The Constitutive Act
does not allow real time intervention. (R17)
Most of the functional principles listed under Article 4 recognize state sovereignty. But
respect for sovereignty often bars the AU from playing a significant part in preventing conflicts
on the continent. As one respondent indicated,
The principal of sovereignty is a structure that won’t solve a problem. Although there are
legal agreements signed by the member states, it is not possible for the AU to intervene in
the internal affairs of independent states. The countries remain sovereign and independent.
When Colonel Zida took power [coup d’état] from President Blaise Compaoré [of Burkina
Faso], he said, ‘I don’t care about AU’s decision. I will give power to the civilians when I
think it is right.’ This reaction takes away AU’s power. It undermines its credibility…The
AU exists because the independent states exist and that is why even small countries have
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the power. That is why you have to get some of the bigger countries to back the
implementation of AU’s decisions. (R13)
Many respondents also noted that member states have difficulty balancing the continental
interests with their own national interest. One respondent argued that continental interests should
guide the PSC by saying, “when you are serving in the PSC, you are there to implement the
Protocol. The Protocol does not talk about national interests. We [member states] signed it from
the view of preventing conflicts. [However] there is a lot of nationalism [within the PSC]. The
national interest prevails over continental interest” (R10). Another respondent also indicated that
some countries “want to secure their interests at the expense of other African countries…I might
have some interest on the conflict in another African country and [AU’s proposed] solution
might not serve my [country’s] interest. So, I won’t act on the solution” (R13).
Although the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol advocate continental interests, it is
very difficult for member states to forgo their national interests. One of the reasons is that
member states nominate ambassadors as their PSC representatives. Based on the interviews,
many agree that these ambassadors are less likely to challenge their leaders. As one respondent
put it,
Mostly, the PSC meets at the ambassadorial level, and how much authority would
ambassadors have to influence the decisions in their capitals? How would you tell your
head of states that he/she is wrong? How would you know the information brought to
your attention are factual and real? [After all,] all unrests don’t lead to violent conflict.
(R14)
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Other respondents also pointed out that countries deemed to have potential conflict are
usually defensive. Due to this, one respondent indicated, “the Commission does not put on board
an ongoing situation on a country until [the conflict] is open…Nobody admits the crisis even
when it is there” (R13). Another respondent explained why this is the case by saying,
“AU is an intergovernmental organization. If they tell me there is going to be a conflict in
my country, and I am a government representative here [in the PSC], I will be the first to
tell the AU Commission not to put out the report [because] I have to preserve the good
image of my country. If I don’t do that I will have to pack my bag and leave”. (R8)
In sum, the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol authorize the AU to prevent conflict in
Africa. The respondents identified several hurdles faced by the AU to enforce these agreements
on the ground. The major hurdles discussed above include failure of member states to meet the
PSC selection criteria (lack of sufficient number of strong states to enforce AU’s decisions,
absence of democratic institutions and good governance practices, inadequate role in
peacekeeping/peacemaking, failure to pay arrears to AU Peace Fund), AU member states’
rejection of AU’s early response action in the name of sovereignty, advocating national interests
rather than continental interests by the PSC members, PSC members’ (state ambassadors’)
limited power to enforce decisions, and the long time it takes to convene the General Assembly
for the PSC to request approval to intervene in member states.
The Commitment of AU’s Decision-Makers to Prevent Conflict
Commitment is another indicator to gauge the political will of early response decisionmakers in the African Union. Commitment has the following two: incentives or disincentives
associated with early response decisions and allocation of resources by member states to prevent
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conflict (Post et al., 2010). This sub-section examines AU decision-makers’ commitment to
conflict prevention across these two indicators.
Incentives and Disincentives of Early Response
The AU needs to secure the consensus and collaboration of member states to implement
conflict prevention. In some cases, these countries recognize the incentive of allowing the AU to
intervene. They take advantage of Article 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act, which guarantees “the
right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and
security” (AU Constitutive Act, 2002). For example, in 2007 the Comoros requested the PSC to
intervene and maintain stability after the President of Nzawani, which is one of Comoro’s
islands, refused to step down after finishing his constitutional presidency limit (Massey & Baker
, 2009). Accordingly, the PSC decided to act and conducted an intervention called “operation
democracy” (Gelot, 2012).
The AU decision-makers also initiated other conflict prevention strategies to prevent
violence or stop already violent conflicts. However, the success of the initiative depends on the
willingness of the countries. For instance, one respondent said,
The AUC Chairperson sent the former President of Cape Verde to Tunisia three times.
[And] this attempt improved the situation there because they [Tunisian government] did
not block the mission…they allowed the AU to intervene and there were some
negotiations. They allowed the AU to broker and facilitate a peaceful transition of power.
(R4)
On the other hand, another respondent indicated that the PSC’s response is more effective
when it is dealing with less powerful countries by saying, “it is relatively easier to reach a
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decision about less powerful countries than on stronger states” (R8). Likewise, another
respondent noted, “there is an asymmetric power relation between the big countries and the small
countries... [For example] in 2007, Comoros was brought up to the PSC. When the Colonel took
power by force… [The AU] decided to send soldiers to intervene and overthrow the illegal
government. [The AU] took this decision unanimously. But [if a similar incident] took place in
Tanzania, we would not take this action” (R13).
There are also cases where member states consider AU’s intervention as a disincentive.
As one respondent put it, “it is better to prevent conflicts. But for prevention to take place, the
actors in the host country need to acknowledge that a problem exists” (R9). Similarly, another
respondent provided several cases where the PSC could not convince countries on the council
about the presence of potential conflicts that needed quick resolution by saying,
Even though there are several early warnings, it is difficult to bring it to the attention
of the PSC because of protests. Why? Because they [the member states] don’t want it
to be reported. There was an early warning on Libya [the 2011 Arab Spring] but how
can you tell Gadhafi that you have a problem? The same thing could happen… in
Equatorial Guinea [the pervasive corruption and authoritarian rule led to violence].
[Also] there was a clear signal in Cameroon that violence [in 2014] was going to take
place. Sometimes I think it is very difficult for the PSC to act. That is why the
missions by the Panel of the Wise became so useful. They go secretly and even
Madam Zuma [AU’s Chairperson] and the PSC Commissioner would go. Their role
is preventive diplomacy. They execute preventive mechanisms that are not public
[that are confidential]. (R2)
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The Panel of the Wise plays a key role in offsetting the power imbalance among
countries by dispatching distinguished personalities to negotiate with the conflicting parties
without attracting public attention. This permits the AU to prevent conflicts without causing the
countries to lose face through exposure. One respondent explained this method as follows:
Our prevention is quiet diplomacy…Today, the Chairperson of the AUC could send
the Panel of the Wise…in quiet diplomacy, we don’t want to put the conflicting
parties on the spot…When you start to talk about conflict, you create noise and bring
more problems because the country [the government] does not recognize that they
have a problem and don’t give recognition to the other party [the opposition]. So you
need to work underground. [Then] they can accept the intervention [although]
sometimes it is not easy. (R9)
The Panel of the Wise also plays a critical role because it assumes leaders are not war
mongers and could be convinced to assume the right course through diplomatic engagement. One
respondent said, “it is also about persuasion. If you are a country’s leader, you don’t want the
people to be in conflict. You want people to lead normal lives…what you tell the leader should
[therefore] be conveyed in a persuasive manner” (R10). This friendly approach by trustworthy
individuals incentivizes countries to permit AU’s intervention.
There are also times when the AU determines that prevention is not necessary because it
either determines it is an internal matter or doesn’t want the case to be taken over by external
actors. For example, one respondent mentioned, “when the South Sudan President deposed his
deputy [in 2013], the PSC decision-makers decided this was an internal matter that AU should
not get involved in” (R4). Later on, however, another respondent indicated that the IGAD was
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involved to resolve the conflict, and the AU accepted IGAD’s role through its subsidiarity
agreement with the RECs. In addition, one respondent also noted that member states decide not
to investigate a matter further lest the UN takes over the issue. The respondent mentioned Sudan
as an example by saying,
In the case of Sudan, Egypt always opposed any decision against Bashir. Although
the PSC members were 15, they couldn’t make a decision because of Egypt. As a
result the PSC never voted because the members didn’t want to break the process. If
we fail to resolve it, then it will be taken over by the UN. The PSC members don’t
want that. They are afraid of being perceived as if they can’t handle African matters.
(R1)
To summarize, member countries have reacted to AU’s conflict prevention effort in
different ways. Especially smaller countries, such as Comoros, have considered AU’s
intervention an incentive. On the other hand, it has been difficult for the AU to get involved in
larger countries such as Libya. The power asymmetry among member states has also curtailed
AU’s effectiveness. Big countries, such as Egypt, have pressured and blocked the PSC from
taking a decision in the case of Sudan. The PSC members are also protective of external
intervention on African matters. The Panel of the Wise has played a key role in abridging power
asymmetry among countries as well as incentivizing countries to deal with the AU in a cordial
and confidential manner.
Commitment as Financial Contribution
When the OAU was established in 1963, its founders consented to shoulder its budgetary
needs by themselves. Article XXIII of the 1963 OAU Charter declared that member states have
pledged to fund their Union regularly. They agreed to calculate each member’s contribution
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using the UN “scale of assessment.” They also concurred that no country’s contribution should
exceed 20 percent of the total OAU budget (OAU, 1963). The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action in
1980 also stressed the following:
Africa must cultivate the virtue of self-reliance. This is not to say the continent
should totally cut itself off from outside contributions. However, these outside
contributions should only supplement our efforts: they should not be the mainstay for
our development. (Lagos Plan of Action, 1980)
Despite the above declarations, the OAU was not successful in soliciting its budget from
its member states. As Van Walraven (2010) put it as follows:
Even if member states paid their dues, consistent delays in actual transfers
complicated functioning. While members owed $4 million in 1971, debts had grown
to $16 million a decade later and, by 1986, never dropped below $35 million mark,
i.e., well over an entire annual budget. For the period 1965-80 only half the
membership could retrospectively boast of a payment record not marred by
arrears…If some countries battled against extreme poverty or turmoil, others used
non-payment to express dissatisfaction with the OAU policies…These
arrears…show the fact that a small number of more important countries were always
responsible for half of the budget or more. (p. 39-40).
The AU Constitutive Act did not replicate this Article XXIII of the 1963 OAU Charter
formally but continued to utilize it by adding Article 23, which levied sanctions on countries that
defaulted. Article 23 (1) of the Constitutive Act states the following:
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The Assembly shall determine the appropriate sanctions to be imposed on any
Member State that defaults in the payment of its contributions to the budget of the
Union in the following manner, denial of the right to speak at meetings, to vote, to
present candidates for any position or post within the Union or to benefit from any
activity or commitments. (AU Constitutive Act, 2002)
If countries fail to comply with AU’s sanctions, the Article 23 (2) of the Constitutive Act
authorizes the AU to take stringent measures. These include “denial of transport and
communications links with other Member States, and other measures of a political and economic
nature to be determined by the Assembly” (AU Constitutive Act, 2002). Despite these sanctions,
however, member states continued to accumulate arrears. For instance, the OAU created the
Peace Fund in 1993 in order to cover the cost of African countries participating in peacekeeping.
Between 1993 and 2005, however, the Organization (OAU/AU) managed to collect only $70
million where $45 million was paid by external donors (Williams, 2011).
The failure of countries to pay arrears has left few dominant countries to take on the
lion’s share of AU’s financial contribution. In particular, Gadhafi’s Libya paid the arrears of
several African countries. Several commentators believed that Gadhafi paid for those countries
so that they could regain the votes which they lost as a result of the sanctions, which would lead
them to support Libya’s foreign policy within the AU. For example, Gumede (2005) wrote as
follows:
Gaddafi never hesitated to use his vast oil and gas riches to promote his foreign
policy objectives in Africa… At Sirte [in 1999], for example, he paid the arrear
membership fees of The Gambia, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad,
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Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Niger, Malawi, and Mali to
enable them to meet OAU requirements for participation in the pre-AU proceedings
and voting. (p. 209)
In 2004, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) concluded, “the
AU cannot be funded solely by traditionally unreliable financial contributions of member states
or outside support. Relying principally on assessed contributions has proven unsustainable”
(UNECA, 2004, p. 65). Between 2003 and 2005, the AU sanctioned Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sao Tomé and Principe, Seychelles,
Somalia, and the Union of Comoros for not paying their arrears (AU, 2003; 2004; 2005). In
2006, it added Eritrea and Mauritania onto its list of sanctions and excluded Somalia due to its
conflict situation (AU, 2006). In 2005 and 2006, only 12 countries paid their arrears. This
number increased to 23 countries in 2007 and 29 countries in 2008 (Engel, 2015; Hanson, 2009).
In July 2005, the AU adopted a “new Scale of Assessment as proposed based on the
principle of Capacity to Pay of Member States with the ceiling of 15% and without floor rate”
(AU, 2005a). Accordingly, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, South Africa, and Algeria volunteered to
cover up to 15 percent of the AU’s budget (AU, 2005a). Although this payment plan was set to
be reviewed every three years, “no Assembly or Executive Council documents available have
mentioned the scale” (Gathii, 2011, p. 247-248). Since 2006, the five African countries
mentioned above contributed 75 percent of the member states’ budget for the AU (Williams,
2011). In particular, the Libyan government under Gadhafi has been contributing up to 15
percent of the AU’s budget while paying off the arrears owed by other countries, thereby
increasing Libya’s total contribution to more than 20 percent (Chotia, 2011; Williams, 2011).
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After the removal of Gadhafi from power, the AU begun to seriously consider alternative
sources of financing. In July 2011, the chairperson of the AU at that time, Dr. Jean Ping, sent a
special envoy with a letter appointing Nigeria’s former President Olusegun Obasanjo as the
Chairperson of the High Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union
(NEPAD, 2011). The NEPAD (2011) brief summarized the challenges and efforts to bring forth
alternative solutions of financing to the AU as follows:
It is clear that the current financing arrangement for the AU dependent on assessed
contributions of African Member States and Partners Fund is no longer adequate,
sustainable and reliable to meet the growing needs of the Union. Delays in payment
of contributions by Member States, coupled with the difficulty in accessing partner
funds…are increasingly impacting negatively on the pace of implementation of the
Union’s activities, projects, and programs. These are major challenges that deserve
urgent attention and all the technical analyses conducted so far have confirmed that
options identified as alternatives…will not only have a significant revenue impact for
the Union but will also be equitable and efficient. The options include import levy,
tax on air tickets, and tax on insurance premiums. Some of these options are already
being applied and have proven extremely successful in some Member States and
RECs, such as tax on air tickets in Senegal and import (community) levy in the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It is the Commission’s
wish that this long standing issue would be acted upon decisively once and for all for
inaction is no longer an option if the Union is to succeed in addressing its numerous
challenges. (NEPAD, 2011)
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The above remark shows a clear resolve by the Union to free itself from external funding.
Meanwhile, the AU has continued to diversify its reliance on traditional western donors by
welcoming China. In addition to building a new headquarter building worth $200 million
(alongside its furniture) for the AU’s 2,500 seat grand hall in 2012, China also pledged to
provide $95 million (a huge amount considering AU’s annual budget of $270 million) for the
AU over three years (York, 2012).
As of 2015, the 53 African member states contribute only 28 percent of AU’s $500
million operating budget (AFP, 2015). In addition to this, the AU solicited most of the $750 it
needed to support peacekeeping missions from external donors (AFP, 2015). The current Chair
of the Union, President Mugabe, said, “over 70 percent of our budget is foreign funded. This is
not sustainable” (AFP, 2015). Thus,”given the high financial dependence of the AU on external
power, AU member states and AU organs could not opt out for keeping external actors out of the
regional body” (Leninger, 2015, p. 63).
In January 2015, AU’s heads of states congregated in South Africa. During this meeting,
AU’s finance minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala proposed an action plan to raise member states’
contribution in order to cover 100 percent of the operational budget, 75 percent of the program
budget, and 25 percent of the peace operation expenses in a five-year period, effective on 2016.
Member states could pay their dues either directly from their state treasury or by levying $10 on
air tickets for international flights from Africa, by imposing a two-dollar tax on hospitality
services, or by charging two-dollars for SMS messages.
The AU finance minister’s plan determined the individual contribution of member states.
The countries are categorized into three groups based on their total GDP. Countries whose total
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GDP exceeds four percent of the entire continent’s GDP would cover 60 percent of the budget.
Countries whose GDP ranged from one to four percent of the continental GDP would cover 25
percent of AU’s budget. And those countries whose GDP was lower than one percent of the
continental GDP would cover 15 percent of AU’s total budget. Most African countries (36 out of
54) are included in the third category. Twelve African countries, namely Cameron, the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya,
Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia, are in the second category. And six countries,
Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa, were identified in the first tier.
The civil wars, humanitarian crises, and terrorist threats in the continent pose a
significant challenge for countries to pay without defaulting. The same declaration, which
endorsed a five-year budget plan, also stated that the AU “strongly condemns the continuation of
hostilities in Libya…and reiterates its grave concern over the worsening humanitarian
crisis…and expresses deep concern about the worsening scourge of terrorism in Libya” (AU,
2015, p. 4). The declaration also expressed concern for the scourge of terrorism “in north eastern
Nigeria and the neighboring countries by Boko Haram, in Mali and the larger Sahel, as well as in
North Africa, by various terrorist groups” (AU, 2015, p. 4). It also stressed “the need for urgent
and effective neutralization of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and all
other negative forces and armed groups operating in East of the DRC” (AU, 2015, p. 2).
In summary, African leaders have repeatedly made declarations on the need to be selfreliant. The OAU Charter of 1963, the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980, and the 2005 proposal to
review the payment scales serve as major examples. However, they relinquished their
commitment several times by accumulating large arrears. As a result, the AU relied on external
donors such as the EU, the United States, Japan, and China; and dominant African countries such
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as Libya, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, and South Africa. In particular, the Libyan government under
Gadhafi secured huge influence on the AU by paying off the arrears of other countries. After
Gadhafi, the AU begun to craft another plans to secure self-reliance in 2015. This ambitious plan
intends to cover 100 percent of AU’s operating budget, 75 percent of its program budget, and 25
percent of its peace operation cost internally. However, the threat of terrorism in the most
African countries, particularly on the traditionally large funders, such as Nigeria and Libya,
makes it difficult to foresee the successful implementation of the 2016 budget plan.
Commonly Perceived Early Response Options and Effectiveness in the AU
Post et al. (2010) identify “commonly perceived, potentially effective policy solution” as
the third dimension of political will (p.660). In this sub-section, I have examined two indicators
of commonly perceived conflict early response options. The first indicator inquires whether AU
decision-makers have converged on similar response options to prevent a crisis situation. I have
used the conflict in Burundi as a case to analyze this question. By focusing on the 2014/2015
conflicts in Burundi, it is relatively easier to trace the involvement of PSC and the AUC.
Besides, Burundi was a member of the PSC while the conflict started. I have traced the decisions
and stances of the AU–CEWS decision-makers to prevent violent conflict. In the second section,
I have explored the effectiveness of AU decision-makers’ response mechanisms to prevent
conflicts in Africa. This indicator evaluates the response options the AU- PSC has and their
implementation.
Consensus on Conflict Early Response Decisions
The Case of Burundi: The civil war in Burundi ended after twelve years following the
signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2005 (Coleman, 2015; Ndikumana, 2005). This
agreement has been considered as a successful power-sharing agreement that enabled Burundi to
transition to a post-conflict country (Vandeginste, 2015). One core element of this peace
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agreement was a power-sharing arrangement between the conflicting parties where “40 percent
of the parliament seats were reserved for the Tutsi minority and 60 percent of the seats to Hutu as
they are the majority” (Coleman, 2015, p. 9). President Pierre Nkurunziza, who led the National
Council for the Defense of Democracy- Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
party, has been in power for the past ten years (Vandeginste, 2015).
On March 21, 2014, the government of Burundi presented a draft proposal to amend the
constitutional provision on term limits of presidency (Nduwimana, 2014). This amendment
extended the term limit of the presidency for the elected party from two to three terms, thereby
violating the constitutional provision (Schneider, 2015; Vandeginste, 2015). The constitutional
amendment requested by the ruling party is intended to extend the term for the incumbent
President Pierre Nkurunziza. The opposition parties, as well as the general public, voiced
discontent against this proposed change through demonstrations, culminating in violence. The
ruling party CNDD-FDD insisted that President Pierre Nkurunziza should run for president by
confirming him as their only candidate (Schneider, 2015). Despite the party’s plea for the change
on the constitution, there were some members of the party who disagreed with the idea of having
the current president run for the third term (African Center for Strategic Studies, 2015). Due to
this, the parliament rejected the proposed constitutional change (Nduwimana, 2014).
Subsequently, the government of Burundi took the proposal to the constitutional court,
which ruled the action as constitutional (Ntomba, 2015). On May 4, 2015, the constitutional
court of Burundi decided the constitutional interpretation of provision 96 allows the current
president to run for the third term. Hence, the president’s term was amended, thereby enabling
the incumbent president to run for a third term in 2015 (African Center for Strategic Studies,
2015). Meanwhile, those against the court ruling expressed their refusal in demonstrations,
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which turned violent. The army grasped this opportunity to stage a coup d’état, but was
unsuccessful (Hatcher, 2015; Njuguna & Melanie , 2015). The chaos consumed the lives of
seventy people and displaced 100,000 people, who fled to the neighboring countries of Rwanda
and Tanzania (Vandeginste, 2015).
Conflict Early Warning – On Burundi
Several parties, including AU-CEWS conflict experts, have expressed alarm over the
looming conflict in Burundi. On March 15, 2015, the News Highlights of the AU- CEWS
Situation Room reported, “the concern of UN on the violent confrontation between the police
and members of opposition in Burundi, Secretary general Ban Ki-moon is urging both the
government and political parties to de-escalate tensions and to campaign political violence ahead
of the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015” (AU-CEWS, 2015). The CEWS experts
that I interviewed stated that they had developed an early warning on the situation on Burundi
beginning the moment when the incumbent president initiated the process to change the
presidency terms that triggered public demonstrations. The ISS Addis Ababa branch also focused
on Burundi in its Early Warning Issues for April 2014 report. This report reconfirmed the
conflict early warning signs and the concerns of the AU. AU’s special representative for the
Great Lakes Region also voiced the concern of the AU about the political developments in
Burundi on February 2014 (ISS, 2014).
Respondents from PSC also confirmed that AU-CEWS experts had reported conflict
early warning on the situation in Burundi when the president initiated constitutional amendment.
One respondent stated that the chair of the month for April 2014, who was from Nigeria, brought
up the issue to be framed for discussion. Another respondent noted that when the representatives
from Burundi were asked to respond, they protested, claiming that the concern was not based on
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credible evidence and that the conflict warning was merely established on false rumors. Due to
this, the PSC concluded that the AUC should engage in a field visit to Burundi and determine
what was taking place on the ground.
Although this decision of verifying the credibility of the conflict early warning
information was the right decision, taking more time for fact finding exacerbated the already
growing tension. From the very beginning, the issue of Burundi in the PSC agenda was
considered as a conflict early warning case by many respondents. For instance, the Chairperson
of the AUC tweeted, “I could see from where I sit that there was trouble going to brew in
Burundi. That’s why I took the initiative to even go myself” (Zuma D., 2015a). This clearly
shows there was a conflict early warning. However, the divergent view of member states,
particularly Burundi--a member of the PSC during that time, prevented the PSC from tabling the
case in their monthly agenda. Instead, the AUC sought to prevent the potential for violent
conflict by sending a high level mission to Burundi. The AUC chairperson also visited Burundi (
(ISS, 2015b).
Violent Incidents and AU-CEWS’s involvement
On March 2014, the court of Burundi blocked the change of constitution by the president.
One month later, the President ordered the UN senior official to leave the country following UN
warning regarding the situation in Burundi (BBC, 2015). The AU-CEWS’s News Highlight also
reiterated the political instability in Burundi on March 2014. The conflict intensified when the
constitutional court ruled in favor of the President’s reelection almost one year later. As shown in
the preceding section, the nomination of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s for reelection in 2015
ignited massive demonstration, which culminated in violence (UNSC, 2015).
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The PSC convened to discuss the conflict in Burundi on March 5, 2015 and engaged in
the process through the AUC. On April 30, 2015, the commissioner for Peace and Security
briefed the PSC about the security situation of Burundi. The PSC issued a press release where it
confirmed its support for the AUC chairperson’s stand on Burundi. The Council:


Reiterated its concern about the serious threats that the prevailing situation in

Burundi poses to peace, security and stability in the country, with far reaching
implications for the whole region.


Renewed its urgent appeal for restraint and dialogue, to help overcome the current

difficulties, preserve the gains made and deepen democracy and the rule of law, in
accordance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.


Underlined its rejection of violence and its demand for the scrupulous respect of

human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as for the disarmament of all militias
and other illegal armed groups. (PSC, 2015e, p. 1)
Despite the prompt involvement by the AU and the EAC in Burundi, the conflict
continued to escalate. Meanwhile, the president continued to bid for a third term amidst strong
opposition from the opposition parties and the general public.
The Dialogue: Negotiation Conditions and Position of Decision-Makers
Following the continued threat of violence in Burundi, the UN, AU, EAC, and other
regional organizations called for a peaceful dialogue. These organizations actively engaged in
mediating between the conflicting parties – the opposition and the government of Burundi. The
UN sent a special envoy, Said Djinnit, to facilitate a dialogue between the Burundian
government and the opposition parties on April 28, 2015. The East Africa Community (EAC),
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), AU,and the International
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Conference on the Great Lakes Region also participated in the dialogue (UNSC, 2015a). The
discussion began on May 5, 2015 but was suspended three days later (UNSC, 2015a). Although
the AUC sent a special envoy to facilitate the process, it “failed to either kick-start the
dialogue… or persuade [President] Nkurunziza to renounce his candidature” (ISS, 2015b, p. 3).
The dialogue resumed on May 20, 2015, leading to five negotiation-proposals listed below:
1) Appeasement measures & mutual commitment
2) Respect of the constitution and Arusha Agreement in the election process
3) Management of the electoral calendar
4) Guarantees and measures for peaceful elections
5) Protection of constitutional rights (PSC, 2015a, p. 5)
According to the AUC Chairperson’s report to the PSC of June 14, 2015, the parties
disagreed on two main points, namely suspension of demonstration and allowing President Pierre
to be reelected (PSC, 2015a). However, they reached consensus to postpone the election day and
permit media outlets to resume their programs (PSC, 2015a). The dialogue was briefly
interrupted on May 23, 2015 due to the assassination of an opposition leader and resumed five
days later. Nonetheless, the parties failed to agree because the opposition parties refused to
accept the nomination of the incumbent president for reelection while the government refused to
release the opposition political leaders imprisoned during the demonstration (PSC, 2015a).
Despite repeated setbacks, the AU did not give up on Burundi. The PSC heads of states
met in Johannesburg on June 13, 2015 and made the following declarations on Burundi:
(i) The resumption of dialogue between all the Burundian parties within one week
following the adoption of the present communiqué, under the facilitation of the AU,
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the UN, the EAC and the ICGLR, with the support of the concerned members of the
international community. Council invites the Chairperson of the Commission to
immediately initiate the necessary consultations for the operationalization of this
international facilitation, under the auspices of the Chair of the EAC;
(ii)

The inter-Burundian dialogue, building on the work already done with the

facilitation of the UN, shall focus on the measures to be taken to create conditions
conducive to the organization of free, fair, transparent and credible elections, as well
as on all the matters on which the parties disagree;
(iii)

The date of the election shall be set by consensus between the Burundian parties,

in the spirit of the EAC communiqués of 31 May 2015 requesting a postponement of
the elections, and on the basis of a technical assessment to be undertaken by the UN;
(iv)

The immediate deployment of AU human rights observers and other civilian

personnel, as agreed in communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(DVII). Council reiterates its call
to the Government of Burundi to extend its full cooperation to this process;
(v)

The deployment of AU military experts, both from the region and other regions of

the continent, in collaboration with the Government and other concerned actors, to
verify the process of disarming the militias and other armed groups. This group of
experts, whose strength shall be determined by the Chairperson of the Commission, in
consultation with the region, will submit regular reports on the implementation of the
disarmament process [extremist militia group Imbonerakure, which functions as the
youth wing of President Pierre Nkurunziza ruling party]; and
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(vi)

The deployment of an AU election observer mission, if conditions for the

organization of free, fair, transparent and credible elections, in accordance with the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, are met. (PSC, 2015b, p. 2)
Although the aforementioned declarations were intended to address the conflict in
Burundi, they left out an important element at the core of the conflict, i.e., whether President
Nkurinzziza ought to run for president. In any event, the government of Burundi, which was also
a member of the PSC at that time, rejected the PSC’s proposals (ISS, 2015a). Many reports
observed differences among the decision-makers on the Burundi’s president candidacy for
reelection (ISS, 2015a; ISS, 2015b; Parrin, 2015). The ISS report also indicates that there was no
willingness from the heads of state to act on Burundi at the early stage and AU official the ISS
interviewed stated, “we asked the heads of state over and over to do something about Burundi,
but no-one wanted to”(ISS, 2015b).
The AUC chairperson was against the reelection of President Nkuruniziza. In an
interview with CCTV, the AUC Chairperson stated, “my view is that if there is a constitution, it
should be respected. If there is a need to amend it, there should be consensus across the country
about its amendment. It cannot be done unilaterally by one section of the population” (Zuma D.
N., 2015). Furthermore, on May 7 2015, she responded to the decision of Burundi’s
constitutional court by tweeting, “other than the Burundi’s court, all interpretations of the
constitution and Arusha Agreements are clear that there shouldn’t be third term” (Zuma D. ,
2015b).
The EAC member states (Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) also had different
views regarding the Burundian crisis. While the President of Tanzania was opposed to the
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reelection of Burundi’s incumbent president, Rwanda did not approach the case on the
unconstitutionality of the president’s term. Rwanda did not want the issue of reelection to be
questioned because Rwanda’s president was also hinting on changing his own country’s
constitution and running for a third term, which was subsequently approved in 2015 (Mutambo,
2015). Finally, the EAC decided that Burundi should postpone the Election Day (Mutambo,
2015).
On November 13 2015, PSC of the AU held its 557th meeting and decided to deploy 100
military and police personnel by 15th of December (PSC, 2015d). As a follow up to this decision
the PSC held another meeting on December 17 and passed a resolution that the African
Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) would have 5000 military personnel
and police (PSC, 2015c). The PSC communiqué further laid out 96 hours timeframe for Burundi
authorities to express their acceptance of the AU peacekeepers’ deployment (Williams P. , 2015).
Furthermore, the 565th communiqué stated that the need for intervention from the AU Assembly
if there is any refusal to accept the implementation of 5000 peacekeepers’ deployment (PSC,
2015c). However, the Burundi’s parliament rejected PSC’s decision unanimously (Allafrica,
2015).
The PSC has held several meetings as a follow up to the rejection of the peacekeepers by
the Burundian Government. After unsuccessful attempts to convince the government of Burundi
to allow the deployment of MAPROBU, the PSC decided not to intervene. According to the PSC
communiqué issued on January 29, 2016 the PSC abandoned the intervention because of the
following reason:
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[The PSC] Considers it premature to send such force to Burundi …[instead they decided]
to dispatch a high level delegation to Burundi to meet with the highest authorities of
Burundi, as well as with other Burundian stakeholders, to hold consultation on the
inclusive Inter-Burundian dialogue. (PSC, 2016e, p. 2)
According to Williams (2015) the PSC’s decision was based on the reports of human
rights abuse documented by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ factfinding mission and AU’s human rights observers. However, the decision-makers did not have
the same stand on intervention in Burundi. For instance, President of the Gambia, which was a
PSC member, openly rejected the idea of MAPROBU at the AU Summit, AU Assembly and the
PSC meeting at the heads of States level (Mccormick, 2016). The lack of political will from the
leaders of Burundi and the challenge of enforcing decision has affected the decision of AU to
intervene (Cocodia, 2016). Generating consensus on the early response decision with recipient
country authorities such as Burundi is crucial. However, the implementation of AU’s power to
intervene during certain circumstance such as crime against humanity and genocide requires
strong consensus among the AU decision-makers than the leader of the country.
In summary, the above discussion shows the different stands among decision-makers on
how to respond to the Burundi crisis. First, the PSC members failed to reach consensus on
tabling the Burundian crisis for discussion partly because Burundi was also a member of the PSC
at that time. These divisions prevented the early warning signal (which was timely) from being
translated in effective early response. Meanwhile the political situation of Burundi became
violent and the PSC started to engage on the issue openly. However, the decisions makers still
did not have commonly agreed effective early response solution. Furthermore, EAC heads of
states were also divided on the legitimacy of President Nkurinziza’s decision to extend his term
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by changing the constitution. Yet their decision did not question President Nkuriniza’s
presidency term change, which is the root cause of the conflict. Moreover, the PSC’s decision to
intervene in Burundi was a strong stand which could have been a precedent useful to limit the
power of sovereignty. However, the PSC reversed its decision of intervention can undermine its
legitimacy and acceptance by member countries and the people.
Effectiveness of AU Early Response Mechanisms
In 2002 the AU adopted the Peace and Security Protocol because of the costliness of
peacekeeping operations (IPI, 2012). The CEWS Handbook identified the goal of early response
as the de-escalation of conflict. The handbook also identified the following two conflict
prevention options described by Wallensteen and Moller’s (2003) as follows:
There are two ways of understanding conflict prevention. One concerns the direct
preventive actions: a crisis is judged to be in a dangerous phase of military
escalation, intensification or diffusion. Thus, there is a need to act to prevent
increasing dangers. The actor is a third party, whose interests are less immediate and
not directly linked to the incompatibility between the primary parties. A second
concern is the structural prevention, where the idea is to create such conditions that
conflicts and disputes hardly arise or do not threaten to escalate into militarized
action. Here a third party could be involved in furnishing assistance for such
conditions to develop, for instance. These two types of prevention are called light,
direct or operational prevention on the one hand and deep or structural on the other
hand, depending on the scholar. (p. 6)
The AU is mostly preoccupied with direct approach to conflict prevention. There are
hardly any cases where it has implemented a structural approach to prevent conflict. The most
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commonly utilized direct conflict prevention instruments are mediation efforts (where it sends
special envoys or the Panel of the Wise), sanctions, and suspension of member states which
violate the principles stipulated in AU’s Constitutive Act.
Articles 8 (5), 9(1), 10 (2), and 11 (3) of the PSC Protocol identify the AU Assembly, the
AU Chairperson, the PSC members, and the PoW as the actors in AU’s conflict prevention
efforts respectively. Article 8 (5) authorizes the AU Assembly to establish mediation committees
composed of individuals, groups, or state actors. Article 9(1) of the Protocol states that the PSC
can initiate early response directly or indirectly. It can use the AUC Chairperson or the PoW to
implement its decisions. On the other hand, Article 10 (2) of the Protocol authorizes the
Chairperson to identify potential crises and present them to either the PSC or the PoW.
Furthermore, Article 11 (3) empowers the PoW to advice either the Chairperson or the PSC
members on preventing conflicts.
Previously, the AU has been engaged in several mediation efforts whose results remain
contentious. For example, between 2007 and 2014, AU’s chairpersons have dispatched special
envoys, facilitators, special representatives and special joint representatives to at least thirteen
African countries. These include the following: “special envoys (to Guinea, Madagascar,
Guinea-Bissau, Comoros, Niger); facilitators (such as the case of Burundi and the CAR); Special
Representatives (Somalia, Great Lakes Region, Liberia, CAR), and Special Joint Representatives
(Darfur); Chief Mediators (as in Mali) or Joint Mediators (as in Madagascar)” (Chergui, 2015, p.
5). Although many of AU’s mediation efforts led to peace treaties, they failed to secure
sustainable peace in the continent. These include the following: the peace agreements of DRC in
1999 and 2003, Somalia in 2004, Darfur in 2006, Burundi in 2000 and 2006, and Zimbabwe in
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2008 (Nathan, 2009). Nathan (2005) listed eight challenges facing the AU’s mediation efforts
and I have summarized as follows:


The mediation effort is not institutionalized



External state intrusion (mainly because mediation isn’t institutionalized)



Lack of mediation experts



Inadequate resource allocation



Failure to establish rapport between conflicting parties



Difficulty of finding non-partisan mediators



Proclivity to impose punitive measures



Challenge of enabling conflicting parties to take ownership of the mediation
process. (Nathan, 2005)

The AU took note of Nathan’s assessment and initiated the 2008-2010 Work Program to
Enhance AU’s Mediation Capacity. The ultimate goal of this program is to enable the AU “build
a permanent capacity able to manage and support the AU mediation initiatives” (Banim, 2010, p.
8). The specific results expected from this program were:
• AU structures which can support mediation interventions including strategies,
procedures, funding mechanisms, recruitment and deployment systems,
• Roster of African mediators, experts and support staff available for AU mediation
interventions,
• AU mediation capacity to plan, deploy, manage, and monitor mediation
interventions,
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• AU mediation training curricula, including AU mediation handbook, and conduct
training courses and
• Identification of lessons learned and best practices in African mediation experience
(p. 8)
In 2009, the AU organized a seminar on mediation to draw lessons from its engagements
in Sudan, Guinea, Somalia, Burundi, Comoros, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic.
From Burundi, the AU noted that the coalition among multiple countries and organizations has
facilitated the peacemaking process until 2010. However, it also acknowledged that some of the
Burundian participants failed to trust the lead mediator, Julius Nyerere (Govender & Ngandu,
2009). On the other hand, AU’s mediation effort in Comoros led to the dispatch of AU’s
peacekeepers to the country in 2009. Although the peacekeepers stabilized the country, it
encountered resource constraint and a difficulty in coordinating the role of external actors such
as France, the La Francophonie Organization (OIF) (AU and HD Center , 2011; Govender &
Ngandu, 2009). AU’s collaboration with ECOWAS, the UN, the EU and several countries such
as the US, Germany, Spain, Japan, Morocco, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, and Sierra
Leone to impose sanction on Guinea after the 2008 also pressured the perpetrators to acquiesce
with the proposal to establish a transitional government until a national election takes place in
2010.
The participants of the 2009 AU seminar on mediation identified the major mediation
challenge facing the AU as the lack of “more advanced mediation strategies and tactics in order
to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts [through]…further research and in-depth discussion to
inform the development of a comprehensive mediation strategy for the AU” (Govender &
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Ngandu, 2009, p. 37). To this end, the participants looked forward to the “first Triennial Review
of the UN-AU-10-Year Capacity-Building program [as] a good opportunity to take into
consideration the outcomes of the…seminar” (p. 38).
Another very important aspect of mediating conflict in Africa pertains to the
collaboration between the AU and the RECs. A seminar organized by the AU on October 2009
put forth a set of criteria to determine whether the AU or the RECs should take a lead in
mediating conflicts. These are listed as follows:


Intimate knowledge of the conflicts and history



Personal relations with the parties that will ease contact



Utility or cohesion of the organization in relation to the conflict, and



Acceptance from disputant parties. (Govender & Ngandu, 2009, p. 22)

It was based on the above criteria that AU delegated the ECOWAS to stabilize the crisis
in Mali following the coup d’état on March 22, 2012. The AU mandated the ECOWAS to
facilitate the return of Mali to civilian rule, reform its security sector, and empower the civilian
government to neutralize terrorism and criminal activities in the country. The AU also issued
Resolution 2071 which authorized ECOWAS and Northern African countries such as Algeria
and Mauritania to facilitate negotiation and strengthen Mali’s peace enforcement capacity (AU,
2014).
In 2012, the AU formed “Standard Operating Procedures for Mediation Support”
(Chergui, 2015). The purpose of these efforts was to equip the AU with a systematic and
effective conflict mediation capacity. To this end, the AU outlined nine operating procedures
such as creating a mediation team that has the expertise and capacity (see Appendix D).
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Furthermore, the AU published a handbook of conflict mediation in 2014. This handbook is
“intended to facilitate an engagement with the theory and practice of mediation within the AUmediated interventions” (AU, 2014, p. 9). This handbook outlined AU’s mediation strategy as
having twelve guidelines such as helping the conflicting parties address the root causes of the
conflict (see Appendix E)
The AU has made an earnest effort to evaluate its mediation practice and rectify its
drawbacks. It has paid due regard to scholarly assessment given by Nathan (2005) and initiated
discussions to review its performance since 2008. The outcome of these deliberations has
resulted in the formation of AU’s mediation strategy in 2014. The effectiveness of AU’s
mediation strategy remains to be seen. Besides mediation, the AU also imposes sanctions as a
conflict prevention mechanism. The AU imposes sanctions on African regimes that take power
unconstitutionally. Between 2003 and 2014, the AU has imposed sanctions on ten countries (see
Table 5.2).

Table 5. 2
AU’s Sanction on Member States from 2005 to 2014
Country Name

Sanction

Central African Republic

March 2003-June 2005; March 2013-cont.

Togo

February 2005-May 2005

Mauritania

August 2005-April 2007; August 2008-June 2009
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Guinea-Conakry

December 2008-December 2010-April 2011

Niger

August 2009-March 2011

Eritrea

April 2009-January 2011

Madagascar

March 2009- January, 2014

Cote d’Ivoire

December 2010-April 2011

Republic of Guinea-Bissau

April 2012- May, 2014

Mali

March 2012-October 2012

Egypt

July 2013-2014.

Comoros

October, 2007- June 2008

Source: (Hellquist, 2014; Vines, 2013; Williams, 2011).
The AU has continuously raised the stakes of unconstitutional change of government by
ratifying four key documents. These are AU’s Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration, the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, and Ezulwini Framework for the
Implementation of Measures of The African Union in Situations of Unconstitutional Changes of
Government in Africa. Article 30 of AU’s Constitutive Act declares, “governments which shall
come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities
of the Union” (AU, 2000). In line with this, the Lomé Declaration identified four manifestations
of unconstitutional change of government as follows:


Military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government;



Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government;



Replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident
groups and rebel movements;
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The refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning
party after free, fair, and regular elections. (Sturman, 2011, p. 2)

The four indicators outlined in the Lomé Declaration transcend the traditional perception
of “unconstitutional change of government,” such as coup d’état, by identifying not only the
military but also mercenaries, rebel movements/groups, and incumbent parties which lost an
election as possible agents of unconstitutional change of government. Seven years later, Article
23 (5) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance added a fifth dimension
of unconstitutional change of government as “any amendment or revision of the constitution or
legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of
government” (AU, 2007a). If states reject AU-PSC’s diplomatic approach to reverse
unconstitutional change of government, Article 25 states that the PSC “shall suspend the said
State Party from the exercise of its right to participate in the activities of the Union in accordance
with the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitutive Act and 7(g) of the Protocol. The suspension
shall take effect immediately (AU, 2007a).
On March 2009, the PSC held a retreat summit in Ezulwini, Swaziland to establish a
Committee on Sanctions. The goal of this Committee is to “combat and prevent unconstitutional
changes of Government in Africa” (AU, 2009, p. 1). The outcome of this retreat resulted in the
Ezulwini Framework. This framework outlined ten principles guiding AU’s fight against
unconstitutional change of government (see Appendix E). The guiding principles make
uncompromising stand against unconstitutional change of government (AU, 2009, p. 1-2).
Beyond condemning the act, they hold the perpetrators accountable in the court of law. They also
ban them from participating in reelection or tampering with the process in any manner. The
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principles also emphasizes that the constitution drafting process should be people-centric and
should never be tampered by non-civilians.
Even though the principles outlined above are solid, the AU doesn’t strictly implement
them in each case. For example, when General El Sisi overthrew the Morsi government in Egypt
on July 2013, the PSC “decided to suspend the participation of Egypt in the AU’s activities until
the restoration of constitutional order” (AU, 2014, p. 1). As a result, Egypt was not invited to the
US-Africa Summit held on August 2013. Contrary to Ezulwini Framework banning coup
perpetrators from participating in elections, El-Sisi participated in national election and claimed
a 93 percent win (Dersso, 2014). Regardless, the AU dispatched election observer mission and
assessed the election process as fair (Gulhane, 2014). Eleven months after it imposed sanction,
the AU Chairperson admitted Egypt back to membership without providing formal justification.
The AUC Chairperson simply said, “we warmly welcome the delegation of Egypt, our dear
brothers and sisters, back home” (AU, 2014). The treatment of Egypt in this manner could set a
precedent for future transgressors of constitutional government.
As I have shown in the previous section, the AU was lax to act against the constitutional
crisis in Burundi on April 2015. According to Article 96 of the 2005 Burundian Constitution,
“the President of the Republic is elected by universal direct suffrage for a mandate of five years
renewable one time” (Burundi's Constitution , 2005, p. 18). Contrary to this law, President
Nkurunziza, who ruled the country since 2005, declared on April 2015 that he will run for a third
term (UNSC, 2015). This triggered popular protest which killed 100 Burundians, youth gang
violence which forced 40,000 to leave the country, and a series of successful and failed
assassination attempts against leading military and security figures (UNSC, 2015) (Vandeginste,
2015). While this was going on, the AU urged the President to postpone the election to July 2015
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(PSC, 2015b). However the AU did not pass a verdict on whether the President’s proposal to
extend his term was constitutional or not. Regardless, the election took place in July where the
incumbent President won. Meanwhile, violence continues in Burundi to date.
To summarize, the AU has made significant strides in making its conflict prevention
mechanisms effective. The organization has drawn lessons from its past experience and ratified
mediation strategy in 2014 and the Ezulwini Framework on implementing sanctions. At this
point, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of AU’s mediation strategy. However, there are
several cases that could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Ezulwini Framework. The
most recent case of Egypt and Burundi show that the AU doesn’t implement the framework
strictly. The AU transgressed the framework when it allowed governments that take/keep powers
in unconstitutional manner to participate in post-crises elections, win, and continue to participate
as AU member state. This will set a bad precedent for future perpetrators.
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Chapter Six
Depolitization of AU-CEWS Conflict Early Warning Indicators

This chapter examines whether AU-CEWS indicators are depoliticized to permit conflict
early response decisions. Technically, successful early response follows from a reliable and
effective early warning. Similarly, without early response, early warning remains a futile
exercise. To ensure early response by the decision-makers, early warning systems should be
designed to underpin decision-making processes. In other words, the early warning system needs
to be “built back to front” [where] the decision-makers are directly engaged in the early warning
system and it should be built as a satellite around specific conflict prevention mechanisms
(Austin, 2004, p. 149). In these circumstances a dilemma arises on the extent to which the bodies
issuing warning and those responding collaborate without compromising their independence
(Woocher, 2008; Wulf & Debiel, 2009). One way of securing this independence is to use wellestablished and transparent conflict early warning indicators, which are developed free from any
political influence (see Table 6.1). It enables experts to prepare early warning reports by
following technical procedures without dealing with political influences (African Union, 2008).
Accordingly, I will examine the third hypothesis, which is: Depoliticization of early warning
indicators at the AU-CEWS is a critical factor for triggering early response decisions.
In this chapter, I have assessed the degree of politicization of AU-CEWS indicators in
four sections. The first section examines how various actors participated in the development of
AU’s conflict early warning indicators with the goal of evaluating the degree of depoliticization
in that process. The second section identifies the AU-CEWS indicators as a product of the
process discussed in the first section. It will determine whether these indicators were developed
after a careful consideration of available literature, discussions, and documents relevant to
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preventing violent conflict in the continent, in other words, in a depoliticized fashion. It assumes
that indicators developed free of political influence from any particular actor(s) will serve as an
effective tool of conflict prevention.
The third part examines the perception of key respondents on the objectivity of the
indicators. This section explores how the experts, who prepare the early warning reports, as well
as decision-makers, who utilize the reports, perceive the early warning indicators. It will
specifically examine whether the respondents believe the early warning process is technical (i.e.,
immune from political manipulation) in nature.
The final section summarizes the key points on how the early warning indicators are
sufficiently depoliticized to permit early response decisions. The historical evolution of the early
warning department within the AU, the actual process of developing early warning indicators in
the AU-CEWS, and the perception of early warning experts and decision-makers will serve as
sufficient indicators to determine whether AU-CEWS’s early warning process is free form
manipulation (depoliticized).
Development of the AU-CEWS Indicators: Actors and Process
The initiative to develop conflict early warning in the African continent emerged after the
Cold War ended. During the Cold War, the main focus of the OAU was to manage inter-state
conflicts (Ibok, 2000; Salim, 2000). As soon as the Cold War ended, however, African countries
were mired in identity-based civil wars. Hence, in 1990 African Heads of State met and ratified
the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa. This Declaration
acknowledges the transition of conflict in Africa from interstate to intrastate (Hussien, 2010).
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In 1992, the Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim submitted a report
proposal to the Heads of State in Senegal, Dakar (Salim, 1992). The Cairo Declaration outlined
the major objectives of OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
(MCPMR) as follows:
The Mechanism will have as a primary objective, the anticipation and prevention of
conflicts. In circumstances where conflict have occurred, it will be its responsibility
to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions in order to facilitate the
resolution of these conflicts…Emphasis on anticipatory and preventive measures,
and concerted action in peace-making and peace-building will obviate the need to
resort to the complex and resource-demanding peacekeeping operations, which our
countries will find difficult to finance. (OAU, 1993, para. 15)
The OAU allocated six percent of its Peace Fund to the Central Organ of the MCPMR
(Ibok, 2000). Initially, the United States signed the African Conflict Resolution Act in late 1994
to offer technical and financial support to the MCPMR. Later on, however, the United States
suspended this support due to OAU’s alliance with Gadhafi whom the United States accused and
sanctioned for masterminding the Lockerbie Bombing in 1988 (Cilliers, 2008). In 1994, the
MCPMR established the Division for Conflict Management to execute the following
responsibilities:
a) Collect, collate, and disseminate information relating to current and potential
conflicts;
b) Prepare and present policy options to the Secretary general of the OAU;
c) Undertake or commission analysis and long-term research; and
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d) Support and manage political, civilian, and military observer missions, and coordinate regional training policies to support peacekeeping operations. (Cilliers,
2005, p.3)
The Central Organ arranged for conflict related issues to be discussed by member states
on a regular basis. This was done through monthly meetings at the ambassadorial level, biannual
meetings at the ministerial level, and annual meetings at the heads of state level (Ibok, 2000).
The Secretary General of the AU at that time, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, outlined the success of
the MCPMR as follows:
Since the adoption of the Mechanism in Cairo in 1993, the OAU has been deploying
military and political electoral observers as well as Special Representatives to many
conflict situations in Africa, including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(then Zaire), Comoros, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi,
Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia. In the case of electoral missions, the OAU
has officially observed over sixty electoral processes, and some of the countries
where those electoral processes have taken place are now on their third rounds of
holding elections. (Salim, 2009, p. 267)
Although the OAU was actively involved in preventing conflicts, it also suffered
setbacks. The OAU was unable to prevent the 1993-1994 mass killings in Rwanda and Burundi
(Williams, 2009). Furthermore, the MCPMR was “hindered by its lack of an operable
intelligence gathering and evaluation capacity…Without such a capacity the MCPMR lacks
empirical legitimacy and functional operability both of which are needed to enable OAU
decision-makers to make sound decisions and take decisive action” (Levitt, 2001, p. 170).
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In the late 1990s, sub regional organizations such as the ECOWAS and the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) played an active role in deescalating conflicts in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Lesotho, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Essuman-Johnson,
2009). The role of these sub regional organizations triggered two contradicting perspectives
regarding OAU’s relevance. “The first suggested that the OAU was still an important
organization, and called for it to be reformed by giving it new structures and resources. [In
contrast], the second viewed the OAU as a defunct and anachronistic institution that should be
closed down” (Williams, 2009, p. 605). Gaddafi of Libya championed the first option.
During the 32nd OAU Summit of OAU Heads of States, African leaders realized that
“future generations and history will judge [them] severely if, individually and collectively,...
[they] were to shy away all the time from…[their] responsibilities in the face of escalating armed
conflicts in Africa and at the same time lack the political will to respect cease-fire and peace
agreements” (OAU, 1996, p. 23). For the first time, African leaders recognized the need to
establish an early warning system at the Heads of State Level. They affirmed this interest in the
Yaounde Declaration of 1996 by stating:
We welcome the creation in June 1993 of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, and Resolution which is already contributing significantly
towards improving the Organization’s capacity to prevent conflicts and maintain
peace in Africa. We hail in advance the imminent institution within the said
Mechanism of our early warning system (EWS) on conflict situations in Africa,
convinced that its establishment should be able to further improve the action of the
Organization in the area of preventive diplomacy by making it possible, notably
through pre-emptive action in gathering and analyzing pertinent data, not only to
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establish the existence of a threat to the peace, but also to look for a quick way to
remove the threat. We exhort all potential data collectors to communicate same
information in time and provide the OAU Mechanism regularly with any at their
disposal on warning signs of imminent conflict. (OAU, 1996, p. 23-24)
The OAU held a seminar in Addis Ababa in 1998 which proposed an initiative to
establish an internet linked situation room at the OAU headquarter alongside focal points to send
information throughout the continent (Cilliers, 2005). The participants also discussed how they
could accommodate contributions from NGOs, academics, journalists, and other partners in the
information collection process. In 1999, OAU Heads of State met in Sirte, Libya, to transform
their organization to the AU (Adejo, 2001). During this time, African leaders raised a question
they ignored for more than three decades, namely, whether the OAU was capable of dealing with
a globalized world and secure Africa’s interests (Cilliers, 2005). The leaders reached a consensus
on the importance of reforming the OAU.
Gadhafi proposed to create a United States of Africa having a single defense force,
currency and leadership (Tieku, 2004). But other African leaders, especially Thabo Mbeki of
South Africa and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria opposed this proposal by stressing that the focus
should be reforming the multilateral organization, which already existed, namely, the OAU.
African leaders made a compromise between the two extreme proposals and agreed to craft the
AU Constitutive Act. Nigeria and South Africa played a leading role in preparing the
Constitutive Act based on international standards and the African reality (Tieku, 2004).
Ten years after the OAU established the MCPMR, the AU Heads of States ratified the
PSC Protocol on December 2003. “The PSC was not part of the AU Constitutive Act…Rather it
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grew out of ad hoc process to reform the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and
Resolution” (Williams, 2009, p. 604). Member states held three brainstorming retreats in 1998,
2002, and 2004 to discuss the formation of African PSC (Williams, 2009). The major countries
(Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and South Africa) pushed for a permanent membership within
the Security Council but faced strong resistance from other countries, most notably Tanzania
(Williams, 2009). Accordingly, the PSC membership is not limited to only few countries but,
rather, all African countries will have the chance to serve in a rotating bases (See Table 3.2).
On July 9, 2002, the debate and compromise made among AU’s member states resulted
“in the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council
of the African Union in Durban” and it was ratified on December 2003” (Williams, 2009, p.
607). This protocol was drafted with the assistance of UN Security Council staffers.
Accordingly, the CEWS was formed as per Article 12 of the Protocol “in order to facilitate the
anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (AU, 2002).
The CEWS, which is one of APSA important branches, was created amidst competing
political interests between Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa. In particular, the proposal to create
the PSC came from Nigeria. As Tieku (2005) noted, “Nigeria got what it wanted [from the ad
hoc meeting] because the amendment [to the Constitutive Act] contained a clause that made the
Peace and Security Council an organ of the AU” (p. 265). According to Tieku (2005), the
competing interests among major AU members could have created a stalemate in the short run.
But, in the long run, the AU could have taken advantage of this division to increase its influence.
Furthermore, Tieku (2005) wrote as follows:
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As the experience of the European Union suggests- the success of the EU is largely
attributed to the effective exploitation of a similar rivalry between leaders of
Germany, France, and Britain by EU officials…the competing interests could be
used to make the AU effective. This is because conflicting interests provide leeway
for the AU bureaucrats to exercise the decisive entrepreneurial leadership. (p. 265)
The origin of the AU-CEWS should be understood in the context of OAU’s
transformation to the AU. The unsatisfactory response of the OAU towards African crises in the
1990s and the changing environment following the end of Cold War created a consensus among
its member states on the need to reform the organization. However, the practical proposal to
reform the organization came forth from South Africa, Nigeria, and Libya. Their role in the
formulation of the constitutive act and the PSC protocol had its influence on the development of
CEWS.
To summarize, the OAU’s difficulty in resolving African conflicts in the 1990s, the
collaboration with UN Security Council advisers, and active membership of big and small
countries fused to create the PSC protocol. However, when it comes to preventing conflicts,
AU’s bureaucrats would have to persuade member states in making decisions. This poses
difficulties because, as Williams (2009) put it, “it is clear that the AU member states have kept
the commission in general and the PSC’s Secretariat in particular in an emaciated condition.
[Hence]…these bureaucrats are…unlikely to wield high levels of autonomous power in the
foreseeable future” (p. 617-618).
The Process and the Actors
CEWS is one of the branches of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Article 12(4) of the AU protocol on the establishment of the PSC underlines the importance of
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developing conflict early warning modules to predict violent conflicts (AU Protocol, 2004). In
2003 the AU Conflict Management Division organized multiple workshops on the development
of the CEWS and produced its implementation roadmap. Three years later the PSC requested the
AUC to expedite the operationalization of the CEWS (PSC, 2006). Accordingly, the AUC
organized two meetings to facilitate the operationalization of the CEWS. The first meeting was
held on 17-19 December 2006. In this meeting the participants identify the need to develop
conflict early warning indictors that are “tailor made to the needs” of end users namely the AUC
chairperson and the PSC (Africa Union, 2006). They agreed on the key steps of conflict early
warning development and communication that are:
(i) The collection of data, (ii) strategic analysis of the data collected, through an
appropriate indicators’ module, (iii) early warning reports and engagement with decisionmakers, and (iv) the coordination and collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms for
conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and other stakeholders on conflict
prevention and early warning in Africa. (AU, 2006, p.1)
The AUC chairperson presented the CEWS operationalization roadmap to member states
and the AU Executive council adopted it in 2007 (Engel & Porto, 2013). Many actors ranging
from civil society to government representatives have participated in the process of developing
the AU’s conflict early warning indicators. Many conflict early warning experts from RECs,
expert representatives of AU member states, academicians, UN and other international
organizations took part in the two initial meetings that formed the early stage of the early
warning indicator development process (AU, 2006b). The main actors of this process were from
AUC, who mandated to work on the operationalization of the CEWS by the AU Heads of State
and governments, and the PSC. In this meeting the attendants included conflict early warning
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experts from RECs, government representatives, and experts from AU member states. Moreover,
others who also participated include African researchers, the UN, and other nongovernmental
organizations also participated (AU, 2006b).
The AU-CEWS Indicators
The AU-CEWS handbook as well as the workshops conducted on developing AU early
warning systems showed that the AU derived its indicators in a depoliticized manner. These
documents reveal that the organization made an extensive review of the literature on conflict
prevention, interacted with various parties who offered indicators’ modules, and referred binding
legal documents at the global and continental levels to design its early warning modules
(Dokken, 2008; AU, 2004, 2006a, 2006b).
Article 12(4) of the PSC Protocol states that the African Union “shall develop an early
warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and
humanitarian indicators” (AU, 2004, p. 17). Initially, the AU was reluctant to adopt a template of
conflict warning indicators (Dokken, 2008). Dokken further stated that there were several offers
to the OAU and, later on, the AU, of multiple “technologically advanced [conflict] indicator
module systems, which…[it] rejected” (2008, p. 138). African government experts met at the AU
to review the challenges of operationalizing the early warning system in Africa: “making bold
claims towards a universal explanation for violent conflict, and, thus, a single list with a limited
number of indicators valid for all African countries” (AU, 2006a, p.4).
Gradually, however, the AU decided to design its own conflict early warning indicators.
These indicators were derived from universally accepted principles (such as the UN Charter) and
42 relevant documents ratified by African leaders since 1963 (see Appendix C) (AU, 2006b).
These documents do not identify conflict early warning indicators directly. However,
“they easily translate into such a framework [conflict prevention indicators] when they are
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interpreted ex negativo, i.e., when they are translated into a list of attitudes/behavior which the
African leaders disapprove of” (AU, 2006b, p. 5). After serious careful deliberations, the AU
identified 19 indicator baskets listed below and 73 indicator questions (R20) (See Table 6.1). For
instance, the agriculture indicator basket has six indicator statements listed below it. These are
the following:


Conflicts between groups using shared fisheries or forests was evident or
reported.



Competition over arable land, watering points, pastures or grazing land pastures
was evident or reported.



Conflict over appropriation or redistribution of agricultural land was evident or
reported.



Significant food insecurity was evident or reported.



Shortage of animal feed, seed, or, fertilizer, or price increase in the same
imposed hardships on farmers.



Cash crop prices remained stable on the international market.

Table 6. 1
AU- CEWS Conflict Early Warning Basket Indicators
Agriculture

Health

Demography

Human Rights

Economy

Infrastructure

Education

International Relations

Humanitarian Emergencies

Labor

Environment

Natural Resources
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Gender

Military

Governance

Peace Support

Politics

Society

Security
Source: Personal interview with AU-CEWS Experts
To summarize, the conflict indicators were designed in a manner that attempts to address
conflict in the continent. There are no indications of any African country that either attempted to
influence certain indicators from being included or excluded from the process and actors
involved. Also, the AU did not copy a blue print used by similar multilateral organizations. A
review of the AU-CEWS handbook, workshops and other literature show that the AUC
developed the early warning indicators with a clear goal of preventing conflict, not serving any
actors’ political interests. This allows the experts to utilize these indicators without any tacit
political influence when they develop early warning analysis reports.
Depoliticization of Data Gathering and Analysis
The CEWS has three mandates. These are “data collection and analysis; engagement with
decision-makers; and coordination with Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms
(RECs/RMs)” (AU, 2006, para. 2). This sub-section examines whether AU-CEWS work in
handling these tasks are depoliticized. The Situation Room of CEWS gathers conflict
information from open sources and its political liaison offices (AU, 2008) The UN situation
center and other external partners have assisted the AU’s situation room assistants to have the
capacity in collecting continental conflict information 24 hours a day (Williams, 2011). The
Situation Room utilizes six technological tools to gather information (see Table 6.2).
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Table 6. 2
CEWS Information Gathering Tools
Tools
Africa Media
Monitor:

An automated data-gathering software that facilitates the
collection of information from a large variety of sources [such
as BBC, EIU] in real time in various languages;

CEWS Portal:

A software used for information sharing with the RECs’ early
warning mechanisms;

Indicators and
Profiles Module

A database for the collection and appropriate management of
structural information baselines, to enable the development of
risk assessments;

Africa Reporter:

An analytical tool tailored to the CEWS indicators and
templates to facilitate the submission of incident and situation
reports from AU field missions and Liaison Offices;

Africa

A tool designed to forecast risk propensity or vulnerability

Prospectus:

with respect to structural influences and constraints;

Live-Mon:

A new software that performs an automatic geo-localization
of news items so that events can be displayed on a map.

Source: AU, 2015
Due to the technical nature of early warning data collection described above, some
interviewees stated that conflict early warning development process is depoliticized. For
instance, one respondent indicated, “the warning part is technical. And the response is a political
decision” (R7). Another respondent also noted that the experts’ “job is to develop early warning
[whereas]…the decision is political” (R20). Likewise, another respondent also indicated, “the
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PSC members, these are just politicians…[the experts’] duty is to support the PSC technically”
(R1). The use of open source data to develop an early warning and the appointment of experts to
analyze the data makes the AU-CEWS data gathering process free from political manipulation.
This suggests the early warning process is depoliticized to the extent that experts are able to
modify indicators based on the realities on the ground. As one respondent put it,
at the technical level, we have no problem. We can change it [the indicators] because
it is not written in stone. We can change our indicators and review them. But at the
decision-making level, they might say ‘you got it wrong’. (R6)
On the other hand the interaction among early warning experts and decision-makers is
not depoliticized. Williams (2011) noted that “CEWS personnel were unable to generate early
warning discussions within the PSC on the crisis surrounding the Kenyan elections in 2007 or
instability in Guinea Bissau in late 2008” (p.10). Williams further indicated “CEWS personnel
must…overcome the widespread anxiety among AU member states about the potential for
spying to occur under the guise of early warning” (2011, p. 9). Furthermore, Williams (2011)
stated that “some member states have actually requested the commission not to report on events
affecting them; in effect, asking the commission to ‘turn off’ the CEWS when embarrassing
situations arise” (p.9). These hurdles have been a source of discontent among AU’s leaders
(Williams, 2011). For example, in 2004, the Secretary General of the AU, Alpha Oumar Konare,
stressed on the need to depoliticize policy-making by saying,
it would be necessary for Member States to agree to surrender or delegate some of
their sovereignty in policy formulation and implementation to the African Union
Commission…If African leaders accept to transform the Commission into a
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Continental, Executive Body, that body will have the authority to issue regulations
and directives for Member States in a number of policy areas. (Konare, 2004)
Thabo Mbeki (2012) also expressed similar concerns years after Konare made this
statement. Mbeki indicated that the AU Constitutive Act is not sufficiently depoliticized by
emphasizing the limited role played by the Chairperson. Mbeki (2012) indicated that the
Chairperson of the AUC could only propose alternative policy options to African leaders. She/he
could neither select nor endorse policies pertaining to the continent. He wrote,
The very obvious fact, in terms of the Statutes of the AU, is that however potentially
powerful, the Chairperson of the AUC is merely the most senior civil servant of the
AU, which is, of course, important. However, this Chairperson cannot determine AU
and therefore African policy, as this is decided by the foreign ministers’ meeting as
the AU Executive Council and Heads of State and Government, meeting as the AU
Assembly. Of course, it is possible for the AU Commission, led by its Chairperson,
to present policy initiatives or interventions to the constitutional structures of the
AU, and thus to act as more than a mere administrative structure. (Mbeki, 2012, p.
14)
The fact that early response is not depoliticized makes the political will of Member States
a crucial factor for effective action. In 2012, the International Peace Institute(IPI) hosted a panel
discussion involving over forty participants (AU’s early warning experts, UN member states,
civil societies, and think tanks) by collaborating with the Permanent Missions of South Africa
and Azerbaijan (International Peace Institute, 2012). The seminar participants “underscored the
urgent need for relevant AU organs to strengthen the political will to act on early warning, not
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least by improving the implementation of continental and regional normative frameworks” (IPI,
2012, p. 4).
Objectivity or De-politicization of the EWI
The AUC developed the conflict early warning indicators along the political, economic,
social and environmental dimensions. Pursuant to Article 12(4) “the early warning system shall
develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic,
social, military and humanitarian indicators which shall be used to analyze development within
the continent and to recommend the best course of action”(PSC Protocol, 2003, italics mine).
The protocol under Article 12(2)(a) further requires the early warning information gathering and
analysis to be conducted based on “an appropriate early warning indicators module” (AU PSC
Protocol, 2003, italics mine). These provisions have guided the early warning indicators
development, data collection, and analysis. However, what is considered as “acceptable political,
economic…. early warning indicators” and “appropriate early warning module” are open to
interpretation.
Initial documents of the conflict early warning development show that the indicators are
developed based on commonly accepted norms and principles. Any violation or as Wane et al.
(2010) call it “ex- negative” of these norms and principles is used as a base for conflict early
warning indicators. These indictors could be open to political resistance if the country is not
accepting the early warnings as “credible”. However, political indicators particularly indicators
which might target the government in power directly are the most susceptible indicators for
either political resistance or manipulation. Thus, member states will be challenged to accept any
scrutiny that affects their power.

129

While this approach is useful, it limits the application of other indicators of potential
conflict, which are not considered as norms or principles by the member states. One of these
issues that are sources of potential violence is a lack of good governance and unlimited terms of
presidency. The conflict early warning on governance issues, such as changing the constitution
of the country, is considered an internal affair of a sovereign state. Changing the constitution,
particularly extending the presidency term (in cases such as Burundi, Burkina Faso) or
disagreement among top leaders of a country (e.g., South Sudan) in most cases are causes for
potential violence and in many instances not accepted by the society. The moves of the
incumbent government to change the constitution and the public reaction are seemingly good
indications of potential violent conflict. These indicators are either ignored or treated differently
because of the resistance from the member states. For instance, changing the constitution is
considered as an internal affair of the country and, hence, it could be considered as inappropriate
indicator of early warning.

In line with this, more than 60 percent of my interview respondents stated that early
warnings on governance issues are very difficult to bring to the attention of PSC members
because they are difficult to address. Cases such as the changes of presidency terms by the
leaders of Burkina Faso and Burundi in 2014, and other similar situations, were considered in the
early warning reports of the CEWS. However, the response was not easy because there was
resistance from the countries. One respondent from the PSD stated that the clause “appropriate
early warning indicator” in the PSC protocol is causing a problem to the AU-CEWS because,
“You can’t tell them there is going to be a coup” (R17).
OAU’s bureaucracy spearheaded the early warning mechanism in the OAU. No particular
country influenced this decision. The initial idea to develop an early warning institution within
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the African continent emerged because OAU’s bureaucrats perceived the changing nature of
conflict in Africa from interstate to intrastate mode after the Cold War. OAU’s Secretary General
at that time, Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, played an instrumental role in proposing the establishment
of the MCPMR in 1993.
The origin of the AU-CEWS was also a reaction to the failure of the MCPMR to prevent
the mass killing in Rwanda. This failure and the changes following the Cold War divided African
countries between those who wanted to liquidate the OAU and those who wanted to overhaul its
operations. Although the desire to transform the formation and structure of the OAU was
proposed early on, it was during this point that political forces entered in the process of
reforming the OAU. Major countries such as Nigeria, Libya, and South Africa competed in
reforming the OAU (Tieku, 2004). Libya proposed the transformation of OAU to AU, while
South Africa designed the Constitutive Act, and Nigeria contributed the idea of PSC to the AU
(Adogamhe, 2003).
However, the rivalry among the states mentioned above did not result in a zero sum
result. Instead, Libya’s idea to establish the AU, South Africa’s proposal to create the
Constitutive Act, and Nigeria’s initiative to formulate the AU PSC Protocol succeeded
simultaneously. Moreover, smaller countries such as Tanzania played an important role in
preventing the selection of permanent members within the PSC. Accordingly, there are no
designated permanent seats in the PSC.
Although strong African countries wished to promote their national interests in the
reformation process, the final product, in other words, the AU did not favor any particular
country. In fact, scholars such as Tieku (2004) indicated that the EU’s experience which
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witnessed the rivalry among strong states (Great Britain, France, and Germany) ended up
strengthening the clout of EU’s bureaucrats. The AU’s experience of developing early warning
indicators also reflects a similar trend.
The AU developed its own early warning indicators independently. It did not adopt early
warning module systems of other organizations such as the United Nations. Instead, the AU
made an extensive review of the literature on conflict prevention (see Appendix C). Even after
reviewing the literature, the AU did not endorse any particular paradigm. Rather, it concluded
that it was not possible to devise a blue print that would equally apply to all African countries.
Based on the above assertion, the AU held several workshops to develop its own tailormade conflict early warning indicators. These workshops derived early warning indicators by
referring binding documents ratified at the global (e.g., the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights) and continental (e.g., the Cairo Declaration) levels. The designers of these
indicators agreed it was possible to identify early warning indicators through negative
interpretation (ex-negativo) of these documents. For example, if a certain document declared it
was necessary to establish constitutional governance in African states, then attempts to abort
constitutional governance (e.g., coups) would serve as indicators of potential conflict. The final
outcomes of these deliberations were the 19 basket indicators and the 73 statement indicators
adopted to identify potential conflict in the continent. These indicators are comprehensive
enough to categorize the multiple sources of conflict in the continent.
This chapter also reviewed the perspective of early warning experts and early response
decision-makers towards the indicators. Some of the respondents believed that the early warning
indicators are depoliticized because conflict early warning development as a process is technical
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task. However, some decision-makers pointed out that some of the indicators were liable to
political manipulation. They argue that Article 12 (2) (a) of the AU PSC Protocol stating that AU
should gather information based on “appropriate early warning indicators’ module” makes it
difficult to determine what’s “appropriate” and what is not. As a result, some attempts to prevent
potential conflicts in countries such as Burundi were rejected by decision-makers as rumors until
it became too late.
To summarize, the AU has made a significant effort to depoliticize the early warning
indicators. The leaders of the organization have played critical initiatives to establish an early
warning mechanism since the OAU days. The major drivers of these developments were not
particular countries but rather the changing nature of conflict in the continent and the failure of
the organization to adapt to them. These drawbacks initiated countries such as Libya, Nigeria,
and South Africa to play a central role in reforming the OAU. However, the final product (i.e.,
the AU-CEWS) did not reflect the interests of particular countries. The whole process of
developing an early warning system in the continent was driven independently from the
participation of various groups such as African governments’ experts and AUC. With the
exception of some decision-makers who expressed concerns over Article 12 (2) (a) on the phrase
“appropriate”; other respondents expressed contentment over the technical (hence depoliticized)
nature of early warning indicators. Due to these, it is fair to conclude that the AU-CEWS 73
early warning indicators are developed free from any influence or manipulation from member
states, which could lead to fair early response decision. However, the process of developing early
warning and reporting it to the decision-makers might be constrained by member states political
interests such as state sovereignty.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusion
In this study I started by asking “when do conflict early warnings lead to early response
decisions in AU-CEWS?” This question is important because preventing conflict is more
efficient than managing it (Brown & Rosecrance, 1999; Chalmers, 2007; 2004). An effective
conflict prevention mechanism would have saved countless lives lost in mass atrocities witnessed
in the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Burundi from 1993- 2000, Somalia since 1991, Darfur, Sudan
since 2003, and other African countries (Abyebare, 2003; Bhavani & Backer, 2000; Coleman,
2015; Munya, 1999; Nweke, 1987;Straus, 2005; Vandeginste, 2015). Furthermore, between 2000
and 2013, the international community has expended around $900 million in Africa to manage
conflicts while preventing them would have reduced $900 cost by fivefold (Coning, 2013).
Pursuant to Article 7 (4) of the OAU Charter, African leaders recognized the need to
prevent conflict as early as the establishment of the OAU on May 25, 1963 when they
established the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. However, their primary
focus was interstate conflict. The proliferation of intrastate conflict after the Cold War called for
a new approach to conflict prevention. This led to the formation of the “Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution” (MCPMR) as per the 1993 Cairo Declaration.
Although the MCPMR observed more than sixty elections and mediated conflicts in 11
countries4 (Salim, 2009), it failed to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The failure to prevent
intrastate conflicts such as the genocide in Rwanda and the change in African countries politics
triggered a momentum to overhaul the OAU in 1999.

4

Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Comoros, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Malawi,
Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia
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In 1999, African Heads of State agreed to reform the OAU and establish the AU.
Subsequently, as discussed in Chapter One, the Heads of State ratified the AU Constitutive Act
in 2002 and the AU PSC Protocol in 2004. Article 12 of the PSC formally inaugurated the AUCEWS as a body involved in the anticipation and prevention of conflict. Following that, the AU
was actively involved in addressing the conceptual and empirical framework of the AU-CEWS
for five years. The AU-CEWS produced its formal roadmap in 2008 and became operational in
2009.
Several scholars have evaluated the performance of the AU-CEWS since it was
conceived in 2004 (Cilliers & Sturman, 2004; Nathan, 2007; Noyes & Yarwood, 2013; Vines,
2013;Williams, 2008, 2011). Although they identified certain loopholes such as a lack of
financing and trained personnel and preoccupation with resolution over prevention, these authors
also imparted valid recommendations such as removing bureaucratic bottlenecks and overcoming
political interests. Their studies have limitations, however. Most importantly, their studies did
not identify the reasons behind the problems, and did not apply available theoretical literature to
examine the existing problems. Furthermore, they did not conduct a systematic qualitative study
by gathering primary data from the early warning experts and early response decision-makers
working at the AU-CEWS directly. My study addresses this gap by exploring an array of
theoretical frameworks pertinent to early warning, interviewing 10 experts and 20 decisionmakers, and utilizing relevant primary and secondary sources (PSC communiqués, AUC Press
releases, memos, charters, and other documents) accessible to me.
In Chapter Two, I examined various theories relevant to conflict prevention from
multiple disciplines. Scholars in the intelligence studies (orthodox) such as Kent (1950) did not
believe that it was possible to predict conflict due to the involvement of multiple actors and
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erratic human nature, hence creating a complex and chaotic scenario. However, revisionists such
as Cohen (2012) held a strong belief in the power of scientific methods to predict conflict.
Swanstrom and Weissmann’s (2005) conflict life cycle model showed the important
contribution of identifying the stages of conflict and possible modes of intervention. It showed
that conflict prevention would be more effective when action was taken at an early stage (at least
when there was unstable peace) before it became an open conflict. The model showed the
importance of preserving the structural building blocks of a society (its political, economic, and
social dimensions) as foundations of a stable peace. If this structural prevention was not attended
in advance, the next stage was to prevent conflict through direct intervention.
Horowitz’s (2001) model also gave an important insight toward conflict prevention. He
identified the stage when an aggrieved party took time to deliberate a response to a provocative
incident, which he termed a “lull.” Conflict prevention should take place when the lull period is
long. Based on the length of the lull, top level (governments, diplomats, etc.), mid-level
(religious leaders, civic leaders, etc.), and local level (community elders, youth leaders, etc.)
actors should be involved in preventing conflict.
I also examined psychological theories such as social judgment theory and cognitive
dissonance theory. Proponents of social judgment theory argue that decision-makers approach a
given stimulus (e.g., early warning signals) with preconceived notions (O’Keefe, 1990). Hence,
they tend to accommodate the stimulus that supports their preconceived views while overlooking
the stimulus that stands contrary to their outlook. The manner in which they treat disagreeable
information is what psychologists call cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory argues
that people in general prefer to reduce cognitive dissonance (Feininger, 1962). Both of these
theories shed light on the critical role of presumptions in early response decision-making.
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The most comprehensive theoretical framework relevant to conflict early warning and
response that I reviewed in the literature included Meyer et al.’s (2010) persuasion model and
Post et al.’s (2010) political will. The persuasion model combines the contextual and actor
specific factors in the early warning-response nexus. It posits that an effective early response
depends on the quality of the early warning (skill, training, cogent report, bureaucratic flow), the
relationship between the warner and the warnee (hierarchy, level of interaction), and contextual
factors (other issues, political factors, past experience).
Meyer et al.’s (2010) persuasive model focuses on how and who develops the conflict
early warnings and how they communicate it to the decision-makers (warning recipient) in a
persuasive manner. This model stresses not only the quality of the conflict early warning but also
the information filtering mechanisms, the motivation to process the warning, and the relationship
between the warner (conflict early warning experts) and warnee (decision-makers). The
motivation of the decision-makers to utilize the early warning depends on factors such as their
ability to take political action and preexisting beliefs. The warning recipient’s (decision-makers)
role in making early response decisions depends on their and the institution’s political will.
Hence I also reviewed political will theories of decision-making.
Post et al.’s (2010) article on political will is the main theoretical framework I used to
assess the political will of decision-makers in the AU-CEWS. For decision-makers to decide on
conflict early warning, they have to have capability, commitment, and availability of commonly
perceived and effective policy options- “conflict early response options.” I also included
decision-making theories provided by Woocher (2008b). Woocher’s decision-making theory is
based on the works of Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) three decision-making models. These
models are rational-actor model (decision-makers select options that reduce cost and increase
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benefit), organizational behavior (the objectives, structure, norms, and standard operating
procedures determine the effectiveness of early response), and government politics model
(decisions are the outcomes of political bargaining among different actors promoting differing
interests within the established organizational code of conduct). The last model combines the
previous two because it acknowledges self-interest laid out in a rational model and standard
norms stressed in the organizational behavior model.
The theoretical framework and empirical literature I reviewed in this study stressed that
establishing an adaptive and learning organizational culture within the early warning-response
institution, securing a strong political will among the decision-makers, and designing
depoliticized early warning indicators are critical to prevent conflict. Based on these, I framed
three hypotheses and related independent variables which I identified, defined conceptually, and
operationalized, namely: organizational culture, political will, and depoliticization of early
warning indicators. I have adopted Sun’s (2008) definition of organizational culture which is
defined as “a set of deeply rooted values and beliefs that are shared by the personnel in an
organization” (p. 137). Political will is defined as “the extent of committed support among key
decision-makers of a particular policy solution to a particular problem” (Post et al., 2010, p.
659). Depoliticization of early warning indicators is defined as the extent to which AU-CEWS
conflict early warning indicators are developed free from political manipulation
I employed primary and secondary data to test my three hypotheses, which were the
following: 1) Early warning leads to early response decisions if the organizational culture in the
AU-CEWS encourages involvement (e.g., debate, learning, and regular interaction between the
experts and decision-makers and empowers decision-makers) and adapts to external challenges
(i.e., learns from failure); 2) Political will of the decision-makers affects early response; and 3)
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The conflict early warning indicators formulated by the AU-CEWS were developed in a
depoliticized manner to permit an effective early response.
In Chapter Three, I discussed my research methodology. I collected primary data from
thirty respondents through face-to-face semi-structured interviews which I organized using
NVivo software, by disseminating survey questions using Qualtrics software, and by reviewing
primary data (communiqués, press statements and reports of PSC and AUC) available in AU’s
online archive. I accessed the respondents using a targeted snowballing technique where one
respondent referred me to others who provided further information on the issues. While I
conducted face-to-face interviews with thirty out of 41 early warning experts and decisionmakers, I only managed to get a response from four out of the seventeen survey questionnaires I
distributed among the field and liaison officers. In addition to this, I also conducted a case study
on Burundi’s early warning mainly because the Burundi case was evolving when I conducted
this study and there was an early warning report to the PSC. I also reviewed several available
online primary products such as the AU-CEWS news highlights, the AU- PSC data archives, and
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Besides primary data, I also used secondary data
information from multiple scholarly articles and books as well as video documentaries on
African conflicts.
I used thematic analysis to analyze my interview data. This method was useful to identify
the main themes within the “early warning-early response” decision nexus as perceived by those
involved in the process. I also utilized decision-making tree techniques to assess how
information of early warning was issued and the role of decision-makers to utilize this
information. This included providing the information to PSC and how the PSC decided to utilize
the information. I also used a process tracking method to identify how and who made early
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warning-response tasks in a selected conflict case, Burundi, mainly because the Burundi’s case
was new during this study and there were early warnings issued by the CEWS. Along the whole
process, I adhered to the ethical standards of data collection and analysis procedures stipulated in
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) from which I obtained permission to conduct this study.
The first hypothesis proposed that conflict early warning leads to early response if there
is an organizational culture within the AU-CEWS that encourages involvement (debate, learning,
and regular interaction among warning experts and decision-makers, and empowers decisionmakers), and adapts to external challenges (i.e., learn from failure). My findings reveal that the
organizational culture of the AU-CEWS has not yet reached an optimal level in at least five
aspects while it shows strength in two indicators. These are further explained below.
There are several explanations behind the suboptimal organizational culture of the AUCEWS. The first reason has to do with the fact that AU-CEWS became operational only in 2009.
It takes time to consolidate a strong organizational culture in such a short frame of time. Second,
the AU-CEWS is understaffed, undertrained, and regularly rotated. The organization is working
towards developing a tailor made training program to train its experts. The outcome of this
program is therefore yet to be determined.
Thirdly, the collaboration of the AU-CEWS with the RECs has been encouraging
(although some RECs have not yet become operational) as they regularly interact and meet twice
a year. However, AU’s preference to delegate warning-response tasks to the RECs has
sometimes failed because these organizations are less equipped to handle certain kinds of
conflicts such as post-electoral violence as witnessed in Kenya’s 2007-2008 election.
Fourthly, the flow and quality of information within the AU-CEWS has been contentious
because the information (early warning) does not flow up to the top decision-makers, which in
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this case are the PSC. All decision-makers stated that they hardly get information about conflict
cases before it turns into violence but they get updates on already violent conflicts. Many
attribute this problem to incapacity of the conflict early warning experts to develop early warning
while others argue that the PSD’s way of presenting the early warnings is weak because they
don’t present the cases and the consequences openly. Representatives from the AU Commission
stated that the AUC briefs the PSC about the evolving issues and proceeds to conduct further
studies on the issues or use the AUC chairperson’s good offices to address the conflict. In the
meantime, the conflicts become violent.
Many African countries hardly meet the standard early warning indicators (especially
governance indicators). There is also a debate on whether the AU-CEWS ought to use
intelligence sources (already used by CISSA and ISA) as opposed to the open source it currently
utilizes. Although intelligence also uses open sources, their reports are considered as more
credible than conflict early warning reports. Furthermore, the fact that PSC lacks a standard
procedure to select the agenda of the month has made it vulnerable to strong African states and
external lobbyists who attempt to pressure the chair of the month to include/exclude their desired
agenda. Issues of conflict early warning like other issues need to be tabled for discussion upon
the approval of all the PSC members. This has its own effect on the probability of getting to the
attention of decision-makers on potentially violent conflicts because such conflicts might not
happen when the agenda of the month is set.
On the other hand, this study finds that the AU-CEWS has developed a strong
organizational culture in at least two indicators. AU-CEWS experts consult regularly while
preparing early warning reports. Regular consultation and interaction between the experts and
Situation Room assistants enables the system to develop open discussion and involvement of the
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parties (experts) when developing the early warning. Hence, it limits the communication barriers.
Besides conducting weekly meetings in person to identify major trends, they also utilize
technology to deliberate on issues without meeting in person. Second, decision-makers within
the AU-CEWS make decisions based on consensus. Despite having an option to determine issues
using a majority vote, they have never resorted to it so far, hence implying a strong cordial
culture. However, reaching a consensus might delay early response. On balance, therefore, the
AU-CEWS needs to build its organizational culture in at least five aspects namely involvement
between decision-makers with CEWS experts, timely information flow from the experts to
decision-makers. It has to keeping its two strongest attributes viz work relationship with RECs
and open debate when delivering early response decisions.
In Chapter Five I tested my second hypothesis, which states, “The commitment and
consensus among key AU-CEWS decision makers, (i.e., their political will) is a prerequisite for
early response decision.” I argued that in the AU-CEWS the capability of decision-makers as
well as their commitment to conflict prevention facilitated early warnings to translate into early
response decisions. The capability of decision-makers was based on clear legal authority and
organizational structure (hierarchy) that enabled effective decision-making. The study showed
that the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol were key legal frameworks that authorized
decision-makers to respond to conflicts.
The respondents identified three obstacles to early response pertaining to political will,
namely: taking longer time to effect swift early response; failure of member states to meet the
membership criteria to be PSC members (lack of good governance, insufficient role in
peacekeeping, failure to pay arrears to AU’s peace fund); resistance to early response in the
name of sovereignty and prioritization of national interest over continental interest.
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As shown in Chapter Five, commitment is another dimension of political will.
Accordingly, I examined the commitment of AU member states focusing on two indicators of
commitment. These indicators were incentives and disincentives of early response, and financial
contributions of member states. Decision-makers can decide on conflict early warning reports
when there is a mutual understanding on the potential violent conflict with the country listed in
the conflict early warning report. In most cases member states that have been reported to face
violent conflict refuse to accept the reality hence making early response decision difficult.
Countries that considered early response decisions from the PSC in line with their interests
requested the intervention from the PSC such as was the case of Comoros in 2007. On other
occasions when early response decisions of the PSC challenged the government in power, it
became a disincentive to the country, particularly to the government and the PSC to act because
it creates a challenge to force the country to obey its decisions. Thus, it limited the early response
decision-maker’s commitment to act. Many respondents agreed that AU needed to treat strong
and weak states equally.
The AU remains dependent on contributions of external donors and strong African states.
It is only in 2015 that it has laid out a concrete plan to secure financial independence. Most
recently, the AU has also made initiatives to establish a sanctions regime (in 2009) and
mediation strategy (in 2014) whose results remain too early to gauge. Several respondents
acknowledged that decision-makers tended to deliver quick responses over smaller countries
such as Comoros while facing challenges to respond to crises in bigger countries such as Sudan.
To some extent, military and economic power asymmetry has been assuaged by the mediating
role played by the Panel of the Wise.
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Financial independence has been another key aspect of gauging political will. Many
respondents pointed out that AU’s over-reliance on external funding to execute its plan has made
it vulnerable to external pressure. The majority of AU’s funding comes from external actors (the
U.S, Japan, and China) and five dominant African countries (Libya, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, and
South Africa). Libya is not any more dominant as it has reduced its contribution and has not paid
fully for the last three years. Since the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, African States aspire to be
financially independent to cover their activities in the AU. However, it was only in 2015 that the
AU crafted an ambitious plan to cover its expenses where member-states pay100 percent of its
administrative running cost, 75 percent of its program budget and 25 percent of its peacekeeping
expenditure until 2020. This plan is through new payment arrangements based on members’
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Member states can either pay from their state treasury or collect
taxes from ticket sales, hospitality services, and SMS messages. As an initiative, this is a strong
indicator of political will if implemented and could have tangible impact in the future. However,
the crises in major contributors such as Libya and Nigeria will likely delay the success of this
plan.
The AU has made significant progress in laying out a framework of conflict prevention
mechanism. The Ezulwini Framework on sanctions regime (ratified in 2009) and its mediation
strategy (ratified in 2014) serve as essential indicators. In this regard, the AU has succeeded in
reversing unconstitutional changes of government. Yet, some cases such as AU’s response to the
2014 crisis in Burundi and the 2011 crisis in Egypt show that it has not implemented the
sanctions regime strictly, while the effectiveness of its mediation strategy remains to be seen.
To conclude, there is lack of political will to decide on conflict early responses in the
AU-CEWS. This is because first, conflict early warning information does not reach the decision-
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makers and there are also reports on already violent conflicts which preoccupies the decisionmakers. Second, when decision-makers receive an early warning briefing, PSC representatives
want to secure their state sovereignty and national interests over the continental goals of the PSC.
Third, the hierarchal power of members of the PSC and their representatives (ambassadorial,
heads of state and minsters) impedes the power of decision-makers to decide on conflict early
warnings. And finally, high dependence on external donors to fund the agenda of peace and
security has made the PSC vulnerable to external pressure. On the other hand, some
improvement has manifested in recent strategies to gather financing, apply sanction regimes, and
implement mediation strategies. All of these initiatives are new. The most important aspect of
these initiatives is practical implementation whose results are too early to judge.
In Chapter Six, I examined the third hypothesis, which stipulated that, “Depoliticization
of early warning indicators at the AU-CEWS is a critical factor for triggering early response
decisions.” I tested this hypothesis by closely reviewing the process of early warning indicators
for the AU-CEWS, the role of the context, various actors, the process through which the
indicators were developed, and the perception of those who utilize those indicators.
The post-Cold War realities in Africa triggered the initiative to pursue the process of
setting up an early warning mechanism. OAU’s Secretary General, Salim Ahmed Salim,
recognized the proliferation of intrastate conflicts in Africa in the early 1990s. He submitted a
proposal to the Heads of States to ratify the formation of a conflict prevention mechanism
(MCPMR) in 1993. But the Rwanda genocide demonstrated the MCPMR’s ineffectiveness,
thereby calling for the need to reform the OAU. The lack of early response to prevent conflict,
among other reasons, invited South Africa, Nigeria, and Libya to pursue their national interests
in the formation of the AU Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol (which formed the AU-CEWS
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as per Article 12.4). But the competition among these countries brought resistance from smaller
countries such as Tanzania, thereby offsetting national interests. As a result, the AU-CEWS
Conflict Early Warning Indicators might to some degree be developed in a depoliticized manner
where conflict prevention became the earnest goal of the AU.
The process of developing the AU-CEWS warning indicators took five years (20042009). Despite offers of modules from external actors, the AU refused to adopt early warning
templates used by similar organizations. Instead, it identified over 49 documents,such as the
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), AU Constitutive Act (2000), and the PSC
Protocol (2002), ratified by African leaders to serve as its starting point of reference. The AUCEWS interpreted these documents ex-negativo (by stating their transgression was an early
warning indicator). In addition to reviewing these documents, the AU-CEWS also reviewed
available theoretical literature on conflict prevention. These internal efforts imply that the
indicators were depoliticized (i.e., immune from political manipulation by an internal or external
political actor). The final product thus became the nineteen basket indicators and seventy-three
question indicators used to identify preventable conflicts in Africa (see Appendix B).
The respondents interviewed in this study also affirmed that the early warning task was
mainly technical in nature. They stressed that experts utilize the indicators objectively. One
respondent mentioned that the clause that AU-CEWS should employ “appropriate indicators” as
stated in the PSC Protocol makes it vulnerable to subjective interpretation. However, this does
not mean that it promotes the interests of any particular country.
The goal of early warning indicators was, therefore, to prevent conflict in Africa. The
role of OAU/AU’s bureaucrats, the earnest effort they made to create a tailor-made (i.e., based
on Africa’s reality) process, and the testimony of respondents indicate that AU-CEWS indicators
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were developed in a depoliticized manner. As the chapter on political will indicated, political
interests surface more at the early response stage where national interests are strongest.
In conclusion, this study sought to answer the following question: “when do early
warnings lead to early response decisions in the AU-CEWS?” In order to address this question, it
identified three important independent variables and they are organizational culture, political
will, and depoliticization of early warning indicators. The AU-CEWS became operationalized
only in 2009. During this short period of time, it has made critical initiatives such as designing a
tailor-made training program to improve the skills of its experts, developing conflict mediation
strategies, and devising a plan to make the AU financially independent to strengthen political
will, and making sure that AU-CEWS indicators are developed based on AU’s documents to
prevent political manipulation by internal/external actors.
While it is essential to make sure these initiatives come to fruition, most respondents also
stressed that the AU-CEWS should increase its staff, improve the interaction between experts
and decision-makers, treat stronger and weaker nations equally, and take the early warning
indicators more seriously. Further study is also needed to follow up the results of the initiatives
such as the sanctions regime (2009), mediation strategy (2015), and alternative sources of
funding (2015) taken more recently.
Recommendation
The AU-CEWS has been in operation since 2009. Its main goal is to develop timely
conflict early warnings and inform decision-makers to take early response action. This early
warning and response nexus is what makes conflict early warning system a tool to prevent
conflict. In the absence of conflict early warning effective utilization conflict early warning
system fails to serve its main purpose. The AU-CEWS has showed some progress on areas such
as operationalizing the CEWS and staffing it, coordinating with RECs, and current initiative to
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receive conflict early warning briefing from the conflict early warning experts twice a year.
However, there are many areas where the AU-CEWS could improve to create the conflict early
warning and response nexus. I have identified these areas as follows.
First, conflict early warning information needs to flow directly to the PSC. The current
information (conflict early warning) flow is identified as one of the major problems of the AUCEWS. The experts collect the data from open sources and develop the conflict early warning
and communicate it with their department (PS) director. Then the PS Commissioner and Director
will decide on how to proceed with this information. Basically, they can update the early
warning report based on their source of information and communicate it to the AUC
Chairperson. Then they will decide either to inform the PSC or use their good offices to address
the potential violent conflict. This process is long and bureaucratic which needs to be rectified by
the AU.
Second, one of the reasons why conflict early warnings are not flowing to the PSC is lack
of structure in the early warning and response system. Many respondents stated that there is no
structure or procedure to bring conflict early warnings immediately when they are detected. The
conflict early warning issues included in other conflict agenda are considered in the regular
meeting of the PSC. Unless the information is on an already violent conflict, the AUC doesn’t
call for an emergency meeting. The African Union should develop a structure or modality where
they can bring the conflict early warning cases at the time they are detected. This structure could
be an ad hoc committee within the PSC that will take the responsibility to follow conflict early
warning cases and work closely with conflict early warning experts.
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Third, the PSC members argue they never had a chance to discuss potentially violent
conflicts because they did not get any early warning. On the other hand, representatives from the
PSD (both experts and decision-makers) argue they develop conflict early warnings and ‘brief’
the PSC. Some of the PSC members also agree that they get some briefings. However, they don’t
consider them as conflict early warning because, as they stated, the AUC presents it only to
inform them not to take action. Scholars such as Meyer et al. (2010) indicated that for a conflict
early warning to get the attention of the decision-makers the early warning should be presented
persuasively. Hence, when the AUC presents or briefs the PSC they have to convey the conflict
early warning in a way that captures sufficient interest and trigger the necessity for urgent action
– which is an early response decision.
Fourth, the PSC should trust the conflict early warning process. Many PSC members
don’t consider conflict early warning ‘briefing’ as an early warning because CEWS uses open
sources to develop conflict early warning. They consider the use of open source mainly
mainstream media outlets as not credible enough to show the realities of the member states. They
value the briefings they receive from the intelligence organ, the CISSA, as a more reliable early
warning without noting that intelligence work is also based on open sources alongside
intelligence information. Thus it would be beneficial for the AU’s conflict prevention to build
the capacity of CEWS for soliciting sources by assigning trained field officers to collect data for
the CEWS in all member states. The decision-makers also need to develop the required trust on
the utilization of open sources. This includes the willingness of member states to provide
credible information that could make the conflict early warning reports substantial. The best way
forward is to strengthen existing relations between the AU-CEWS, the CISSA, and the ISC by
formally setting the standard of collaboration between.
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Respondents also criticized how conflict early warning is utilized. There is the unequal
treatment manifested in the lack of the willingness by members to bring up conflict early
warning cases on the more powerful African countries while less powerful countries have often
been scrutinized and even faced intervention by the PSC. Countries that are considered to face
potential conflict are rarely in the agenda of the PSC. There has to be a legal mechanism that lays
out a level playing field for all member states regardless of their internal strength or external
influence. This creates active engagement of PSC member states in voicing their issues when
they deal with issues of potential violent conflict.
The PSC can be effective in addressing potential violent conflicts if there is a formal
criterion for selecting the monthly agenda and limit the current PSC member states or others
from refusing to be in the agenda of conflict early warning. Many of the respondents noted the
AU member states don’t want their countries to be discussed in the PSC. Sovereignty and
national interest are the main pretexts states raise to bail out their country from being on a
conflict warning agenda at the PSC table. Thus a strict agenda setting that allows the flow of
conflict early warning information could solve the problem.
The PSC holds its meetings at three levels and these are Heads of States, Ministerial and
Ambassadors. Ambassadors meet on a regular basis and their countries assign them. Being the
representatives of their country, ambassadors have a duty to secure the interest of their country in
the PSC decision-making. Ambassadors often find it difficult to choose between continental and
national interest in conflict that includes their countries. In order to rectify this dilemma, the AU
needs to develop a mechanism where the people who represent the member states have
responsibility to the values and principles of the continent above national interest.
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Limitations and Suggestions for Further Study
This study did not benefit from the input and perspectives of members of the Panel of the
Wise (PoW) because they don’t have a fixed office at the AU headquarter. Their input could
have significantly strengthened this study.
Also, I did not have the chance to access all the PSC members because they were
engaged in addressing already violent conflicts at the time. Besides getting access to some of the
PSC decision makers was not easy. It was also very tough to bring cases of conflict that
happened into the discussion because memories fade. Instead I focused on the ongoing cases
such as Burundi and Burkina Faso.
Many studies indicate the cost effectiveness of conflict prevention than conflict
management and post conflict reconstruction (Brown & Rosecrance, 1999; Chalmers, 2007;
2004). However, there are many conflicts new or old that became violent in Africa. The absence
of an effective conflict early warning system could be one of the reasons why there are violent
conflicts in Africa. Studies indicate that an early warning system could be effective if it is linked
to a decision- making organ like the case in AU-CEWS. As I have shown in this study, linking
the early warning with the responding organ tends to hinder effectiveness of the system because
of many factors ranging from organizational culture to lack of political will from the decisionmakers to act. On the other hand it is impossible to assume a separation between the warning and
responding bodies could bring a change on responding to conflicts early. However, maintaining
the balance between these two extremes is important. Thus, a future study on how to balance the
power disparity between decision-makers and early warning experts can explain better the
warning response nexus effectiveness.
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According to Article 12(3) of the PSC Protocol the AUC shall collaborate with “ United
Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic
institutions…and NGOs to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early warning system”
(PSD, 2006, p. 1). Accordingly, the participation of civil societies in the early warning
formulation was one of the goals the AUC had when operationalizing the AU-CEWS. Hence, a
further study whether there is collaboration with CSOs and their role in conflict prevention might
be helpful to understand citizen’s participation.
Moreover, the AU-PSC has rendered 456 decisions between 2004 to June 2015. While
most of these cases have been on already violent conflicts there were also some cases on early
stage of the violence. The intervention of the PSC ranges from sending mediators to deploying
peacekeepers. A further study on the type of intervention the PSC took might give an insight on
the capability and role of the PSC in conflict prevention.
Implications for AU -Conflict Early Warning Systems
The AUC is engaged in discreet conflict prevention missions in many of the conflicts
before they become violent. Some of these cases are Burundi and Burkina Faso in 2014. Many
attest that such discreet peace negotiation missions are effective in addressing the potential
violence. However, there is no empirical evidence on such claims. Future research is needed to
explore in more detail the effect of AU’s discreet preventive diplomacy on preventing conflicts
in Africa.
The results of this study supported argument that political will and the organizational
culture of AU-CEWS affect early response. Political will is expressed in terms of presence of
key decision-makers, commitment (both financially and incentive and disincentive of early
response decision) and presence of commonly perceived conflict response options. Lack of

152

political will limits the decision maker’s (namely PSC) ability to decide on conflict early
warnings. One of the reasons is member states’ focus on their national interest over their
responsibility from the continental organization. Besides national interest, not providing funding
to the peace and security programs from the member states themselves indicates lack of political
willingness. Conflict early warning system needs an organ with the power and capacity to
implement its early response actions. While identifying these challenges has been easy from the
interviews, tracing the process and link of conflict early warning becomes difficult on cases that
did not become violent. First, successful cases are not documented and there is also a challenge
to proof whether or not the de-escalation was due to early response decision of the AU.
The AU employs negotiation, mediation, suspension and sanction techniques to prevent
violent conflicts. It has also engaged in preventive strategies such as sending special envoys and
discreet missions to countries before conflicts turn violent. The effectiveness of these methods of
preventive diplomacy is not documented and researched. Further study on this aspect could
unravel the potential and drawbacks of conflict prevention theory and conflict early warning/
response systems.
Conflict early warning system is a tool designed to prevent violent conflict. This tool
could work only when it is understood nuances under which the system operates in. Some of
these nuances include the interaction between the conflict early warning developing and the
decision-maker’s organs. This includes the conflict early warning information communication
channel, and the priorities of the decision-makers when they deal with the conflict early warning
information. My study has examined these nuances using the AU-CEWS. Applying to other
continental early warning systems such as the EU can further expand this study and its results to
build a concrete conflict prevention theory that explain the context.
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Who Might Benefit from This Study
I have identified various theories and literatures that are pertinent in the field of conflict
prevention and decision-making. My study applied theories that are believed to have effect on
early warning response by taking the AU-CEWS. Thus, both practitioners and intellectuals on
the field of conflict prevention can benefit from this study mainly:


African Union, RECs, the UN



Other continental organizations such as EU



Researchers and students of conflict prevention and management
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Appendix A
AU Field Missions and Liaison offices
Field Mission Location
Burundi
Chad
Central African Republic
Comoros
Cote D’Ivoire
Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC)
Guinea Bissau
Liberia
Sudan
South Sudan
Western Sahara
Algiers
Kenya
Somalia
Libya
Madagascar

Opening
Soon
Opening
Soon
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Appendix B
CEWS Early Warning Indicators Basket
CEWS Top Level Baskets
Labour
Natural Resources

Agriculture
Demography

Military

Economy

Peace Support

Education

Politics

Humanitarian Emergencies

Health

Environment

Human Rights

Gender

Infrastructure

Governance

International Relations

Health
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Appendix C
CEWS Initial Conflict Early Warning Indicator Sources

Objectives
Prevention and
reduction of intraand inter-state
conflicts

Documents adopted by the
OAU and the AU
 Cairo Declaration on the
Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management
and Resolution AHG/ Decl.
3 (XXIX), 1993
 Tunis Declaration on Code
of Conduct for InterAfrican Relations, 1994
 OAU Convention on the
Prevention and Combating
of Terrorism, 1994
 Yaoundé Declaration on
Drug Control, Abuse and
Illicit Drug Trafficking in
Africa, 1996
 African Nuclear Weapon
Free Zone Treaty, 1996
 Constitutive Act of the
African Union, 2000
 NEPAD Framework
Document, 2 2001
 Declaration on the
Framework for an OAU
Response to
Unconstitutional Changes
of Government, 2000
 Memorandum of
Understanding on the
Conference on Security,
Stability, Development and
Cooperation in Africa
(CSSDCA),
OAU/CivilSociety.3 (II),
Annex, 2002
 Decision on the CSSDCA,
AHG/Dec. 175
(XXXVIII), 2002
 AU Plan of Action on the
Prevention and Combating

Generic early warning
Indicators
 Horizontal (intra-state) or
Vertical (inter-state)
escalation of violent
conflict
 Increase in human rights
violations in a polity
 Secessionist agendas
 Proliferation of small
arms and light weapons
 Armed insurrections
 Territorial disputes
 Border conflict
 Cross-border movements
of small arms and light
weapons
 Border skirmishes
 Occasional or regular
cross-border raids
 Preparation of an
insurgency from a
neighboring country
 Expulsion of identity
groups
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of Terrorism, 2002
 Durban Declaration on the
Control of Illicit Drug
Trafficking and Abuse,
2002
 Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for
the African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2003
 Solemn Declaration on a
Common African Defense
and Security Policy, 2004
 The African Union Non
Aggression and Common
Defense Pact, 2005
Constitutional

democracy, including
periodic political
competition and

opportunity for
choice, the rule of law,
citizen rights and
supremacy of the
Constitution

• African (Banjul)
Charter






African (Banjul) Charter
on Human and Peoples’
Rights, 1981
Declaration on the
Framework for an OAU
Response to
Unconstitutional Changes
of Government, 2000
Coup d’Etats in Africa,
AHG/Dec. 142 (XXXV),
2000
Constitutive Act of the
African Union, 2000
NEPAD Framework
Document, 2001
OAU Declaration on the
Principles Governing
Democratic Elections in
Africa, AHG/Decl.1
(XXXVIII), 2002
NEPAD Declaration on
Democracy, Political,
Economic and Corporate
Governance AHG/235
(XXXVIII), Annex I, 2002
Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for
the African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2003








Gross human rights violations
by state or non-state actors
Coup d’etats
Suspension of a constitution
Limitation of constitutional
rights
Cancellation or rigging of
elections
Public or private hate talk in or
by the media
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Promotion and
 African Charter on Human
protection of
and Peoples’ Rights, 1981
economic, social and  African Charter of Popular
cultural rights, civil
Participation in
and political rights as
Development, 1990
enshrined in African  Resolution on the African
and international
Commission on Human and
human rights
Peoples’ Rights,
instruments
AHG/Res.230 (XXX), 1994
 Constitutive Act of the
African Union, 2000
 NEPAD Framework
Document, 2001
 Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for
the African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2003
Uphold the separation  Constitutive Act of the
of powers, including
African Union, 2000
the protection of the  NEPAD Framework
independence of the
Document 2001
judiciary and of an
 Solemn Declaration on a
effective legislature
Common African Defense
and Security Policy, 2004
 Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for
the African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2003
Ensure accountable,
efficient and effective
public office holders
and civil servants






Fighting corruption in 
the political sphere


NEPAD Framework
Document, 2001
African Convention on
Preventing and Combating
Corruption, 2003
Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for
the African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2003
Solemn Declaration on a
Common African Defense
and Security Policy, 2004
NEPAD Framework
Document, 2001
African Convention on
Preventing and

 Restrictions of individual or
collective economic, social and
cultural rights by the state or
non-state actors
 Policies of economic, social and
cultural exclusion
 Gross human rights violations



Major changes of the
ecological balance
Environmental stress (e.g.
through natural disaster or
climate change)

 Violations of the separation of
powers
 Passing over the judiciary
 Intruding into parliament’s right

 Active steps to prevent
accountability
 Widespread corruption in the
public service




Widespread corruption among
the political class
Misappropriation of funds
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Promotion and
protection of
the rights of women








Promotion and
protection of the
rights of children
and young persons







Combating Corruption,
2003
Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for
the African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2003
Solemn Declaration on a
Common African Defense
and Security Policy, 2004
African Charter on
Human and Peoples’
Rights, 1981
Protocol to the African
Charter on Human ad
Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women in
Africa, 1995
Decision on the 15th
Annual Activity Report of
the African Commission
on Human Rights and
Peoples’ Rights,
AHG/Dec. 171
(XXXVIII), 2002
Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for
the African Peer Review
Mechanism, 2003
African Charter on
Human and Peoples’
Rights, 1981
African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of
the Child, 1990
Decision on the 15th
Annual Activity Report
of the African
Commission on Human
Rights and Peoples’
Rights, AHG/Dec. 171
(XXXVIII), 2002
Decision on the Report
of the African
Committee on the Rights
and Welfare of the Chid,



Violations of women’s
rights



Violations of children’s
and young person’s rights
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Promotion and
protection of the
rights of vulnerable
groups including
internally displaced
persons and refugees








AHG/Dec. 172
(XXXVIII), 2002,
Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators
for the African Peer
Review Mechanism,
2003
Convention Governing
Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in
Africa, 1969
African Charter on
Human and Peoples’
Rights, 1981
Decision on the 15th
Annual Activity Report of
the African Commission
on Human Rights and
Peoples’ Rights,
AHG/Dec. 171
(XXXVIII), 2002
Objectives, Standards,
Criteria and Indicators for
the African Peer Review
mechanism, 2003




Violations of the rights of
IDPs and refugees
forced displacement (IDPs
and refugees)
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Appendix D

AU Mediation Operating Procedures

1.

Appointing and hiring process for lead mediator (decision to deploy a mediator,
mediation roster, mandate and contract with mediator);

2.

Creating an AU mediation team (expertise and capacity; core team members; resource
persons);

3.

Pre-deployment briefing for the mediator;

4.

Designing the mediation strategy (a key component focusing on mediation strategy and
operational plans;

5.

The use of international contact groups;

6.

Funding support for mediation;

7.

Reviewing and evaluating progress made during a mediation process;

8.

End of assignment debriefing; and finally,

9.

Evaluation of finalized AU mediations. (Chergui, 2015, p. 3)
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Appendix E
Ezulwini Framework: Ten Principles on Unconstitutional Change of Government

1.

Coups d’état are illegal and totally unacceptable;

2.

The African Court of Justice and Human Rights should be given the necessary
competence to try perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government;

3.

Perpetrators of coups d’état shall be liable for prosecution before the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights;

4.

Perpetrators of coups d’état shall not stand for elections conducted for return to
constitutional order;

5.

Perpetrators of coups d’état shall not constitute obstacles by negatively influencing
the conduct of a transition towards the return to constitutional order;

6.

Constitutions shall not be manipulated in order to hold on to power against the will of
the people;

7.

Constitution-making or constitutional review processes shall not be driven by
personal interests and efforts aimed at undermining popular aspirations;

8.

Military/security forces shall not interfere in the transition towards the return to
constitutional order;

9.

Fostering of conditions conducive for a return to constitutional order;

10.

Sanctions shall apply in a graduated manner from the moment that an unconstitutional
change of government takes place. (AU, 2009, p. 1-2)
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Appendix F

1.

AU Mediation Principles
The parties must own the agreement

2.

Mediation and negotiations should be inclusive of all significant political actors

3.

Civil society must be involved in the mediation and negotiations

4.

The mediator(s) must help the parties develop a relationship of trust and cooperation

5.

Mediation must be a non-threatening venture for the parties

6.

Mediators must be impartial

7.

There is no quick-fix solution in deep-rooted conflict

8.

Mediators must help the parties address the root causes of the conflict

9.

Mediators must be flexible, creative, responsive and adaptive

10.

The drafting and implementation of peace agreements should be properly linked

11.

The process must address the regional dimensions of national conflicts

12.

There is a need for systematic and rigorous approaches to mediation processes. (AU,
2014, pp. 15-16)

175

